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**ACTIVITIES OF THE SLUZHBY BEZPEKY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS: MYTHS AND REALITY**

**(Діяльність служби безпеки Організації українських націоналістів:
міфи та реальність)**

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INTRODUCTION

Actuality of the theme. There are many myths surrounding the OUN-UPA, and in particular, the “Sluzhba Bezpeky”, both among Ukrainians and among Ukraine's neighbors. The activities of the OUN Security Service are often used to propagate and dehumanize insurgent movements on the territory of Ukraine. This research will rely solely on facts, which will allow an objective assessment of the activities of this secret service. This adds relevance to the work, for as an objective assessment, it can contribute to a constructive discussion both among Ukrainians and at the global level.

As of today, the information that confirms or refutes the myths related to the activities of the OUN Security Council is poorly structured and needs to be cataloged. In addition, it is important to restructure the international discourse on the role of the OUN-UPA in general, as well as the OUN Security Council in particular in certain events and phenomena that took place during the 20th century. The fight against such myths is an important step in reviving the discourse on the role of the Ukrainian nationalist organization in the 20th century, as well as the Second World War. In addition, this work also aims to actualize this discourse by revealing the activities of the little-discussed body of the entire organization, namely the Security Service of the OUN.

Dissecting controversial topics, such as the activities of the SB, is vital, for such historical topics are very important for modern national identity and the representation and protection of the interests of Ukrainians in the international arena.

The **aim** of this research is to examine the

In order to fully fulfill the **purpose** of this study, the following **tasks** will be identified in the course of work:

- Study of the context of the XX century Ukraine to understand the circumstances as to why the CB was formed
- Analysis of the features of the structure and ideological principles of the SB
- Assessment of the activity of the mentioned structure and its political role in the contemporary Ukrainian context

- Consideration of the relations and ideological differences between the NKVD and the CB for a full understanding of the plan of their activities

Thus, the above tasks form the main part of the work and are the way to achieve the research goal.

The **subject** of this research is the functions, goals, and methods of the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The **object** of this research is to study the work and activities of the Security Service of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The **chronological boundaries** of this essay are from 1939 until the 1950s.

The **geographical boundaries** of this essay are limited to the western territories of Ukraine (ZUZ).

The **theoretical approaches and methods** in this research include synthesis and analysis, descriptive method, and elements of discourse analysis.

The **primary sources** used during this research were composed of various instructions and regulations distributed by the Sluzhba Bezpeky OUN.

The **historiography** of this research included Jeffrey Burds' "Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948", "General Mykola Arsenych: Life and activities" and "Activities of SB OUN in Volyn". These three works, two of which are in Ukrainian and one in English, contribute exclusive details to understanding the SB. Jefferey Burd's reveals the women's perspective in the underground, with special focus on the SB. O. Ischuk and V. Ohorodnik delve into the activities of the SB and reveal the story of one of SB's leaders, permitting a look at the SB from the inside of the organization. Yaroslav Antonyuk's book about Volyn covers many of the myths discussed in the research based on the territories of the Volyn region.

The **structure** of this research begins by defining the "Sluzhby Bezpeky", explaining how it came to be, understanding what ways it functioned and what its structure was. The research begins with theory, and ends with the practice of the SB, comparing the two to understand the Ukrainian service in an objective way. The essay heads with an introduction, is followed by two chapters, each made up of three units, and a final conclusion. The last four pages of the essay are made of a list of

primary sources and literature used to complete this research. The total page number of the work: 53 pages.

CHAPTER I

FORMATION, TASKS, ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONING OF SB OUN

1.1 Creation of a Special Service

During the interwar period of the twentieth century, Ukraine found itself a divided country: physically, mentally, politically. While drawing new borders was a difficult and tedious task fought over by Ukrainians, Soviets, Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Romanians, altering the mentality and loyalty of the Ukrainian people was even more arduous. Like today, of course there were people belonging to different groups including but not limited to Ukrainian nationalists, those honoring Polish rule and Soviet stalwarts. However, excessive amounts of intervening, constriction and mistreatment of both Ukrainian people and their lands induced a reaction of revolution. Foreign oppression in Ukraine gave rise to institutes such as the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), the Ukrainian insurgent army (UPA), and, during the Second World War, the Organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN). Certain organizations had subdivisions, such as OUN, who later formed their own Secret Services, Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB OUN). The story of the SB, how it was formed, structured, and functioned will allow a better understanding of not only the Secret Services and OUN as a whole but will further explore the fight for a sovereign Ukraine, the story of its people, and will give grounds for understanding the simple yet complex nature of human beings.

Before analyzing the history of the SB OUN, it is critical to understand OUN: its genesis, what it stood for, what its goals were. The formation of OUN began earlier than the Second World War, for it came to being in 1929 during the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, lasting from January 27 to February 3.¹ OUN was an underground organization formulated by Ukrainian emigres who aspired to gain independence for Ukraine, for during the time of its creation, Ukraine was divided

¹ “Створення ОУН.” *Освіта.UA*, 6 July 2009, osvita.ua/vnz/reports/history/4691/.

between the USSR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.² Ukrainian independence was the organization's main objective, and their key method for doing so was armed struggle against their oppressors.³ Physical battle was inevitable in triumphing liberation and was an essential factor of the organization. Members were educated to know about different weapons, studied pyrotechnics and learned about field defense. Though the leaders of OUN understood that in order to truly be victorious, they must not be only physically equipped to fight. Therefore, training was part theoretical. Members were to study the organization of the army, understand the terrain of their lands and learn about aviation; included in the tutelage were even some courses meant to teach members about military cartography. Military literature was to be read and understood, and practical training was to be complete – only then could a member take and pass the required exams to join the lines of OUN.⁴

Psychology and behavior were also taught, and members were morally prepared for possible troubles that they may encounter. As an underground organization, leaders knew to prepare their members for the worst-case scenario. Getting caught as a member of OUN was life threatening and so it was imperative for members to know how to behave if faced with the enemy police or how to act in court. Members were also taught the rules of conspiracy, studied investigation techniques, learned how to resist confidants (secret agents of the police) and other provocations.⁵ Therefore, even if OUN's main tactic of fighting was physical, moral, and psychological preparation was obligatory to defeat their enemy, for the enemy also used a dangerous combination of these three factors in their warfare.

In 1940, OUN divided into two groups: OUN (B) – those who supported and were led by Stepan Bandera, and OUN (M) – supporters and followers of Andriy Melnyk. While both of these groups shared the goal of creating an independent Ukraine, their methods differed somewhat. While OUN (B) is considered to be more radical in their

² "Між Світовими Війнами (1919–1939)." *Територія Терору*, www.territoryterror.org.ua/uk/history/1919-1939/details/.

³ "OUN (ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS) - Glossary." *Dissident Movement in Ukraine*, Віртуальний Музей, 21 Nov. 2006, museum.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1164113212.

⁴ Посівнич, Микола. "Формування військової доктрини ОУН (1929-1930)." *Український визвольний рух* (2003). PDF. – Pg.-4.

⁵ Refer to footnote 4., –Pg.-5.

ways of combat, OUN (M) reflects more moderate ways of achieving their goal.⁶ Knowing that the organization split is important when studying SB OUN, for it was a part of OUN (B).⁷

When examining the need for a Secret Services of OUN, a set of instructions designated for the regional leaders of OUN vindicates the necessity of such a police. The instructions, published circa 1939, claim that: “When we want to fight against such a strong and trained police apparatus as the NKVD, we must create a similar apparatus. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately begin to strengthen the apparatus of the Security Council, to select the best and most capable people, train them accordingly and send them to work.”⁸ Essentially, the need for the Sluzhba Bezpeky was supported by the existence of a Soviet Secret Police. In order to prevail in the fight against the Bolsheviks and their powerful police institutions, Ukrainians had to fight, think, and act like them.

The establishment of OUN’s Secret Services began in February 1939 in the western lands of Ukraine with its first leader being Bohdan Rybchuk. Under the initiation of Myroslav Turash, SB was built on the basis of the National Executive of the OUN (KE OUN), meaning that the workers of this department undertook the task of initiating the work of the Secret Services.⁹ KE OUN was created in 1929 in order to lead the campaign for the creation of the Ukrainian state on the western Ukrainian lands – at that time, a part of Poland.¹⁰ The creation of SB OUN was part of the process of state building: preparing for the independence of Ukraine in the event of the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹¹ Without the organization of a Special Services, the building of a free Ukraine was rather fictitious.

Though the existence of the SB was critical and urgent, its development was delayed. On March 20, 1939, the Polish police arrested a large number of members of

⁶ “OUN (ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS) - Glossary.” *Dissident Movement in Ukraine*.

⁷ *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult*, by Rossoliński-Liebe Grzegorz, Ibidem-Verlag, 2014, p. 190.

⁸ “Надрайонным Проводникам Для Исполнения (Переклад) (Інструкція).” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/12117?locale=ua.

⁹ Іщук, Олександр, and Валерій Огороднік. *Генерал Микола Арсенич: Життя Та Діяльність Шефа СБ ОУН*. Vydavnycho-Polihrafichne t-Vo "Vik", 2010.–Pg.51.

¹⁰ Мірчук, Петро. *Нарис Історії ОУН*. Vol. 1, Мюнхен – Лондон – Нью-Йорк: Українське Видавництво, 1968.

¹¹ Іщук, Олександр, and Валерій Огороднік. *Генерал Микола Арсенич: Життя Та Діяльність Шефа СБ ОУН*. – Pg.50.

the Ukrainian Students' Congress. An extended number of these students belonged to KE OUN, and so the high-profile lawsuit that followed the arrest and resulted with the sentencing to prison impeded the evolution of Ukrainian counterintelligence and Secret Services. Due to these circumstances, the blossoming of SB OUN was delayed until September of 1939.¹² It was during this period that OUN split into two: OUN (B) and OUN (M). Unlike Melnyk, Bandera's wing focused on conquering the fundamentals of intelligence, as well as counterintelligence. In 1939, after the fall of the Second Polish Republic due to German invasion, finalizing the establishment of the SB OUN became feasible. The Ukrainian Secret Service found itself with a new head: Mykola Lebed.¹³

The SB was created as a counterintelligence department with numerous functions. Primarily, the SB was to engage in intelligence: internal, as well as external. SB was to expose and terminate any enemy agents, eliminate functionaries of the occupying administration, and create a nexus of its own intelligencers.¹⁴ OUN's Special Services were intended to protect the leadership of OUN from the Polish and Soviet Special Services, which were established before SB OUN.¹⁵ Being a headman of such an organization was lethal. The protection of Bandera required a separate unit of the SB made up of several dozen workers. In over one and a half decades, this unit counteracted five assassination attempts on Bandera.¹⁶ Such attempts of terminating a main leader of OUN exemplifies the importance and urgency of creating a separate intelligence department of the organization. Though protecting the leaders of OUN was only one of many functions set for the SB.

Apart from offering leaders of OUN protection from enemy secret police, SB also had the task of conducting counterintelligence activities against the Soviet and Polish

¹² Ішук, Олександр, and Валерій Огороднік. *Генерал Микола Арсенич: Життя Та Діяльність Шефа СБ ОУН.* – С. 52.

¹³ Косенко, Назар. “Микола Арсенич: Меч і Щит ОУН.” *Бюро Досліджень Історії Спеціальних Служб*, Бюро Досліджень Історії Спеціальних Служб, 14 Feb. 2021, bdis.org.ua/articles/2021/01/mykola-arsenyuch-shchyt-i-mech-oup/.

¹⁴ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. – Т. 23: Золочівська округа ОУН: документи і матеріали референтури СБ 1944-1951. – Київ – Торонто, 2015. – С. 13-14.

¹⁵ Ішук, Олександр, and Валерій Огороднік. *Генерал Микола Арсенич: Життя Та Діяльність Шефа СБ ОУН.* – С. 53.

¹⁶ Марцінків, Руслан. “ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ СТВОРЕННЯ ТА ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СЛУЖБИ БЕЗПЕКИ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ.” *УНІВЕРСИТЕТ КОРОЛЯ ДАНИЛА*, Івано-Франківськ: Редакційно-Видавничий Відділ Університету Короля Данила, 2020. – С. 68.

secret services. After 1941, the German intelligence also became a target of SB OUN.¹⁷ Besides counteracting the activities of the NKVD and the Gestapo, protecting the leaders of OUN, and conducting intelligence and counterintelligence, the SB was given the task to: ensure the continuance of Ukrainian conspiracy, support internal security, organize sabotages, and investigate any criminal offenses committed by members of OUN (B).¹⁸ Not only was SB's responsibility to combat enemy secret services, but in 1940-1941 they also took upon the fight with OUN (M), whose fight for independence differed from OUN (B) and it was SB's duty to prevent any interference with the liberation of Ukraine.¹⁹

Keeping OUN (B) secure included taking precautions to prevent any members from committing treason. In order to prevent any enemy secret services from recruiting OUN members into their own forces, the SB employed inspections and utilized surveillance of every OUN (B) member.²⁰ OUN instructions about the SB state that, "Territorial leaders take responsibility for these people (SB members). With each person sent to work, up to and including a fighter, the territorial guide must talk, explain to him the tasks and role, and then constantly monitor his behavior and work. Conduct educational meetings - meetings with employees ~ SB."²¹ Communication between leaders and the members was to be strong in order to ensure that OUN members of every department understand his role, as well as to detect and prevent any possibility of treason. Any members that were ready to abandon their service and collaborate with the enemy posed a massive threat to the rest of the organization and, above all, the movement for an independent Ukraine.

While the enemy's perspective of OUN (B) members, actions and methods were perceived as "ruthless", SB, because of its strict practices, was considered to have

¹⁷ Марцінків, Руслан. "ПРАВОВІ ЗАСАДИ СТВОРЕННЯ ТА ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ СЛУЖБИ БЕЗПЕКИ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ." УНІВЕРСИТЕТ КОРОЛЯ ДАНИЛА.

¹⁸ Ішук, Олександр, and Валерій Огороднік. *Генерал Микола Арсенич: Життя Та Діяльність Шефа СБ ОУН*.

¹⁹ Refer to footnote 18.

²⁰ Refer to footnote 18.

²¹ "Надрайонным Проводникам Для Исполнения (Переклад) (Инструкція)." *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*,

generated political terror.²² The functions and actions of SB can be seen in German report from December 1943 gives the accompanying portrayal of the SB OUN:

“The nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army has set up a ‘security service.’ We were able to arrest the representative of the ‘national-Ukrainian security service’ in the Rivne district. He said that this security service is a subordinate group of UPA and has the following tasks: extermination of Communist Party members, Poles and Germans, extermination of deserters, supervising of nonlocals, drafting young people into the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Insurgent Army.”²³

This report shows that the SB was assigned to perform more duties than only intelligence and counterintelligence, and even work outside of the walls of OUN. SB’s focus was not to be only on their own organization, but their main interest laid in achieving a free and sovereign Ukrainian state.

A Ukrainian document dated approximately 1941 includes the description of the need and duties for the SB and confirms that the secret police had more responsibilities than just counterintelligence: “In the liberated territories of Ukraine from the Bolshevik occupiers it is necessary to organize the Ukrainian security service, which has the task of protecting private state property from looting and sabotage. It is necessary to take care of the security and peace of citizenship, to clear the area of Bolshevik gangs and saboteurs. The Ukrainian security service assumes the responsibility to remove from the face of Ukraine everything that could act to the detriment of the Ukrainian nation.”²⁴

The activity of the SB can be broken down into three separate stages: the organizational stage, transformational stage, and final stage.²⁵ The first lasted from 1939 to 1941, and was categorized by an explicit anti-Bolshevik attitude, with the main functions of the Secret Service being protecting OUN (B) leaders and

²² Rudling, Per A. *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: a Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths*. Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2011.

²³ Reichsführer-SS, Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Chef der Bandenkampfverbände Ic.-We./Mu. Tgb. Nr. 67/44 a. H. Qu. 4 Januar 1944 Ic. -Bericht über die Bandenlage ost für die Zeit von 16.12–31.12 1943, Natsional’nyi Arkhiv Respubliki Belarus’ (NARB), f. 685, vop. 1, sp. 1, t. 1, l. 8.

²⁴ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/6402?locale=ua. – Pg. 1.

²⁵ Refer to footnote 16.

conducting intelligence and counterintelligence. The transformational stage lasted from around 1941 to 1944. During this stage, the SB combated against three enemy powers: the Soviets, Nazis, and Polish national underground. During the second stage, the functions of the SB changed due to new circumstances, adding ideological, operational, and investigative and preliminary examination onto their obligations. The last stage, which lasted from 1945 to the 1950s, was when the SB undertook judiciary and penitentiary function due to constant armed conflict with the Red Army or the Soviet's own Special Services. This stage, like the first, was characterized by an anti-Soviet orientation, for during this period the Soviets established their power in Ukraine.

The SB had many functions, which can be condensed into the following categories of responsibility: security, organization, ideology, operative-investigative, and judicial.²⁶ Security consisted of protecting OUN (B) leaders, the organization and ensuring its operation was not interrupted, as well as assuring the general safety of Ukrainian civilians. Responsibilities regarding organization included monitoring the logistics, military and even food products of OUN. The responsibility of ideology meant observing the political and state views of both members of the underground as well as ordinary people who consorted with the Nazi, Soviet or Polish authorities. Operative-investigative responsibilities involved investigating those who have committed war crimes or have acted against the revolution for a free Ukraine. The aforementioned functions of the Sluzhba Bezpeky made it resemble the NKVD, on which the SB was based on.²⁷ The SB's judicial responsibilities included acting as a field-court martial. The variation of such duties exemplifies how rich the SB was in its functions and how much of an influence the Secret Services truly had.

Evaluating the creation of the SB, considering the legitimacy of the police is fundamental. On June 30, 1941, OUN, under the leadership of Stepan Bandera, declared an independent Ukrainian state, which became known as the Act of

²⁶ СПОСІБ, Д. П. “КЛАСИФІКАЦІЯ ФУНКЦІЙ СЛУЖБИ БЕЗПЕКИ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЇ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ НАЦІОНАЛІСТІВ.” *Pravoisuspilstvo*, doi.org/10.32842/2078-3736-2019-4-8.

²⁷ Refer to footnote 26.

Restoration of the Ukrainian state.²⁸ This act declared a Ukrainian Independent Conciliar State – that is a sovereign Ukraine.²⁹ At this time, considering the circumstances of Ukraine, which was under Soviet power, a sovereign state was only a concept. The restoration act consisted of three points: the first was a proclamation of a free Ukrainian state and called the Ukrainian people to fight for independence of all territories of Ukraine. The second point alluded to the foundation of a Ukrainian government in the western Ukrainian grounds, subordinate to the future public government in Kyiv. Section 3 contained confirmations that an autonomous Ukrainian state would work intimately with Germany. This act is important because it reveals that OUN was determined to gain independence for all territories of Ukraine, not only its western lands. The proclamation of a free Ukraine legitimized the need for a secret police, for an independent nation was in need of such a police organ. OUN had all documents legitimizing the Sluzhba Bezpeky, and defeating the Soviets was the only obstacle interfering with its officiality. The status and functions of the authorities were regulated, and the administration along with their methods reflected that of other European countries. Along with this, even after the termination of the Ukrainian state by the Germans, the SB and other administrative authorities continued to execute their duties. Along with this, with the dangers of claiming Ukraine a free nation, the SB was truly necessary. It was because of these reasons that the SB was legitimate in the nationalistic Ukrainian state even though it was still under Soviet rule, for its formation was made with the hope of eventually achieving independence. This way, the Secret Services, a requirement for a properly

²⁸ Організація Українських Націоналістів. “Звіт Національних Зборів у Львові 30 Червня 1941. ‘Зборівські Вісті’, 31 Липня 1941 Року.” *Газета "Зборівські Вісті"*, 31 July 1941, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/%D0%97%D0%B2%D1%96%D1%82_%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%86%D1%96%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%85_%D0%B7%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%96%D0%B2_30_%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B2%D0%BD%D1%8F_1941.jpg

²⁹ Ukrainian National Assembly 30 June 1941. “Акт Відновлення Української Держави|Акт Відновлення Української Держави (з Автографом Ярослава Стецька).” *Державний Архів Львівської Облaсті*, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 15 June 2008, [web.archive.org/web/20171108225943/http://www.archive.lviv.gov.ua/materials/exhibitions/do-21-richchja-vidnovlennja-nezalezhnosti-ukrajini/1146/](http://www.archive.org/web/20171108225943/http://www.archive.lviv.gov.ua/materials/exhibitions/do-21-richchja-vidnovlennja-nezalezhnosti-ukrajini/1146/).

functioning nation, would already be an operational department once the Soviets were conquered.³⁰

1.2 Structure

The structure of an organization allows a grasping of how it functioned, and the processes involved in executing duties. The SB OUN was considered a Ukrainian police department, and so understanding its various units will allow a comprehension of the general structure of SB.

A document published circa 1941, entitled “Instruction of work of the SB” explains the breakdown of the police organization, organized by the regional commandant of the Ukrainian police, consisted of three main departments: intelligence-investigative, criminal and ordinal.³¹ The first of these departments was designated to immobilize any political movement that could potentially harm the Ukrainian nation or its citizens. The second department was to undertake any cases involving murder, arson, looting, falsifications, robberies, deceptions, and misdemeanors against public morality. The third unit had more to do with civilians and everyday life: managing street traffic, control of bazaar parks, managing fire police and sanitary services.³² These functions of the SB were created in anticipation of a free Ukrainian state; hence they were to be ready to instill in the case of the downfall of the Soviet Union. An analysis of all three is required to see how these departments were to play a role in the Ukrainian nation.

Intelligence-investigative: This division was to determine what harmful movements were utilized on Ukrainian lands, who engaged in deleterious work, where they received their instructions from and who managed these operations. Along with these obligations was following those suspected of espionage, along with the suspects’ families. Just as the SB examined those outside of their organization, they also had to conduct proper internal reconnaissance of their members’ lives. Such precautions were taken to prevent any member working for the enemy from within

³⁰ Refer to footnote 26.

³¹ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Pg.– 1.

³² Refer to footnote 31., – Pg. – 2-3.

the organization. This unit also worked with archives and registration regarding communist-Jews: they were to establish an archive of communist-Jewish activities, capture all political archives, conduct registration of all communist instructions, libraries, and quarters as well as a registration of all members of the Communist Party and NKVD.³³

Criminal: This subdivision had the task of administering registration of anyone who was imprisoned for or suspected to be involved in committing arson, robbery, or murder. Additionally, those who were kleptomaniacs or born thieves were to be documented. Regarding arson and plundering, all pyromaniacs or those who engaged in or were suspected of pillaging were to be registered.³⁴

Ordinal: This sector was accountable for maintaining order and consisted of several departments. Its responsibilities concerned internal and external city appearance, for their role was to retain clean streets, markets, public places, restaurants, stores, and care for sewage systems. It was also responsible for controlling prices. Along with this, the ordinal department was to oversee all signs and inscriptions (street names, on shops and other public buildings) were written correctly and in Ukrainian. It also was to ensure that people obeyed the rules of the road (whether walking or driving), and followed instructions and orders issued by the authorities. Their work included monitoring that during holidays, homes displayed Ukrainian and German flags in the proper size and the correct places. The fire department was to look after the fire safety of the entire city, meaning that it was to care for appropriate placement of fire detectors, had water supplies in case of any fires and a rescue team. This department was to work with the sanitary services, which was to, without interruption, monitor the city's hygiene, water and canals, dumps, and sanitation points. The sanitary unit was also to oversee gas services and supply appropriate instructions regarding them.³⁵

The roles of these police divisions incorporated a combination of supervising the Ukrainian organizations fighting for independence, citizens of the state, and the

³³ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Pg.– 1-2.

³⁴ Refer to footnote 33., – Pg.– 2.

³⁵ Refer to footnote 33., – Pg. – 2-3.

spread of Ukrainization. While SB may be known best for the first of these divisions (intelligence-investigative), the additional units were equally as important in the secret services' functions to winning Ukrainian sovereignty. First, the criminal police, in targeting outlaws and those who disrupted peace in the state, attempted to filter the nation of anyone who caused chaos or who acted against the law. This way, the population would be rid of anyone who would not only provoke public disorder but would also disobey the authorities. It was imperative that during the movement for independence, there was order amongst the people as well as cooperation with authority. Stopping criminal activities also helped bring stability to the state. Eliminating criminals also could prevent others from engaging in lawbreaking by serving as a warning of the consequences that follow their actions.

While the criminal department functioned as bringing and keeping order amidst the people, the ordinal unit was responsible for imposing order in the city. In an army, discipline is a deciding factor between success and failure, as it is in all aspects of a revolution, including cities and its residents. It is important to remember that the SB was made with the intent to be a legitimate, operational secret service in the case of the collapse of the USSR. With the changing of authorities, it is key that the people and cities are in order to ensure a smooth transition of power. This explains why the SB had preorganized not only a cleansing of society by detecting and immobilizing any criminals, but also why the secret police had coordinated an optimized, functioning society during the fight for Ukrainian sovereignty.

The ordinal department also proliferated the Ukrainian language and other aspects of Ukrainian culture. For example, ensuring that street signs are written in proper Ukrainian instead of, for instance, Russian or Polish, automatically heightens the presence of Ukrainian culture. By spreading the language and requiring people to display the Ukrainian flag, the ordinal department can be seen as being responsible for expanding Ukrainian nationalism. The Sluzhba Bezpeky wanted Ukraine to look like Ukraine, and Ukrainians to act like nationalists. In an occupied country, language and nationalism becomes a powerful weapon and an important factor in victory, for they affect a person psychologically and can influence their way of thinking. By

influencing Ukraine and Ukrainians to be more nationalistic and “Ukrainian”, the SB would be one step ahead of their enemies.

SB’s intelligence-investigative police department had a more obvious role in the move for Ukrainian independence. Official documents state that each member of SB was to be completely devoted to the Ukrainian cause declaring, “The apparatus of Sluzhba Bezpeky should be the cleanest, most ideological and sufficiently strong: Not working for personal satisfaction and interests but working for the revolution and the common good of Ukraine.”³⁶ In the departments’ work, they oversaw that this duty was complied with. This department gathered information and stayed updated about the lives of anyone who, in any capacity, was or may have been involved in the fight for Ukrainian independence. The intelligence-investigative department protected not only any external threats that were meant to dismantle the success of the underground, but also internal ones. SB was instructed to arrest any Ukrainian insurgents released from Soviet custody and determine if they were safe to release.³⁷ This is because Soviets released victims in exchange for information or made agreements that consisted of treason, for example, spying from the inside of Ukrainian organizations. Such behavior was unacceptable and would deteriorate the entire Ukrainian movement, and so it was SB’s responsibility to eliminate anything that stood in the way of success.

The Ukrainian police also consisted of a supplies department, which was divided into three subdivisions: provisions, uniforms, and weapons.³⁸

Provisions: This subdivision was to try to establish contacts and make agreements with various supply institutions and cooperatives that would help keep police departments shelves stocked with food and practical items. It was this division's duty to find food and supply bases, seize and guard them, making sure they do not get raided.³⁹

³⁶ Refer to footnote 8.

³⁷ “Інструкція Для Членів СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/15461?locale=ua.

³⁸ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, – Pg.– 3-4.

³⁹ Refer to footnote 38., – Pg. 4.

Uniforms: This unit was to initiate communications with textile enterprises. Materials intended for the Bolshevik militia from various textile and leather bases were targeted and prioritized to be used. Police uniforms consisted of black trousers, black shirt with a closed collar, a *mazepynka* (a unique type of headdress of Ukrainian soldiers of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Galician Army) with a Tryzub (Ukrainian, translates to “trident”, is the Ukrainian national coat of arms), black belt, boots, and for winter, a black greatcoat.⁴⁰

Weapons: This department was responsible for the armament of the Ukrainian policeman included a *krees* (a rifle), pistol, Nagant (revolver), grenade, machine pistol, and “*mashinovy krees*” (“*mashinovy*”, in Ukrainian translates to “machine”). Officers carried the appropriate weapons for their assigned missions and had to submit what weapons they had with them.⁴¹

Along with weapons and the required uniform, officers were to wear seals of service, and on their left sleeves, a white belt with an obliquely sewn blue-yellow ribbon.⁴²

In small towns and villages, there was no division between police units as in the city police, though their goals and assignments were the same. The activities did not differentiate between the city police; however, they were executed in smaller masses.⁴³

The structure of the SB was directly connected to the territorial units of OUN. SB referents were instituted at all levels of OUN’s organizational cells: beginning with the OUN leadership and following down to districts.⁴⁴ Everywhere where OUN held an office was a division of SB with them, for they worked parallel to one another. Referents acted in regional, district, supra-district and district OUN headquarters.⁴⁵ As part of the SB structure, from district to regional levels, was officer, deputy

⁴⁰ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Pg.– 4.

⁴¹ Refer to footnote 40., – Pg.–4.

⁴² Refer to footnote 40., – Pg. –4.

⁴³ Refer to footnote 8.

⁴⁴ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. – Т. 26: Коломийська округа ОУН: документи і матеріали референтури СБ, 1945-1950. – Київ – Торонто, 2016. – С. 14.

⁴⁵ Refer to footnote 44.

officer, commander of the SB militia, technical officer, combat officer, an investigative unit and a militia.⁴⁶ A description of each position follows below:

Officer: An officer's responsibilities consisted of completing the overall administration of the exercises of subordinates of the referent and took part in operational work, where he was to enlist agents and informants among the local population, as well as from the MGB ("Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti" - Russian for Ministry for State Security).⁴⁷

Deputy officer (also known as a "sub-officer"): The deputy officer was to assist the officer, and, in the case of the officer's absence, was to perform his duties.⁴⁸

Commander of the SB militia: This role involved executing the leadership of SB's militia.⁴⁹

Technical officer: These officers were to keep files and register agents suspected of intelligence work. They were also to keep lists of NKVD and MGB officers, Soviet and party officials, intelligence reports, as well as protocols of interrogations of detainees.⁵⁰

SB investigative officer: An investigative officer was supposed to investigate the failures of the underground of OUN. Their obligations also included gathering facts about the Ukrainian locals and OUN members who worked with the MGB. Investigators were to inspect any emergencies, including but not limited to ambushes, deportations, and raids. Investigation of the circumstances of anyone fighting for Ukrainian independence.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Веденєєв Д., Биструхін Г. Двобій без компромісів. Протиборство спецпідрозділів ОУН та радянських сил спецоперацій. 1945-1980-ті роки: Монографія. – К.: К.І.С., 2007. – С. 74-75.

⁴⁷ Золочівська округа ОУН: документи і матеріали референтури СБ, 1944-1951 [Текст] / НАН України, Ін-т укр. археографії та джерелознавства ім. М. С. Грушевського НАН України, Вид-во "Літопис УПА", Галуз. держ. архів Служби безпеки України ; [упоряд. Михайло Романюк]. - Київ ; Торонто : Літопис УПА, 2013. - 15 с.

⁴⁸ Refer to footnote 47.

⁴⁹ Refer to footnote 47.

⁵⁰ Проданик Д. Шлях боротьби Василя Сенчака-“Ворона”. – Літопис УПА. Серія “Події і люди”. – Кн. 15. – Торонто–Львів, 2011. – С. 31-32.

⁵¹ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. – Т. 26. – С. 15; ГДА СБУ. – Ф. 13. – Спр. 376. – Т. 57. – Арк. 186 (протокол СБ до справи стягання податку і контингенту в с. Підпечери Станіславського р-ну 27.10.1945 р.)

SB archivists: SB archivists were to register and archive all SB documents, including information about MGB agents and work, suspects, protocols of interrogations, and all other documents regarding the enemy.⁵²

SB militants: Militants were to guard hideouts of any SB officers, workplaces of investigators, or storage places of documents. Their work also included detaining as well as transporting suspects to places of interrogation. Along with this, it was a militant's duty to execute court decisions (ensure that sentences are properly complied with).⁵³

Beneath the district level was a *kusht* (in Ukrainian, translates to “bush”) informant. The *kusht* informant, who performed the functions of the lowest level in the SB, played a leading role in the reconnaissance work of the secret services. While *kusht* informants were to gather information, they did not hold the right to initiate investigations or carry out sentences. They did though, take part in attacks on “*istrebitel*” (in Russian, translates to “destroyer”, “fighter”) battalion, as well as disarming these fighters.⁵⁴

SB informant: An informant was responsible for collecting information and staying up to date on the movement of MGB troop divisions. Their role also included recording and collecting data about Ukrainian locals, including monitoring their behavior. Along with this, an informant was to understand and document meeting places of the MGB and be aware of any communication between the MGB and locals.⁵⁵

Each post was intertwined with the rest, and so the SB practically worked like a machine: the work of each member was cardinal for the entire operation to be successful. While there were higher and lower posts, all were of equal value, for each position contributed to the overall success of the secret services.

⁵² Refer to footnote 47.

⁵³ Refer to footnote 47.

⁵⁴ Літопис УПА. Нова серія. Т. 22: Станиславівська округа ОУН: Документи і матеріали. 1945-1951 / упоряд. Дмитро Проданик, Степан Лесів. – Київ; Торонто, 2013. – С. 29.

⁵⁵ Refer to footnote 47.

1.3 Recruitment and training

An organization's effectiveness, success, and power depend directly on the personnel. For an underground organization, it is crucial to have people that can be trusted, for if any information falls into enemy hands, the entire operation could collapse. For these reasons, the SB was very careful when recruiting their members. They were careful when choosing who to work with and chose their members according to what benefited their police organ, OUN (B), UPA and the entire Ukrainian movement for freedom best.

The Ukrainian police department required several conditions to join their forces. First, an age requirement was instituted: any Ukrainian at least at the age of 20 though no older than 35 could become a police officer.⁵⁶ When applying to be part of the *Starshyna* (in Ukrainian, means "officer"), one could be no older than 45.⁵⁷ Another important factor for joining the SB was experience. Applicants were supposed to have served no less than one year in the army or have worked half a year in the police or gendarmerie.⁵⁸ The police department was new and created at a critical time, and so it was important that members had somewhat of an understanding about how to work in a security department and have gained a sense of responsibility and discipline, an important component of SB members. Education was also considered when evaluating possible members for the secret police. Police officers were supposed to have finished at least five years of school and were to read and write well in Ukrainian.⁵⁹ Difficulties with communication or interpretation of any orders or messages could cause trouble for the entire underground operation. Physical requirements were also instilled for joining the SB. Such prerequisites demanded a height of no less than 165 cm (5'4 feet) and physically healthy.⁶⁰ Members were to be physically and morally well developed as well as morally stable.⁶¹ Moral stability was important because it prevented members from being

⁵⁶ "Інструкція Роботи СБ." *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Рг.– 1.

⁵⁷ Refer to footnote 56.

⁵⁸ Refer to footnote 56.

⁵⁹ Refer to footnote 56.

⁶⁰ Refer to footnote 56.

⁶¹ Refer to footnote 56.

fickle, possibly disabling the enemy from recruiting Ukrainian agents onto their forces.

Documents state that only Ukrainians could be accepted into the police organ. Members were to have no history with any Bolshevik organizations, including but not limited to the NKVD or VKP(b) (Russian for “Vsesoyuznaya kommunisticheskaya partiya (bolshevikov)”, meaning the All-Union Communist Party).⁶² Because this police department was to protect the leaders of OUN (B), secure the movement for a free Ukraine and counterattack any attempts of espionage or any other efforts of demolishing the Ukrainian underground from enemy forces, it was important to have Ukrainian nationalists working for the Ukrainian police. If other nationalities were brought into the police organ, potential threats could arise. It was unclear how other nationalities would perceive Ukrainian locals or the Ukrainian cause, and so the safest and most rational decision seemed to be accepting only Ukrainian members.

Instructions state that, “Every police officer must remember that he is in the service of the homeland, so he must perform his tasks to the best of his ability. He must use every minute for military and police training”.⁶³ It must be remembered that SB was a new police department with a significant role, not only for the Ukrainian movement, but for the Ukrainian nation. SB had no experience of being a secret police, and so it was of the essence to emphasize on the preparation of SB officers. Training was divided into two categories: theoretical and practical.⁶⁴ There was to be no generalized training, for each region was supposed to have unique preparation materials due to territorial distinctions.⁶⁵ Each case was supposed to be written maximally effectively, and to be taught and studied thoroughly, for these lessons were made for scientific purposes. If the cases were not effective in teaching other members or did not benefit the liberation movement, it was “a pity to write, waste time and paper”.⁶⁶ This was quite serious, considering that an underground operation

⁶² “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, – Pg.– 1.

⁶³ Refer to footnote 62., – Pg. – 5.

⁶⁴ “Доручення По Роботі Служби Безпеки ОУН. - Постій, 25.12.1946.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, СБ ОУН, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/1200?locale=ua. –Pg.–5.

⁶⁵ Refer to footnote 64.

⁶⁶ Refer to footnote 64.

had limited resources, not only referring to materials, but also time. The SB was to develop quickly and constructively, so such advice was consequential.

Hutirky (group lessons) were to be led in secret and only about small and closed cases.⁶⁷ Open cases were forbidden from being studied during training, for if any information was leaked, numerous problems could arise, those of which may even prevent the case from getting closed. Because materials that are presented in a theoretical manner are absorbed less and forgotten quicker, practical training was important to conduct.⁶⁸ Various training camps and exercises existed, each one focusing on a different sphere of work of the secret services:

Military training camp: Various drills regarding military lines, physical commands, and marches. Exercises without *kreeses* were also included, which was to help with form and speed, allowing members to practice without taking any weapons into their hands. Communications and cooperation between *royi* (in Ukrainian, similar to “squad”, refers to a small team of members), *chota* (in Ukrainian, historical term for “platoon”), and *sotnya* (in Ukrainian, translates to “hundred”, refers to a military unit along with a territorial unit based on it). Military training also incorporated exercises on various physical movements, such as running, steps and crawls. Police capturing methods were also practiced at such training. Exercises involving swords and *shtyky* (in Ukrainian, refers to bayonets).⁶⁹

Guard services: Taught about guarding in general and reviewed different types of guarding and *stiyky* (in Ukrainian, translates to “stands”, refers to when sentries stand guard at a certain place and time for different and specific reasons). The right of the guard was also taught, along with about the composition of officers making up the guard service. Practicalities were also taught, such as how to properly change shifts and *stiykovykh* (those who stood on *stiyka*), and about the region that was to be guarded. Guards also learned about the duties of the commandant of the guard, his deputy, the duties of the reconnaissance *surmacha* (in Ukrainian, it refers to a

⁶⁷ “Доручення По Роботі Служби Безпеки ОУН. - Постій, 25.12.1946.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ, СБ ОУН.*, –Pg.–5.

⁶⁸ Refer to footnote 67.

⁶⁹ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Pg.– 5.

signalman that communicates to the guards by trumpet, usually when a threat is discerned) and *stiykovoho* (he, who stood on *stiyka*). Guards were also taught how to use weapons correctly and how to keep order among their own services.⁷⁰

Officers were taught about the different types of weapons used, which were divided into theoretical and practical training. Members learned about parts of each weapon, how they operated, and later, they partook in combat training.

Combat training camps: During this training, officers learned about and practiced using light infantry weapons, seizing, and searching homes and learning the circumstances of such searches. This training also taught how to properly raid a city or various stations, such as administrative-territorial or production units, and how to conduct searches there. Searches were a key factor in SB operations and so the material also included how to search forests, parks, gardens, how to raid these places and obtain what was necessary. Officers were also taught how to erect barricades and close streets. Lessons of maneuvering, how to properly retrieve and counter-offence were read and practiced by officers, who had to be in sync with one another in order to be effective. Serving and guarding stores, camps, and bridges, learning how to work with fires, murders and more were also taught.⁷¹

Anti-gas training camps: These camps taught officers about different types of dangerous gases and their fission, as well as the use of gasses. Officers were trained in gas defense, such as how to properly wear masks and what garments were to be used for protection.⁷²

Police and political training camps: Here officers studied criminal psychology, criminology, intelligence and counterintelligence.

Psychology was heavily studied in the SB, especially under the leadership of Mykola Arsenych.⁷³ Understanding human thought and behavior made successful retrieval of information plausible. It also allowed officers to better maneuver in

⁷⁰ “Інструкція Роботи СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ.*, – Pg.– 5.

⁷¹ Refer to footnote 70.

⁷² Refer to footnote 70., –Pg.–6.

⁷³ Кіпіані, Вахтанг, дiректор. *Історична Правда з Вахтангом Кіпіані: Шеф Служби Безпеки ОУН М.Арсенич*, Телеканал ЗІК, 17 Jan. 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XMy5zMhUK8&t=649s&ab_channel=%D0%A2%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BBZIK.

difficult situations, maximizing the effectiveness of the underground. Knowing the psychological secrets of man could potentially save one's life in critical situations, and so it was a significant topic to focus on during training members of the SB.

Being involved in the liberation movement in any way held tremendous risk, and one had to fully commit to his responsibilities and to the Ukrainian cause. In a document entitled "Rulebook of the SB fighter", a code of conduct was listed for the members.⁷⁴ The very first claimed that "the SB militant must not dare fall alive into the hands of the enemy".⁷⁵

Joining the SB meant jeopardizing one's life, for duty, Ukraine and achieving independence was prioritized over life. Being involved in the SB denoted a new way of life, for one had to assume a prudent and vigil persona. Each member had to sign an agreement that committed them to cooperating with the SB, where they agreed that "for treason and non-observance of secrecy and non-fulfillment of tasks I will be responsible before the Revolutionary Court / including the death penalty /".⁷⁶

During the Second World War, the Revolutionary Court was responsible for considering the cases of higher ranked officers. The defendant was able to choose a lawyer among his circle of friends, who would represent him in court. The structure of the court was dependent on the rank of the offender as well as the crime committed. An officer from the Ukrainian Red Cross was added to the tribunal in the case of the defendant being a woman.

The aforementioned importance of moral stability in members resurfaces when analyzing committing to the SB. Becoming a threat to the SB or the Ukrainian cause connoted elimination, and the life they enlisted for had to be strict and one of great discipline. The SB rulebook requires that members be disciplined, obedient and fully committed to conspiracy.

⁷⁴ "Правильник Бойовика СБ." *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/3412?locale=ua.

⁷⁵ Refer to footnote 74.

⁷⁶ "Зразок Підписки Про Співпрацю з СБ." *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/6498?locale=ua.

The SB consisted of an educated, intelligent group of people who were expected to read literature about politics and be politically aware.⁷⁷ They were to lead a sober life, abjuring from alcohol. The member's social life also changed, for his mobility became limited and he was only to be seen by those people who must see him.⁷⁸

The rulebook's writing demonstrated a strict tone. One point stated that "The SB militant knows that the arrested must not dare run away".⁷⁹ Hence, the SB was to prevent any operations from failing at all costs. Any and all violations of the rulebook were to be reported by SB militants to their superior officers.⁸⁰ The penalty for infringement was "severe punishment", most likely determined by the crime and circumstances. The documents exemplify that those belonging to the SB had to be confident in their decision to join the secret services, and loyal to their responsibilities, for their life became committed to serving Ukraine through the SB.

Qualifying for joining the SB consisted of various points. Physical requirements ensured that members were sufficiently strong and capable of the corporeal tasks involved in their work, as well as practical matters, such as escaping enemy forces. They also reviewed ethnic and national histories of their members, certifying that the police force comprised of Ukrainian sympathizers. SB members were to be disciplined and obedient, fulfilling the orders of their superiors and living a life of conspiracy. The Security Council was designed to be composed of intellectuals, for they played a most consequential role in the Ukrainian movement for independence. Individual death was at stake, however SB workers most likely surmised that even more immense was the potential harm that could have been inflicted on the Ukrainian movement for independence with any mistakes in operations or conspiracy. It was for this reason that they had to be maximally disciplined. SB was to fight not only the enemy but also take on the task of minimizing threats from Ukrainian organizations as well, meaning that they were to secure the independence movement from all angles. SB members were to dedicate themselves to constant training and

⁷⁷ Refer to footnote 74.

⁷⁸ Refer to footnote 74.

⁷⁹ Refer to footnote 74.

⁸⁰ Refer to footnote 74.

improvement of their skills. Attending various training camps permitted practicing skills and exercises and learning and recalling the theoretical part of their training. Dedicating their life to SB meant being ready to sacrifice it. Members were forbidden to be captured alive by the enemy and understood that treason to the SB and breakage of secrecy would be punishable by death. For these reasons, dedication, discipline, obedience, enlightenment, and trust defined the SB member.

CHAPTER II

MYTHS AND REALITY

2.1 Successful operations

The Sluzhba Bezpeky was an effective police force, for the organization survived under the totalitarian Soviet regime until the 1950s, which was not the case in any Eastern European country.⁸¹ Their effectiveness can be seen in several aspects of their work, which reveals what factors contribute to making a strong secret service. One of the most effective tactics used by the SB was their interrogation methods that allowed them to extract valuable information from the captive undergoing interrogation.

As mentioned, psychology aided successful operations. In a document entitled “Additional instructions. The case of instructions on the work of the Security Council”, it becomes evident that the SB regarded interrogations as a powerful weapon that required studying. Opening with the importance and recommendation of studying general psychology, the document illustrates that such knowledge could assist in analyzing the behavior of the subject under interrogation.⁸²

Members were given a set of guidelines that were to be followed. Tips included various methods of interrogation and arrest, most of which related to psychology. An example of this was catching the accused off guard, as it disoriented the suspect. Officers would attempt to convince the suspect that their arrest was not a mistake and that The SB gathered information, studied, and taught about the MGB.⁸³ Being aware of how the enemy operates allowed the SB to properly prepare a plan of counterattack to their tactics. While it is evident that no two individuals speak and act uniformly, common patterns of behavior during interrogations did appear and were studied to help in further operations. Officers from the secret service understood that during questioning, enemies were trained to evaluate the situation that they were in,

⁸¹ Refer to footnote 73.

⁸² “Додаткові Вказівки. Справа Про Вказівки По Роботі СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/15464?locale=ua.

⁸³ “Есбський Вишкіл.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/11077?locale=ua.

beginning with what information was known about them.⁸⁴ By attempting to discern what was known about him, the suspect could maneuver his answers to benefit him and his mission. For this reason, interrogators were strongly advised to be as vague in their questioning as possible, as to not give away what information is truly known.⁸⁵ The detainee usually turned to defense, claiming that he knew nothing and was guilty of no crimes. The next phase, where the suspect assessed what kind of people surrounded him, involved the interrogators to participate in role playing. The detainee typically searches for a friend among the interrogators, and so one investigator was to assume the role of a friendly officer. His role was to gain the trust of the arrested by acting kindly towards him, for example, by offering him to smoke or yelling at the guard for tying the captive's hands too tight. The second interrogator was to act callous. During questioning, the two interrogators should not be together in the room in hopes of the arrested revealing information to the officer who he found trust in.⁸⁶

Suspects then learned their surroundings more thoroughly, monitoring the movements, gestures and conversations around them. Usually, because captives acted on instinct and acting out of fear, they formed inaccurate conclusions about their punishment. Fear caused the accused to act on instinct, commonly resulting in an unsuccessful escape, for the SB already had taken precautions for such an attempt. The failed attempt then is followed by the suspect breaking down and revealing information, yet still making an effort to “repackage” the provided information with the aim of reducing the seriousness of his accusations. Captives began to break even more after beginning to confess, though still minimizing their crimes, and justifying their actions. Interrogators were advised to assist the arrested in decreasing their crimes, notifying the person under question that what they did could still be fixed and that their cooperation was important in doing so. SB officers were to instill hope into the person undergoing questioning. For instance, they were not to hit suspects over the head or any other place that could possibly leave the captive crippled, for then the

⁸⁴ Refer to footnote 82.

⁸⁵ Refer to footnote 82.

⁸⁶ Refer to footnote 82.

suspect would lose hope of staying alive, leaving them with no will to further comply, making the interrogation unsuccessful.⁸⁷

SB was aware of the tactics of the enemies on how to divert the interrogator's attention and how to benefit from his emotions, however the secret services also were aware of how to prevent the culprit from succeeding in doing this. The arrested watched and studied the interrogators to understand what reaction their confessions produced, for culprits expected to be compensated for their divulgence, such as better treatment and a less severe regime.⁸⁸ After a short period of time, the suspect became struck with a realization of reality: he began to understand that his crime was to be followed by a severe punishment, inciting a pursuit of escape.⁸⁹

Interrogators were instructed to stay calm in the presence of the arrested, for if an officer lost his temper, it showed weakness, signifying the captive victorious, for he was the one who held control. For example, if a captive attempted escape, officers were to react calmly and gently, allowing the detainee to understand that his misbehavior only worsened his case. If an officer were to become angry, he was advised to leave the interrogation room for some time and return calm and collected. The enemy also tried to disperse the attention of the SB to make them unfocused, though the secret service studied how to evade such attempts. Total focus was to be on the suspect in order to disable him from meddling with the officer. This included shining a light onto the criminal, leaving the officer in darkness, making him unreadable. The SB was to disorient the suspect's attention by giving them various tasks that would distract them from keeping their attention on counterfeiting their behavior. These tasks could be something as simple as making suspects keep their hands in place on a table.⁹⁰

Essentially, interrogations were conducted in a competitive manner. The accused was constantly in search of a way out of his situation, while the SB hindered any attempts of sabotage of their questionings. Because the SB had mastered the art of

⁸⁷ Refer to footnote 82.

⁸⁸ Refer to footnote 82.

⁸⁹ Refer to footnote 82.

⁹⁰ Refer to footnote 82.

interrogations, it allowed them to extract profitable information about the enemy, allowing them to understand their opponent better and strengthen their own techniques, enabling them to fight their enemy more effectively.

Analyzing SB's successful interrogations unveils the efficiency and value of the secret service's methods. A triumphant interrogation is exhibited in a document labeled "Interrogation report of MGB agent Tsypyk Mykhailo Ivanovych".⁹¹

In this case, Tsypyk, who was interrogated by the SB agent who went by the pseudonym "Buy-Turo", is revealed to be conspiring with the MGB. The arrested was a Ukrainian from the village Sytykhiv, in the Bryukhovyt'skiy region, found on the western lands of Ukraine. During his interrogation, the SB unveils his biography and understands why and how the MGB recruited him to work as an agent. From the protocol, it is evident that Tsypyk was not especially a Ukrainian nationalist, nor was he a fanatic of the Soviet regime. From Tsypyk's story, he spent almost his entire life serving each regime that seized him and avoiding death at all costs.⁹²

From his tellings, Tsypyk came from a family that seemed to be sympathizers of the Ukrainian cause. Both his brother and his cousin were mentioned to work with OUN, though his brother later served in the Red Army with the second coming of the Bolsheviks in 1944, though this was most likely by force and not by choice. In 1944, his brother familiarized Mykhailo with OUN by involving him with OUN's *yunatstvo* (in Ukrainian, translates to "youth"). Tsypyk, though, seemed to be someone who was not morally stable, and had trouble discerning what to do with his life, for he was very young.⁹³

His work was not stable. After school he helped his parents at home with farming. With the coming of the Bolsheviks, Mykhailo spent three months studying the mechanics of tractors and how to work with them, he received a job from the Machine Tractor Station (MTS - a state enterprise for the proprietorship and upkeep of farming apparatus) and was assigned to a nearby kolkhoz (a collective farm in the

⁹¹ "Протокол Допиту Агента МГБ Ціпика Михайла Івановича." *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/27784?locale=ua.

⁹² Refer to footnote 91.

⁹³ Refer to footnote 91.

Soviet Union). This job lasted only briefly, for the Ukrainian insurgents ruined this kolkhoz, after which Mykhailo traveled to Lviv to attempt to become a deacon, though it was not long before he returned home to further contribute his efforts to his parents' farm, though he continued looking for work. He again attempted to pursue his studies in machinery, however the level of difficulty compelled him to abandon his courses. His next job was one of importance, for it began his journey to working with the MGB. Tsypyk began working at the main railway in Lviv. At first, he began as a conductor, however not long after, was demoted to a common worker. This did not satisfy Mykhailo and abandoned his work unauthorized to do so. Mykhailo then continued to work on his parents' farm.⁹⁴

In February 1947, around the age of 19, Tsypyk married Bohdanna Pryshlyak, whose parents were killed due to working with the MGB. A few months after his marriage, in April, Tsypyk was called by the *voyenomat* (military enlistment office) to register his documents for serving in the Red Army. Mykhailo though, in reality was called in for questioning regarding his unauthorized abandoning of work at the railway, for his actions were highly illegal. Mykhailo then spent three months in jail before his trial, where he was sentenced to five years of forced labor in the far regions of the USSR. There he was mandated to work in a *laher* (in Ukrainian, translates to "camp"). Because Mykhailo worked previously at the railway, he was granted amnesty in 1948 and was allowed to return home.⁹⁵

During a village holiday, Mykhailo, while intoxicated, pushed a man with a bayonet. Soon after, the MGB arrived to arrest Mykhailo, which would lead to a sentence in prison. The MGB knew that Mykhailo was familiar with prison and understood that he would be willing to exchange his time in jail for anything even close to freedom. The officers suggested that, instead of being sentenced to prison, Tsypyk could become a conspirator of the MGB. Their proposition offered Mykhailo not only "freedom", but in addition, respect, money, and status. Of course, Mykhailo

⁹⁴ Refer to footnote 91.

⁹⁵ Refer to footnote 91.

complied. By doing so, he promised to reveal the secrets of OUN and UPA and contribute to eradicating the Ukrainian underground.⁹⁶

During his explanations of working with the MGB, Mykhailo revealed much about how the Soviet secret police operated. Tsypyk was given the task to uncover who in the village could potentially be working the Ukrainian underground and was assigned to follow, and later assassinate, two Ukrainian insurgents who went by the names of “Bohun” and Barilyak. “Nadiya” was an additional target of the MGB, who was claimed to be a dangerous woman who was armed and killed “good people” (Soviet officers). Mykhailo was also given the task to capture “Nadiya”, or, in the event that this was impossible to accomplish, assassinate her. He was indifferent about his duties until his life was at risk, for the Ukrainian insurgents threatened to kill his cousin for suspected conspiracy with the Soviets. Before this, his motivation was that of receiving a large sum of money promised to him by his captain once Mykhailo completed his assignments.⁹⁷ Due to his many mistakes, though, as well as the effectiveness of the SB, Tsypyk was interceded before he could accomplish his work.

In order to mask conspiring with the MGB and to absolve him of any suspicion among the village, Mykhailo was to claim that he wanted to join the Ukrainian underground and speak positively about the insurgents when asking about “Bohun” and Barilyak.⁹⁸

During the SB questioning, Mykhailo also disclosed what kind of training he received for executing his duties. His preparations were limited to short conversations with his captain, who told him his tasks and explained how to fulfill them. Apart from this, Tsypyk revealed how he was to hunt Ukrainian insurgents: how he was directed to track them and in what ways he was to capture them. By doing so, he revealed common techniques, such as how to correctly perform *zasidtky* (in Ukrainian, refers to concealing oneself and waiting to ambush an enemy).⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Refer to footnote 91.

⁹⁷ Refer to footnote 91.

⁹⁸ Refer to footnote 91.

⁹⁹ Refer to footnote 91.

Tsypyk's interrogation is valuable in that it allowed the SB to understand both how the MGB recruited agents, as well as why ordinary Ukrainian people complied to work with the Soviet police and how they perceived their duties. It also unveils information that helped allow SB to strengthen their own forces by detecting the flaws of the Soviet police.

Tsypyk was recruited at an early age and was not thoroughly educated. His nationalistic enthusiasm was not strong enough to determine his actions. Mykhailo's motives lied in protecting his life and receiving material rewards, such as money for completing his tasks. Fundamentally, Mykhailo acted on instinct, which was fear. When the Soviets were to sentence him to jail, he agreed to work with them. When the Ukrainian underground became a direct threat, he was ready to kill, not for nationalistic ideas, but for his own safety. This case shows that the MGB operated by instilling fear into people.

The MGB in telling their agents to speak openly about the Ukrainian underground also was a key mistake. SB instructed members of the underground to detain any communication about the independence movement with anyone other than required.¹⁰⁰ Conspiracy was a priority of the Ukrainian underground, and so the SB perceived speaking openly about such subjects as suspicious.

What also made the SB so successful was in its training, for they were fighting against not only the top officials of the MGB, but against those like Mykhailo: untrained, ordinary peasants. The SB was made up of intellectuals that were regarded as capable people, competent of being one step ahead of their enemies and staying true to the Ukrainian cause.¹⁰¹ Recruited MGB agents being ordinary people and learning about their perspectives illuminated what factors the SB should focus on when training their own members, planning operations and counter attacking enemy forces.

Of course, such interrogations also revealed information that aided the SB in preventing the MGB from succeeding in certain missions. Questioning allowed the

¹⁰⁰ “Правильник Бойовика СБ.” *Електронний Архів УКРАЇНСЬКОГО ВИЗВОЛЬНОГО РУХУ*, avr.org.ua/viewDoc/3412?locale=ua.

¹⁰¹ Refer to footnote 100.

secret police to understand who the MGB was targeting and what attacks they were planning. It was because of these reasons that the SB had mastered the psychology and art of interrogation.

2.2 Purging

With conspiracy being popularized, it was difficult to determine who was truly trustworthy. Not only was the SB concerned about enemy threats, but they were anxious about internal ones. Ukrainians fighting for independence were aware of highly confidential information that, if exposed to the enemy, could severely fracture the Ukrainian underground movement preventing the achievement of a sovereign state. Such suspicion within the Ukrainian underground network caused massive purgings of Ukrainian organizations that were conducted by the SB.

Analyzing several cases of the purges led by the SB, which were conducted at different times and in various regions, permits a general understanding of their execution and effects. An example of these grievous cleanses is seen in Volyn, which is found on the territories of northwestern Ukraine.

Cleanings in Volyn peaked in September 1944 and in the spring and November of 1945.¹⁰² During these years, Mykola Kozak, who frequently went by the pseudonym “Smok”, was an SB regional officer in Volyn. Kozak led exceedingly drastic purges. Under his authority, in January to October of 1945, of the 938 people who were suspected to be working with enemy forces, 889 were killed. In certain regions of Volyn, 100% of those suspected were slaughtered.¹⁰³ Before May 1945, the families of each member who was considered deserving of punishment by death were also murdered.¹⁰⁴ Families may have been targeted because it was possible that they, being close to the “traitor”, knew information that if leaked, would be harmful to the survival of the underground. Liquidation of families would also eliminate witnesses

¹⁰² Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині / Антонюк Ярослав // Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині / Антонюк Ярослав. – Луцьк: Волинська Книга, 2007. – (Історико-краєзнавче видання). – С. 116.

¹⁰³ Веденєєв Д., Биструхін Г. Меч і тризуб. Розвідка і контррозвідка руху українських націоналістів та УПА. 1920-1945. - К.: “Генеза”, 2006. - С. 219-220.

¹⁰⁴ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині / Антонюк Ярослав // Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині / Антонюк Ярослав. – Луцьк: Волинська Книга, 2007. – (Історико-краєзнавче видання). – С. 116-119.

who, in revenge for the killings, could possibly inform enemy authorities with details of the underground. Following such protocols resulted in the destruction of innumerable innocent lives. Families though, were not the only faultless people who fell victim to SB cleanses.

Occasionally, preposterous grounds were given for killing insurgents. In 1945 an SB officer who went under the alias of “Arkadiy” had 12 people murdered in the Tsuman region. The motives for the killings were that these members were “pathetic and spineless”.¹⁰⁵ Such situations demonstrate that the SB abused its authority to eliminate members based solely on subjective perspectives of individuals. Members of Ukrainian underground organizations were not only judged for their loyalty, behavior and work, but sometimes deemed inexpedient and hence terminated without justified reasons.

Innocent insurgents were also killed due to being framed by the enemy. From an SB interrogation 1947, an enemy agent admitted that it was common for the MGB to plant materials that proved that certain people were conspiring against the Ukrainian underground. Documents were made with false orders that served as evidence that people were guilty of treason and left in fields or apartments where they would be discovered by Ukrainian authorities.¹⁰⁶ Signatures of insurgents were carefully falsified and included in the making of such papers, adding a more authentic aura to the document. The SB, not having sufficient time to closely analyze every piece of found evidence and having little desire to protect those who may have or did belong to the Red Army or OUN (M). The people framed though, were usually innocent Ukrainians, or in certain cases, people involved in the MGB that were no longer needed. Framing was done for several purposes. First, this distracted the SB from those who were genuinely conspiring with the enemy. Such agents were essential for the MGB, for they provided valuable information and so by framing the innocent, the guilty were protected. Next, by prompting SB purges, enemy forces induced mistrust among the Ukrainian underground. The more members were suspected, the more

¹⁰⁵Refer to footnote 104, – С. 118.

¹⁰⁶ Літопис УПА. - Т. 8. Нова серія. - Київ-Торонто, 2006. - С. 711.

members were killed, greatly reducing the size of the underground, and consequently diminishing its power and activity. By distracting and misdirecting the SB, the Soviets improved their chances of operating more effectively.¹⁰⁷

By inciting SB purges, enemy forces also escalated the fear of treason among Ukrainian nationalistic organizations. Those in OUN and UPA were frequently murdered by the SB, though the SB also killed one another as well, for paranoia became a dominant factor for the SB's actions. For example, in 1947, an SB officer, who used the pseudonym "Zubr", personally killed two guards, his own typist and another SB officer, "Sova". Ironically, "Zubr" was also murdered by another SB member not long after he murdered these people. Often, the SB disregarded offering justification for their killings.¹⁰⁸ Such careless killings signified that the SB became obsessed with the possibility of conspiracy among their own people, causing them to act carelessly and instinctively. These actions also signify that the purges were misemployed, for, according to a set of instructions meant for the SB given in 1946, each individual of the underground was to be properly screened before being approached and punished.¹⁰⁹

The extremity of the SB was not supported by all officers of the underground. When recalling the beginnings of the SB purges, a leader of OUN who went by the name of "Duboviy" stated that, "Purification of the organization from the agency's scum began in December 1944".¹¹⁰ The use of the word "scum" when referring to the SB reflects a negative attitude towards the secret police. Criticism of the SB purges was due to their obstructive effects, for instance the insurgents' fear and disapproval of the underground. Even those who were patriots of Ukraine and ready to fight for its freedom deserted their posts in the underground due to disagreements regarding the mass murders of their own "brothers".¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Refer to footnote 105.

¹⁰⁸ Refer to footnote 104, – С. 117.

¹⁰⁹ Refer to footnote 108.

¹¹⁰ Літопис УПА. - Т. 8. Нова серія. - Київ-Торонто, 2006. - С. 1215.

¹¹¹ Веденєєв Д., Биструхін Г. Меч і тризуб...– С. 293.

Despite fear among the Ukrainian insurgents, the SB's cleansings also caused ordinary Ukrainian people to become terrified of the underground and associating with it in any way. In fact, these purges urged peasants to take revenge on the revolutionary movement, for many of their family members who joined the fight for a free Ukraine were killed by their own organizations for no justifiable reason. UPA military leader Maksym Skorupsky claimed that many *seksoty* (Russian informants who secretly worked from the organizations of their enemies) came from villages where their family had been victimized by the SB. Filled with hate, these people were seeking out revenge for the underground.¹¹² This being, the purges of the SB brought in more enemies into the underground operations. A large part of the Ukrainian population fell in spirit due to the great terror of the cleansings.¹¹³ Due to fear and anger, the support of local Ukrainians for the underground fell considerably.

Fear of being associated with the underground was also a product of the SB's purification methods. Collective responsibility caused many innocent lives to be taken by the SB. Collective responsibility meant that anyone found working with another officer that was conspiring with enemy forces would also be punished by death, for he was assumed to be untrustworthy as well. Procedures of this kind intimidated people from being associated with the Ukrainian underground for their own actions do not dictate their future but that they can be killed for the actions of another. Collective responsibility also made those in the underground paranoid, for innocent members lived in fear of being investigated and suspected, which they knew led to arrest and ultimately, execution.¹¹⁴ In 1945, collective responsibility was banned due to the negative reactions of the populace as well as the way that it impacted the Ukrainian organizations from within.¹¹⁵

Ironically, these mass killings, intended to protect the underground, were extremely detrimental to the Ukrainian movement. Purgings eliminated a large fraction of the underground and not always for justified reasons. A weak analysis of

¹¹² Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині...– С. 119.

¹¹³ Refer to footnote 113.

¹¹⁴ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині...– С. 119.

¹¹⁵ Літопис УПА. - Т. 8. Нова серія. - Київ-Торонто, 2006.– С. 1264.

evidence found against members permitted the death of many innocent insurgents. Such inaccuracies also allowed enemy forces to permeate the Ukrainian underground, causing numerous faultless lives from the lines of OUN, UPA and even the SB itself to be taken unjustly. The mistrust between the underground network led to a panic that was dictated by paranoia, which became extremely inimical to the Ukrainian cause. The purges' inclemency caused a surge of terror among Ukrainian locals, which was followed by a reduction in support for the Ukrainian movement for freedom. People also became intimidated with the idea of being associated with Ukrainian nationalistic organizations due to fear of inequitable condemnation. In addition to being threatened by enemy forces, members of the underground also were endangered by their own people. Mykhailo Podvornyak, a member of the insurgent movement in Volyn, claimed that Ukrainians were "no less scared of the SB than they were of the NKVD or Gestapo, for those who fell into their hands did not come out alive".¹¹⁶ Purges of the SB seem to be more destructive to the Ukrainian underground and movement than they were constructive. While their purpose was coherent, their implementation was exceptionally flawed, incapacitating the effectiveness of the Ukrainian underground.

2.3 Minority violence

The Sluzhba Bezpeky acted in radical ways that they believed were imperative for attaining freedom for Ukraine. One of their main goals was to protect the Ukrainian underground movement, in which they took extreme, and arguably, unneeded measures to do so. The SB began to hunt anyone who may have posed a threat to Ukrainian nationalists, their movement and ideology. Often, their victims were not proven to be guilty of committing any true crimes, for the SB began behaving more out of fear than rationality. The SB began disregarding people's individuality and personal actions when eradicating possible threats. Instead, they judged people by other factors, such as generalizations and stereotypes, which resulted in the attacks of minority groups.

¹¹⁶ Веденеев Д., Биструхін Г. Меч і тризуб...— С. 293.

OUN divided minority groups living on Ukrainian territories into two categories: allies and enemies. Classified as “enemies” were Russians, Poles, and Jews.¹¹⁷ While Russians and Poles were targeted for political reasons, attacks on Jews were more ideological, constructed on a general negative perception of their ethnicity. These persecutions were based on generalities that began during the first Bolshevik occupation of Ukraine in 1939. After Germans entered the Polish lands found on Ukrainian territory, Galician Jews were exuberant about the arrival of the Red Army. The coming of the Soviets made Jews feel sheltered from the wrath of the Nazis, of whom they were a prime target.¹¹⁸ Safety allowed them to submit to Soviet power, though their fanaticism for the regime led to more serious relations between the two.

Jews were enthusiasts of the Soviets, for they looked at them as their only hope for survival and freedom, and so they willingly assumed their ideology. Jews became allies of the Soviets and collaborated with them. Doing so, they undertook anti-Ukrainian views.¹¹⁹ Jews’ devotion to their heroes allowed them to surpass the role of “subordinates” and join them as authorities. By 1940, 39% of the officials of the NKVD were of Jewish ethnicity.¹²⁰

This tendency began earlier than the time of the German occupation though. Stereotypes form over a long period of time and get passed down from generation to generation. According to the researchers Shapanov and Zolotaryov, during the 1930s, 66.67% of the authorities of the NKVD on Ukrainian lands were Jewish.¹²¹ That being, it is possible that the associations between Jews and anti-Ukrainian politics were formed earlier than the coming of the SB. Yet, because of this historical context, Ukrainians already stereotyped that Jews were against them and the idea of a free Ukraine. Such generalizations qualified the Jews to become enemies of the Ukrainian secret police, for they were thought to serve as an obstacle to achieving sovereignty.

¹¹⁷ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині... – С. 64.

¹¹⁸ В'ятрович В. Ставлення ОУН до євреїв: формування позиції на тлі катастрофи. – Львів: МС, 2006. – С. 51-52.

¹¹⁹ Refer to footnote 118. – Pg. 53.

¹²⁰ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині... – С. 64.

¹²¹ Євреї в керівництві органів ДПУ–НКВС УСРР–УРСР у 1920–1930-х рр. / Ю. Шаповал, В. Золотарьов // З архівів ВУЧК-ГПУ-НКВД-КГБ. — 2010. — № 1 (34). — С. 53-93. — Бібліогр.: 46 назв. — укр.

The Jews' presence was felt by the Ukrainian population, who were attacked by the NKVD. In Volyn, the Stanislav region (today, Ivano-Frankivsk region), and Ternopol region, for example, one third of the revolutionary committee fighting against Ukrainians was composed of Jews.¹²² Commonly, Jews were not accepted into Ukrainian society for cultural differences and widely spread stereotypes, but their work in the NKVD, offered Ukrainians yet another reason to react negatively to this ethnicity. Hence, Jews were not only the enemies of Ukrainian national organizations but due to their direct attacks on the population, were detested by the Ukrainian people.¹²³ The populace and the nationalistic organizations of Ukraine directed their efforts against the Jews, however, such great focus on them may have potentially harmed the movement for independence, for Jews were used as a diversion by the Soviets.

In 1941, during the Second Great Gathering of OUN, a set of protocols regarding the fight for independence was formulated. Item 17 under "Political Regulations" stated, "Jews in the USSR are the most loyal support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Moscow imperialism in Ukraine. The anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses are used by the Moscow-Bolshevik government to divert their attention from the real cause of the disaster and to direct their pogroms at the Jews in time of a revolt. The organization of Ukrainian nationalists is fighting the Jews as a support for the Moscow-Bolshevik regime, while realizing the masses that Moscow is the main enemy."¹²⁴ This document claims that anti-Jewish opinions in Ukraine have been proliferated by the Soviets, who used the presence of Jews in their political activities to their benefit. By spreading anti-Jewish propaganda amongst Ukrainians, the Bolsheviks averted attention from themselves. The hate towards this ethnic group would make Ukrainians riot against the Jews, absolving the Soviets of blame for oppression or the suffering of the Ukrainian people. This document verifies though, that the Ukrainian authorities were aware of such schemes. Here, nationalists assert

¹²² Refer to footnote 18. – Pg. 52.

¹²³ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині... – С. 64.

¹²⁴ Кульчицький С. В. ОУН в 1941 році / Станіслав Владиславович Кульчицький // Документи. В 2-х ч. Ч. 1 / Станіслав Владиславович Кульчицький. – Київ: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2006. – С. 43.

that their conflict with the Jews was not based on ethnic, cultural, or even religious factors, but because of political differences. The enemy for OUN was not Jewish ethnicity but communism and the Soviets, which the Jews were commonly and generally closely associated with.¹²⁵ Hence, if Jews were thought to support communism and the Bolsheviks, they were considered to interfere with the Ukrainian movement for independence, making them an enemy of the Ukrainian Sluzhba Bezpeky.

SB distributed instructions to their members regarding the Jews, claiming that any Jew who was not working for the benefit of the Ukrainian cause was to be furtively murdered.¹²⁶ The elimination of the Jews was to be done silently and without notice, for the neither the Jews, nor the Ukrainian people were to be aware of the SB's activities regarding their death.¹²⁷ There may have been numerous motives in the authorities instructing the SB to conduct these murders quietly. First, if this information were to spread, it is possible that NKVD members would learn more about the doings of the SB. This could have harmed the entire SB operation and Ukrainian revolution, as well as put SB officers and members at an even higher risk of being detected and ultimately, destroyed. Another reason may be that the authorities, in issuing these instructions, did so in attempt to prevent any associations of contributing to the Nazi operations of eliminating Jews, the Holocaust. Despite these secret operations, OUN officially claimed to be against the murdering of Jews.¹²⁸

Slaughtering those of Jewish ethnicity had several purposes, the first of which was to eliminate those who were thought to threaten the movement for Ukrainian independence. However, the SB also used these killings as a way of indirectly communicating with the Soviets. Extermination of Jews was often done directly in revenge to the communist regime.¹²⁹ Again, the Jews were not targeted by the SB for

¹²⁵ Refer to footnote 123.– С. 66.

¹²⁶ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині...– С. 65.

¹²⁷ Refer to footnote 126.

¹²⁸ Refer to footnote 126.

¹²⁹ Refer to footnote 126.

ethnic reasons, but instead because of stereotypes that claimed they were collaborating with or tended to support the Bolshevik ideology.

It is important to remember that OUN and SB were organizations formed by people, whose ideas and feelings may not have corresponded with their organizations' stance on certain topics. While Jews were considered to be enemies, it is recorded that there were certain towns in which OUN members prevented Jewish pogroms from occurring.¹³⁰ There are also records of collaboration between Ukrainian nationalistic organizations and Jews. For example, Jewish doctors, along with their families, were secretly taken from ghettos to assist in the hospitals of UPA.¹³¹ Ivan Klymiv, a regional leader of OUN, claimed that some Jews were ready to contribute their efforts to the Ukrainian cause and were ready to sacrifice their life for it; however, he emphasizes that those who did offer were small in number.¹³²

In Ukraine during the 1940s, Jews were stereotyped for being communist supporters and sympathizers of the Bolshevik ideology. Fighting with the spread and support of communism, as well as with the encouragement of the Soviet occupation, the SB condemned anyone who stood in the way of their mission to attain independence. While OUN and the SB claimed that they were not against Jewish ethnicity, they targeted Jews based on generalizations claiming that they were collaborators with the Soviets.

Two factors are important when analyzing the case about SB persecuting the Jews. First, though official instructions of the SB required members to be intellectuals, not all members of the SB belonged to this category. The SB police department was composed only of men, for the specific of work required mostly physical strength and a passion for Ukrainian nationalism. Such intense concentration of these two elements resulted in a lack of intellectual development. Despite training being mandatory for all members of SB, the general intelligence levels of some members were low. This is demonstrated in the explanations of Danylo Shumuk, an instruction for the Ukrainian underground. He criticized the SB saying, "Among 56 people, only

¹³⁰ В'ятрович В. Ставлення ОУН до євреїв: формування позиції на тлі катастрофи... – С. 59-60.

¹³¹ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині... – С. 65.

¹³² Refer to footnote 131.

5 mastered the material and understood what it was about, and the rest, as they say, "*anyi v zub nohoju*." It was not interesting to give lectures at such a training, and it was absolutely impossible to hold conversations with those people. They just were not capable of thinking ..." (*anyi v zub nohoju*, a Ukrainian idiom that means "not at all").¹³³ Such a description reveals that even though members attended training, not all of them were cognoscente nor were they particularly sagacious.

The SB decided the fate of many peoples' lives, which may have been influenced by their way and level of thinking. In order to be most effective, members had to be able to deliberate who was worthy of harsh sentences and who was not. If proper consideration was not applied to killings, the innocent could have been liquidated.

The SB's eradication methods reflect the ways of the Ukrainian underground period. Members with a profound yearning for attaining sovereignty for their state were willing to be radical in their ways of achieving independence, which meant that sometimes critical actions were based on emotions, little thought and subjective reasoning. The main goal of the SB members was to exterminate the enemy, which were pursued at any cost. As evident by previous examples, a combination of fear and passion regulated the behavior of many members of the underground. Though these were not the only factors that contributed to such drastic killings.

It must also be considered that the police department of the SB did not have any judicial police. Along with this, no underground prisons existed to detain the guilty. No criminal justice system and the non-existence of jails led shootings to be central punishment for those admitted by the police.¹³⁴ Establishing criminal infrastructure requires large sums of money: the type of funds that the underground had no access to. Building a jail was also unrealistic for SB, for a jail would immobilize the underground, making it easier to uncover. With no place to keep offenders, along with the beforementioned reasons, the number of killed Jews by the SB may have been affected by such problems. The Jews though, were not the only minority group attacked by the SB OUN.

¹³³ Refer to footnote 131. – C. 65.

¹³⁴ Ярослав А. Діяльність СБ ОУН на Волині... – С. 67.

Women contributed greatly to the Ukrainian underground. They took on various tasks to help the liberation movement, sometimes endangering themselves and their families to contribute to the fight for an independent state.¹³⁵ Regardless of their efforts, women were still considered a threat to the Ukrainian underground at times and so were attacked in specific ways.

Women in Ukrainian national organizations, as well as ordinary Ukrainian locals were considered capable of becoming enemies of the SB. Those who were suspected of having any sexual relations with the Soviets were considered *moskal'ki*, a derogatory term meaning “Red Army whores”.¹³⁶ These women were thought of collaborating with the enemy, for sexual relationships allow not only a physical closeness but also a certain type of intimate relationship. Information could have been leaked due to emotions and would have been disadvantageous to the Ukrainian revolution. Erotic relations between Ukrainian women and Soviet soldiers also indicated a pro-Soviet ideology in women who agreed to such affairs, making *moskal'ki* an enemy group of the SB.¹³⁷

Sexual relations and romances were viewed as dangerous to the Ukrainian underground. Though women contributed to the movement for independence, their presence in the underground created the possibility of romances between insurgents. This was seen as destructive to the operations of Ukrainian organizations. Romantic relations distract people from their everyday duties. If insurgents became infatuated with one another, it is possible that they would become less productive. When women were accused of being less productive due to romantic reasons, their cooperation with the underground became jeopardized. For example, when UPA member Halyna Kokhanska was accused of not completing all of her tasks due to romantic ties with an insurgent, she was almost discharged from her position. These allegations originated from two insurgents who wanted to take revenge on Kokhanska, for she attributed them for being responsible for making certain underground reports

¹³⁵ Violence and the UPA Woman: Experiences and Influences / L. Zaricznik // Європейські історичні студії. - 2015. - № 2. - С. 253. - Режим доступу: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/eis_2015_2_17

¹³⁶ Burds, Jeffrey. “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948.” Cahiers Du Monde Russe. Russie - Empire Russe - Union Soviétique Et États Indépendants, Lodel, 16 Jan. 2007.– Pg. 307.

¹³⁷ Burds, Jeffrey. “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948.” ...– Pg. 307.

erroneous. The claims made against her were proven to be false and Kokhanska did not lose her position. However, this example demonstrates how male insurgents could attack women underground members who may have offended them or made them feel personally attacked.¹³⁸

Women were claimed to make Ukrainian male insurgents emotionally weaker than they would be without her impact. With the presence of women, men in the underground were thought to begin to desire the cordiality of a family life. Hence, they would not only become sensitive and unfocused in their work, but they would begin to be motivated by personal desires. It was important that members stay concentrated on completing their duties, defeating their enemies, and gaining independence for Ukraine. Because of these alleged effects on work performance, relationships in the underground were strongly discouraged and sexual activity was monitored by the SB OUN along with other higher rank officers.¹³⁹

The woman became a sexual target of the SB and the underground. Certain underground commanders regarded that male insurgents were not to limit their sex lives. Sometimes, commanders even had several mistresses. This became problematic if the women became impregnated. If the woman did get pregnant, she was forced to abort her child.¹⁴⁰

The consequences of becoming pregnant often entailed execution. This may have been done for many reasons. If a pregnant woman were to leave the underground, locals would be suspicious of who impregnated her, a question that threatened to reveal the male insurgent's position and secret work. If a man did not want to be associated with the child, and propagated abort, there was chance that the broken-hearted woman would seek revenge to the man who hurt her. This revenge could take form by turning to enemy authorities to denounce a woman's lover of working in the underground. Because of this, it was considered safer to eliminate all threats and evidence, leading to the eradication of impregnated women by execution. Certain SB

¹³⁸ Гінда, Володимир. "Повстанські Коханки." *Збруч*, 11 Mar. 2016, zbruc.eu/node/42541.

¹³⁹ Гінда, Володимир. "Повстанські Коханки.", zbruc.eu/node/42541.

¹⁴⁰ Refer to footnote 139.

members, such as “Zubr”, ordered their pregnant mistresses to be executed while pregnant. Some women agreed to abortions yet were reported to the SB for their sexual relations in the underground and were punished by death.¹⁴¹

While the SB eliminated women in the underground that either were mistresses of insurgents or impregnated by them, SB officers were not as severely punished for their relations with women insurgents. For example, an SB leader who went by the pseudonym of “Chernyk” committed rape, yet the only punishment he received was a demotion in rank.¹⁴² This case demonstrates that Ukrainian women were not only raped by the occupants of Ukraine, but also by their own men who were regarded as “heroes”. Even more, while the male insurgents who committed such crimes against women did receive punishments, they were minimal.

Women working in the underground felt harsh repercussions for having had relations with insurgent men. Punishments for sexual relations included forced abortions or death sentences. In the case of being infatuated with another member of the underground or distracting a man from his duties may have resulted in losing one’s position in the underground. Ordinary girls or women discovered to have any serious relationships (whether only intimately sexually or serious as marriage) with the enemy was usually killed.¹⁴³ SB instructions from 1945 claimed that women were not to be punished lightly, but to be sentenced to death for such crimes as being intimate with the enemy in any way.

By their treatment of the Jews and women of Ukraine, the SB proved itself to be a radical organization. They were fearful of anyone who endangered Ukrainian national organizations and the independence movement. Much of the SB’s activities were based on stereotypes and generalizations of certain groups that claimed these people as threats to the Ukrainian state. In their focused determination to bring back independence to Ukraine, the SB failed to consider people as individuals, which in

¹⁴¹ Refer to footnote 139.

¹⁴² М.І. Гавришко., Чоловіки, жінки й насильство в ОУН та УПА в 1940–1950-х рр. // Український історичний журнал. – 2016. – № 4. – С. 96.

¹⁴³ М.І. Гавришко., Чоловіки, жінки й насильство в ОУН та УПА в 1940–1950-х рр.–С. 103.

addition to damaging their own operations, caused the unjustified persecution of countless people.

CONCLUSION

Political and cultural suppression in Ukraine led to an intense surge in nationalism. With the appearance of Ukrainian nationalistic organizations, such as OUN and UPA, people became actively involved in the fight for a sovereign state. Leaders of such structures answered organizational questions that would help them prearrange ways that the independent country would function in the case of the downfall of the Soviet regime. This plan included the formation of a national secret police that originated from OUN (B): “Sluzhba Bezpeky”. The name of this security organ translates from Ukrainian and means “security service”. It was an underground, radical police organ that, with its many functions, ensured the independence movement in Ukraine was secure and effective.

This work divides into two chapters: the first, centering more on the theory of the SB, while the second, its practice. Beginning with how the SB was formed and why the nation was in need of such a service, the first chapter attempts to explain the context of the secret service’s appearance.

The Sluzhba Bezpeky began forming in 1939 with the intention of protecting the leaders of OUN (B). Its functions also comprised of securing the Ukrainian liberation movement from any external factors, as well as from internal threats. The SB’s primary enemy was the Soviet Union, its police, and supporters, and so this research dedicates much analyzation between the relationship between SB OUN and MGB/NKVD.

Chapter one explains not only what work the SB was supposed to do, but what kind of people filled the ranks of the police organ and what preparation they underwent before serving. While in theory these individuals were to be well-rounded, morally grounded, physically strong, and intellectually developed, many were accepted into the SB due to their fundamental nationalistic views. This, as the research demonstrates, was a flaw in their system of operation, for many lives were taken due to behaviors being based on emotions rather than rationality.

Examples of the SB acting out of fear and radicalism is seen in chapter two, where the SB's purges of the Ukrainian nationalistic organizations were examined. Purges were conducted due to the SB's anxieties about the internal threats: Ukrainian agents conspiring for the Soviets. Lack of trust between the Ukrainian underground networked produced paranoia causing the SB to act on instinct rather than sagacity, leading to severe, negative consequences.

During this research, a close examination was conducted to see both the positive and negative aspects of the Sluzhba Bezpeka's work. The SB's ideology was strong and its members' passion for Ukrainian freedom is what fueled their radical positions and ways of action. Though the police organ was destructive to itself at times and had enemy forces continuously trying to ambush it, its intentions of renewing an independent Ukraine had limited options of approaching their goal due to working in the underground and having limited sources.

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