B. The *Logos* the Center of All

1. General remarks

The interest in the study of the concept of *logos* in late antique philosophy and patristic theology has become so immense that it developed into a separate domain of scholarly research. Wilhelm Kelber tentatively referred to the subject of the study of *logos* as logosophy to accentuate a field of rational inquiry that has existed and functioned on its own terms from the early times of philosophical discourse.\(^1\) The term logosophy, or logology as previously formulated by P. B. Pade, reflects a recognizable degree of autonomy of philosophical discourse. The notion encompasses an important set of notions that unified a major antique philosophical-theological system of thought, one that was dominant in neo-Pythagoreanism and Stoicism, operative in Middle- and Neo-Platonism, critical for the early Christian theology, and extremely influential in the ensuing dogmatic formulations and philosophical schools of thought of Western civilization.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) When Wilhelm Kelber spoke about logosophy, he did not overlook its potent esoteric sense, origins of which reach back as far as Heraclitus and his fascination with the mystery of Diana of Ephesus. See *Die Logoslehre von Heraklit bis Origenes* (Stuttgart: Verlag Urachhaus, 1976), p. 7.

\(^2\) P. B. Pade intended the term and the notion of logology to be in a strictly theological sense that played a paramount role for Clement’s understanding of the identity of Christ. See Λόγος Θεός: *Untersuchungen zum Logos-Christologie des Titus Flavius Clemens von Alexandrien. Eine dogmengeschichtliche Studie*. Inaugural Dissertation (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1939), p. 163; for a closer discussion of Pade’s work, see below.
It has often been pointed out that the doctrine of the *logos* had its advantages and disadvantages for nascent Christian theology. On the one hand, the term was prevalent in antiquity and was used one way or another by virtually all philosophical schools and mystery cults, each of which enshrouded it with its particular doctrinal gist. Under a strong influence of Stoic philosophy, the main tendency in the second century CE was to deem the *logos* divine and to make it the organizing principle of the complex structure of the universe and its laws. The *logos* was often identified with the reason and the will of God or with the Ideas or Platonic Forms that are in the mind of God. Alcinous, Plutarch, Albinus, Philo, and other Middle Platonists strongly opposed the possibility of intermingling the *logos* with matter due to the overtly dualistic understanding of the realm from above, to which the *logos* undoubtedly belonged. Together with other divine attributes, the *logos* stood in sharp contrast to the realm of material world. On the other hand, the intellectual nature of the Stoic *logos spermatikos*, one of the highest of all logological kinds, even though composed of the most subtle matter, it was omnipresent and omnipotent in all there is in the universe, giving it the purpose of linking and orchestrating the existence of everything, both human and divine, by virtue of its cardinal role in the structure and laws of the universe. Gnostic writers, as it is apparent in Valentinus’ metaphysics, allotted the top status to the *logos* along with the corresponding eon *zoe*, which stood at the center of the emanatory system of eons of the *ogdoad* (*pleroma*). Both the *logos* and his partner eon *zoe* derived from the *nous* and the *aletheia*,

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3 For example, George Prestige contended that “the doctrine of the Logos, great as was its importance for theology, harbourd deadly perils in its bosom,” see his *God in Patristic Thought* (London: S. P. C. K., 1952), p. 129.
who, in turn, were direct progeny of the *bythos* and the *suge* and gave birth to the eons of the *anthropos* and the *ecclesia*.4

Thus, the notion of the *logos* was a convenient point of contact between various philosophical and religious schools and also became a juncture for new interpretations by early Christian commentators, who took great pains in representing the *logos* as the unifying ontological reality that linked cosmological, metaphysical, ethical, epistemological, anthropological, and, ultimately, eschatological concepts encapsulated in the Johannine paradoxical formulation of the “*logos* became flesh” (John 1:14). The critical problem with our understanding of the term *logos* today, however, lies not only in the diversity of its meanings in antiquity and thus the difficulty of the understanding of how precisely the Christian authors interpreted it, but also in a striking contrast of its ancient meanings with our contemporary post-Cartesian and more so with our postmodern perception of the term. Postmodern philosophy embraced such disintegration of the meaning of the term and pushed it even further away from its ancient sense by making the search for the center of things not necessarily important and desirable, thereby alienating, to put it metaphorically, the *logos* of poetry from that of daily work; the *logos* of wealth from that of social justice; the *logos* of ethics from that of politics or stem cell research.

Indeed, some theological schools of contemporary christology, under the impact of such a disintegrated understanding of the *logos*, gave grounds for the criticism of the

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christology “from above” by the alternative christology “from below,” being uninterested in synthesized and metaphorical and thus purportedly “speculative” definitions of the logos and so clung to the more tangible, “down-to-earth,” interpretations of Christ’s identity. For the christology “from below,” the weight of the inclusive meaning of the term logos has often become much too heavy for reconstructing Christ’s identity for its metaphysical senses that are embedded in its classical understanding. As an example, it has been argued that “it was an unfortunate turn when theology eventually after Clement moved away from this concept [of Jesus Christ as the word of God and the living law] to the interpretation of Jesus to that of the logos, from νόμος ἔμπνευσεν to σάρξ γενόμενος, with the ensuing logical definitions of the relationship of the two natures in Christ.”

Such speculative characterization of the term, however, is not the only possible interpretation of it. The complexity of the ancient notion of the logos can present itself not only as being difficult, obscure, or simply old and unnecessary for contemporary theology but also as revealing and rewarding for a theological pursuit of Christ’s identity or the notion of identity per se. What I would like to show in this dissertation is that the term can prove its resourcefulness even to a postmodern reader as soon as she reassesses and appreciates the antique ways and methods elaborated by early Christian authors who synthesized the function, structure and purpose of the logos with a rich and flexible variety of applications.

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What William Richardson intimated about theology after Clement by saying that it has found itself in the cul-de-sac of logical speculations on Christ’s identity, many contemporary scholars held about Clement himself. They overlooked the dynamic and extremely complex character of Christ’s identity in Clement’s christological vision. The concept of the *logos* was the Via Canopica of Clement’s theology, ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. A strong emphasis on the preexistent nature of the *logos*, his absolute

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6 Via Canopica, today Horreya Avenue, was the main and the broadest boulevard in Alexandria running through the center of the city and connecting the western Sun Gate with the eastern Moon Gate, thereby being the city’s “armature,” “a clearly delineated, path-like core of thoroughfares and plazas that provided uninterrupted passage throughout the town and gave ready access to its principle public buildings,” as William McDonald defined it, see his *Architecture of the Roman Empire* (New Haven, 1986), p. 3, 5. The ancients often recurred to the linkage between the urban topography and the socioeconomic structure, which has its direct correlation with the cultural and religious structure of any particular city. See Strabo, *Geographica* 17.1.7; Ammianus Marcellinus, *Historia* 22.16.7-9; *Expositio Totius Mundi* 35.1-8, 36.9-16.

transcendence and divinity, of which I will speak more later in this chapter, is part of what often is called an impersonal, logical and static concept that allegedly obfuscated the uniqueness of Christ’s identity and his personal dynamic characteristics. However, when we look at Clement’s logos christology more closely, we find that for him the logos is not a purely intellectual category, metaphysical principle or simply a logical formula but rather a personalized reality that permeates, represents, and unites the human and divine. Harold Blair’s understanding of the logos is the central and most significant characteristic of Clement’s logos christology. Clement portrays a deep-seated personalization of the logos, who became human, as was inaugurated by the author of the Gospel of John. Human outreach beyond his/her own existence is met with God’s readiness to provide unconditional love, help and support. Moreover, as I will also show later, for Clement, the logos is the one who for eternity makes the transcendental God assert God’s own dynamic personal expression, which eventually became a vivid model (and not a formula in mathematics or physics) for the creation of the world with its

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9 See my reference to Blair’s conception of the logos as “polymerization” of archetypes in the previous chapter.

10 For Clement’s understanding of God’s philanthropy, see Paid. 1.3.7-9.
concrete objects and their functional purposes and also for the consequent becoming of
the *logos* a human with a concrete body, living, and a human vocation or profession, as
one might say, of an itinerary rabbi.

Clement is allotted a recognized status in interpreting the multifaceted notion of
the *logos* in Christian terms for his essential personalization of the *logos*. He is part of
the emerging Christian tradition with such prominent figures of early Christian theology
as Paul, John, Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras of Athens, Theophilus of
Antioch, Irenaeus, and the author of the *Letter to Diognet*. We may also add to the
beginning of this list the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria. Philo may have
understood the *logos* as a separate divine agent or merely a metaphorical
anthropomorphic manner of speech that was intended to reconcile the absolute
transcendence of God and God’s engagement with the world. In addition, a profound
influence on the formation of Clement’s own understanding of the *logos* is found in his
notes taked in the classes of Gnostic teachers he may have attended either in Alexandria
or elsewhere. In those notes we find a highly polemical and perhaps first of its kind
discussion of the Gospel of John, where the Gnostic teachers and with them Clement
himself struggled to understand John’s theology as well as its ontological, cosmological,
eschatological, and soteriological meanings.

However, while Clement shared much of his predecessors’ erudition and intuition
with regard to the personalization of the philosophical concept of the *logos*, he
nonetheless marked a new phase in adapting it to the Christian meaning of God’s Word
in the broader context of the prehistoric and historical activity of the *logos*. There is a
general agreement among scholars that Clement is first of all a moral theologian and not a Christian metaphysician in a sense that we speak of Origen.\footnote{Salvatore R.C. Lilla, \textit{Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism} (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 60ff. Cf. also Philip Rousseau, \textit{The Early Christian Centuries} (London: Longman, 2002), p. 114-115.} Clement never wrote a separate treatise on \textit{The First Principles}, even though he promised to write it a number of times. Nevertheless, based on Clement’s surviving logological discussions, we can establish his \textit{logosophy} as the one recognizably coherent system of thought and indeed a worldview that provided much of the terminological apparatus for ensuing generations of theology.
2. In How Many Logoi Did Clement of Alexandria Believe?\textsuperscript{12}

In order to recreate Clement’s doctrine on the logos, an extensive overview of the scholarship on the subject will provide us with the background of the main problems and possible solutions to the identity and function of the logos in Clement’s theology and christology. It will also provide us with several intricate discussions of Clement’s key logosical passages. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I touched upon some of the most important tendencies of the christological discussions of the last two centuries. A similar program may be observed in the field of the early patristic logology in general and studies on Clement’s logos in particular. As will be demonstrated shortly, Clement is regarded by some scholars precisely for his logosophy as the pillar of ecclesiastical orthodoxy (Tollinton, Völker, Méhat), by others as a semi-Gnostic nonconformist (Harnack, Casey, Egan), and still by others as some type of a freelance philosopher fusing Gnostic, Hellenistic, and Christian concepts of the logos (Kelber, Dawson, van den Hoek). Now, if one was to ask the question as to whether Clement of Alexandria believed in one divine logos or in two (or three, or “n” stages of emanation of the logos) – indeed this very question dominated the scholarly debate of Clement’s christology of the last century – the answer would depend on several presuppositions. Here I will outline only three.

\textsuperscript{12} Part of this chapter was presented in a form of a paper at the First Graduate Student Paper Reading for the School of Theology and Religious Studies Student Association on October 4, 2005, to commemorate the second anniversary of passing away of the late Dean Msgr. Steven Happel, Dean of STRS at the Catholic University of America. To this inspirational preacher, professor, and friend I dedicate this section.
The first presupposition defines a hierarchy of “authority” of Clement’s texts. Only five of Clement’s ten known writings have survived (plus scattered quotations in the later church fathers, who cited Clement’s lost works such as *Ecloguae Propheticae*, *Hypotyposes*, and *Adumbrationes*). From those five books, only three were meant for publication. The rest were Clement’s private notes either for his lectures or more likely sketches for his written or unwritten compositions. Does then one treat all the texts of Clement equally? Or does one give priority to Clement’s more polished and better thought through works? Or, on the contrary, one could dwell on the seemingly random notes, since as a “rough” material they may reflect Clement’s beliefs more genuinely and intimately. The second presupposition pertains to Clement’s sources: one has to find out to what degree Clement was original and/or how much he appropriated the view on the *logos* of Philo, Apologists, Middle Platonists, and Gnostics. And finally the third presupposition is of a methodological nature: one needs to choose the best approach to a complex christological interpretation of the *logos*. Either one treats the *logos* as a separate theological/philosophical category or as Clement’s starting point for a broader christological quest for the identity of Jesus Christ. Different scholars take different approaches, but as I will demonstrate in the following pages there are two very clearly distinct groups of scholars that give their answers to the above questions in symptomatically comparable ways.
a) One *Logos* vs. Two *Logoi*

My point of departure is the previously quoted work by P.B. Pade entitled Λόγος Θεός. Originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation at the theology department of the Papal Gregorian University in Rome in 1939, it accurately sums up the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century scholarship on Clement’s christology and teaching on the *logos*. Pade’s method of research is predominantly that of *Dogmengeschichte*. Besides establishing the model of Clement’s *logos* christology, his second interest was to raise the question as to whether or not Clement belonged to the ecclesiastically defined standards of orthodoxy. It seems, however, that in establishing Clement’s orthodoxy the author was guided by the dogmatic standards of Nicaea if not that of the Vatican I. Pade’s test of Clement’s orthodoxy is based on two concerns of a dogmatic nature: a) how did Clement regard the relationship between the Father and the Son, and b) did or did not Clement believe in the subordination of the Son to the Father.\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{13}\) See Pade, Λόγος Θεός, pp. 39-42. The author criticizes Eugène de Faye, who in his *Clément d’Alexandrie. Étude sur les Rapports de Christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au II\textsuperscript{e} siècle* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1906), p. 244, contends that Christ the *logos* was a person but only when he was incarnated; de Faye is not certain whether, according to Clement, the *logos* was a person before the Incarnation, or, as Clement’s predecessor Philo believed, the preexistent *logos* of God was an integral part of the Father and not an independent agent. Pade goes also into a brief discussion of the older scholarship as represented by A. Baillait’s foreword entitled *Vita Sancti Clementis Presbyteri Alexandrini* to *Sancti Clementis Alexandrini Opera* (Venetiis, 1715), pp. IX-X; Nicolas Le Nourry, *Dissertations de omnibus Clementis Alexandrini operibus* in J.P. Migne, *Series Graeca* IX, col. 795-1481 (reprinted in *Le Nourry’s Apparatus ad Bibliothecam Maximam Veterum Patrum etc.* [Paris, 1703-1715]), esp. col. 853, 855, 858, 1114ff., and Georgius Bullus, *Defensio fidei Nicaenae ex scriptis Cath. Doct. Qui intra prima Ecclesiae christianae saecula florerunt* (Ticinæ, 1784), sect. 2, c. 6; 9; 3; sect. 4, c. 3, who saw Clement as the precursor of Nicaea (325); for Christopher Bigg the idea of Unity in Clement was more important and thus he concludes that the tendencies of subordination in Clement were secondary, see *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), p. 97; A. de la Barre also concluded that Clement’s theology should still be regarded as orthodox, see *Clément d’Alexandrie*, in *Dictionaire de Théologie Catholique* I (Paris: Letouzey, 1911), col. 137-199, 159.


Pade’s Λόγος Θεός contains several significant insights for the study of Clement’s christology, yet at the same time its obvious shortcomings call for further investigation and improvement. In and of itself, this work is not only a proficient summary of the previous available scholarship on the subject, but it has a comprehensive register and analysis of passages that discuss the logos identity of Christ from a perspective of the relation between God and the logos. While the logos was found


See also Walther Völker’s overview of the end of 19th – beg. of 20th century scholarship on Clement’s logos in his Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1952), p. 39, n. 1.

14 Pade, Λόγος Θεός, p. 176.
divine, eternal, and equal to the Father, the historical, i.e., human, aspect of Christ the 
logos is almost entirely missing in his approach. There are also further disadvantages of 
Pade’s work. The drawbacks are due to the issues concerning the sources available to the 
author. Besides the works of Clement (Protrepticus, Paedagogus, Stromata, Quis Dives 
Salvetur) acknowledged by textual criticism, our author was well informed of the 
difficulties and uncertainties pertaining to the claims of authenticity and interpretation of 
Clement’s Excerpta ex Theodoto and Eclogae Propheticae. The latter work, which is a 
collection of fragments of Clement’s commentaries on various books of the Jewish 
Scriptures, the New Testament, and early Christian Apocrypha, also contains a Latin 
translation of a disputable fragment of Clement’s commentary on John, otherwise called 
Adumbrationes Clementis Alexandrini in Epistolas Canonicas (I. Petr., I Jud. et II. Jo.). 
With all proper reservations, Pade deliberately chose to draw upon the contents of the 
Adumbrationes, which are regarded by modern scholars as a dubious source that later 
scripts most likely attributed to Clement. He cited the disputed passage on the eternal 
generation of the Son from the Father along with his central arguments that corroborate 
Clement’s orthodoxy.15 On the other hand, he explicitly distrusted the obscure passages 
of the Excerpta and thus almost entirely shunned to discuss some of its key christological

15 Adumrationes in epistola Johannis prima, in Opera. Ed. by Stählin, vol. 17, (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 
The major defects of Pade’s study are the shortage of use of Gnostic concepts and barely any reference to the *Excerpta* as Clement’s significant source.\(^{17}\)

On the other hand, Pade succeeded in collecting and analyzing most significant passages that discuss the identity of the *logos* in its relation to God in Clement’s main texts. The exceptions are those passages found in Clement’s *Excerpta*. I will look at most of them in detail later while discussing interpretations of Clement’s *logos* by Casey, Wolfson, Lilla, Osborn and others, especially in light of polemical discussions of other Clement’s scholars who deal with the identity of the *logos*.

On a christological level, Pade placed Clement’s conceptions in a strictly theological framework by showing Clement’s keen interest in the crucial contours of a theological discourse linked to philosophy, revelation, gnosis (learning, faith, and knowledge), the Scriptures, and the ecclesiological *regula fidei*. All five elements played their respective roles in establishing the frames and boundaries of Clement’s theological system, which served a purpose of demonstrating the soteriological mission of Christ. Thus, according to Pade, the overarching intent of Clement’s theology was the human attainment of salvation, which set up a stage for the drama of the Christ’s mission in heaven and on earth.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{16}\) Pade, p. 34.

\(^{17}\) Before the discovery of the Nag Hammagi library hardly anyone in modern times could claim him/herself an expert in this field in the true sense of the word.

\(^{18}\) Pade, pp. 64-67.
The first role in this eschatological drama motivated by the conundrum of the
destiny of the human race belonged to no one else but the Creator of heaven and earth
and of everything that exists. Pade rightly emphasized that, for Clement, the identity of
God was the ontological underpinning of all dependant identities, including that of
Christ.\textsuperscript{19} According to Pade, Clement spoke about God in concurrence with the Middle
Platonic apophatic and emanative philosophical terms articulated in the Judeo-Christian
religious philosophy of Clement’s predecessors, i.e., Philo of Alexandria and Basilides.
Thus, on the one hand, God is absolutely transcendent,\textsuperscript{20} without beginning,\textsuperscript{21}
uncontainable,\textsuperscript{22} unconceivable,\textsuperscript{23} unnamable,\textsuperscript{24} formless,\textsuperscript{25} and passionless.\textsuperscript{26} On the
other hand, God is one and unique,\textsuperscript{27} the Father,\textsuperscript{28} eternal,\textsuperscript{29} ubiquitous,\textsuperscript{30} philanthropic.\textsuperscript{31}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 68-91.
\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Ferdinand C. Baur, \textit{Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes
in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung} (Hildesheim; New York: Olms, 2005 [Originally published in
Tübingen, 1841]), p. 191.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Protr.} 6.68.2.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Strom.} 2.2.6.2-3.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Strom.} 5.4.24.2; 5.6.33.4; 7.5.28.1; cf. Plato \textit{Phaed.} 247 a; \textit{Tim.} 29 e.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Strom.} 5.12.82.1-2.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Strom.} 3.17.103.3.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Strom.} 4.23.151.1-2; 7.6.30.1.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Protr.} 6.68.3; \textit{Strom.} 4.23.151.3; 6.3.29.2.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Strom.} 5.1.1.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Paed.} 3.3.16.4.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Strom.} 2.2.6.3; 7.5.28.1.
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Mind, Creator, the Almighty, and all those other supreme designations that are not God’s proper names, but rather feeble human epistemological attempts that, according to Clement, help us form an idea about the ultimate Being. In order to create the world and to communicate with it, God acted through the mediator, the *logos*, who had something in common with both the Creator and the creation. The relationship of God to the *logos*, therefore, defined the identity of the latter.

According to Pade, Clement followed the Johannine tradition of the *logos* christology and identified the *logos* with the only-begotten Son of the Father. One can find Clement commenting on the Gospel of John throughout all of his works, not to mention *Adumbrationes* and *Excerpta*, which basically are several of the first skilled commentaries on the Gospel that established a particularly Christian Alexandrian tradition of biblical commentary. In those commentaries, the relationship between the Father and the Son became the key to interpreting the *logos*, the Son of God, as the ontological recipient and bearer of God’s divine identity, which in turn secured the place of the *logos* on the side of the pre-temporal and uncreated realm rather than on the side of the world created in time. Additionally, together with timelessness, the *logos* enjoyed the status of full divinity: the *logos* was eternally divine with God. According to Pade, even

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31 *Paed.* 1.8.63.3; 1.13.101.1.  
32 *Strom.* 4.25.155.2.  
33 *Strom.* 5.12.82.1.  
34 *Strom.* 4.1.2.2.  
35 Cf. again *Strom.* 5.12.82.2.
though God and the *logos* shared the same ontological divine essence, the Father and the Son formed two separate entities that acted congenially and agreeably. Eternal coexistence also suggested equality of the Son with the Father, which derived from the Platonic reasoning of contraposition of the divine and material, where the former is one and undivided and the latter one is multiple and consists of parts. Pade believed that the subordinative status of the *logos* – spoken of in the John’s Gospel and in Clement – meant exclusively the earthly mission of the *logos*, who paradoxically united the divine and earthly in Christ. Therefore, Pade concluded, by virtue of its unique position as God’s Son, the *logos* was called divine, eternal, and equal in his divinity to the Father.\(^{36}\)

Pade wrote his dissertation as a direct response to, and critique of, an established scholarship that presented Clement as a thinker, who was on the edge of Christian orthodoxy. However, he was perhaps one of the last scholars interested in this type of argumentation. About a half century prior to the publication of this dissertation, Theodor Zahn moved scholarship in a different direction.\(^{37}\) Rather than arguing whether Clement was “orthodox” or not, he inaugurated a long discussion, which – as will be shown – is still going on even today, concerning Clement’s belief in the twofold theory of the generation of the *logos* from God that resonated in the ensuing Arian theology.\(^{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Cf. Pade, pp. 68-171.


\(^{38}\) Cf. an Arian passage from Thalia cited by Athanasius in *Contra Arianos* 1. c. 5 that clearly speaks of the twofold generation of the *logos* and *sophia*. I am not, however, concerned here with the question whether or not Arius espoused this view or it was Athanasius’ inventive interpretation of Arius.
In his work, Zahn discussed a brief fragment from the lost work of Clement called *Hypotyposes*. The passage is quoted by Photius in his *Bibliotheka*, in which Photius discussed Origen’s texts that underwent multiple textual and theological bowdlerizations that occurred as a result of translations, copying, and the polemics regarding the use of Origen’s texts for theological evidential proofs. As an example of a similar misrepresentation, Photius pointed out how Clement of Alexandria could have been a victim to similar forgery, since one can find orthodox teachings in some of his works, but in others “he [Clement] is altogether led astray into impious and fabulous doctrines.”

Moreover, Photius continued, in those other writings “in his folly he [Clement] is convinced that there are two *logoi* of the Father, of which the lesser appeared to men, but not even that one. For he says: “The Son is called the *logos* like the paternal *logos* but this is not the one that became flesh. No, nor was it the paternal *logos* but a certain power of God, a kind of emanation of his *logos* that became reason and has been immanent in the hearts of men.”

Zahn believed the latter quotation, which Photius attributed to Clement, to be genuinely of Clement’s authorship. Furthermore, from

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Clement’s parallel extant writings, Zahn collected evidence that was meant to prove Clement’s belief in two divine logos.

Following the main line of Zahn’s argument, Robert Casey agreed with Zahn’s basic thesis, i.e., that the passage quoted by Photius did belong to Clement, for he found the language of the passage to be very close to the language used by Clement (the phrase ὁ λόγος πατρικός was a clear sign of this).41 However, Casey decided to provide more solid proof that would support the thesis, since Casey found the arguments presented by Zahn “forceful” “though not always right.”42 As his evidence Casey presented three passages from Clement’s extant writings, i.e., Protrepticus 10.98.4, Stromateis 7.3.16-6, and Excerpta 1.19.1 that he believed supported the thesis. The first two passages deal with the notion of the hierarchy of the images of God, where the human mind is called the third divine image being the reflection of the logos, who, in turn, is the second image of God.43 The third passage speaks of the Incarnation of the logos in the context of


42 Casey, “Clement and the two divine Logoi,” p. 45.

43 These two passages do clarify Clement’s understanding of the relationship between the ultimate Mind (ὁ νοῦς), its most immediate Image (ὁ θεός λόγος), and human mind (ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ), but give us little information about his belief in the twofold generation/emanation of the logos unless we do the necessary speculative adjustments. See Protr. 10.98.4: “For the image of God is his logos, the genuine Son of the nous, the divine logos, the archetypal light of light; and an image of the logos is the true man, the nous, which is in man, who is therefore said to have been made after the image and likeness of God.” – “Εἰκών” μὲν ὑπ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ (καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θεός λόγος, φωτὸς ἀρχή ὁ λόγος, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ ἀληθινὸς σωτήρ, ὁ κατὰ εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιωσιν” διὰ τὸ τὸτε γεγενήθαι λεγόμενος.

Strom. 7.3.16-6: “For above all things the soul of the just man is an “Image divine made like to God himself,” in which is enshrined through obedience to the commandments the Ruler of all both mortal and immortal, a King and Parent of the beautiful, who is really a Law and Rule and eternal Reason, who is the one Savior peculiar to each yet common to all. This is the real Only-Begotten, the seal of the glory of
recollecting on Theodotus’ commentary on John 1:14. Here Clement commented on the
verse of John 1:14 “and the logos became flesh” and noted that “not only by his presence
did he [logos] become man, but the essential logos became Son by limitation, not
essentially.”

Casey concluded, therefore, that the incarnate Jesus Christ must have been
the Son of the logos. I should note, however, that ten years later in his commentary on
Excerpta that Casey furnished with his own translation of Excerpta into English he
ventured a slightly less rigorous distinction between the two logoi in light of Clement’s
polemics with Valentinus.

the universal King and all-powerful Father who impresses on the Gnostic the perfect vision according to his
image, so that there is now the third divine image likened as far as possible to the second Cause, to the real
Life, through whom we live the true life, as if copying the Gnostic type which was made for us and is
directed toward the firm and unchangeable things, – μάλιστα γὰρ ἄγαλμα θεῶν καὶ θεῷ προσεμφερές ἄνθρωπον δικαίου ψυχῆν ἐν ἥ διὰ τῶν παρασχελμάτων ὑπακοῆς τεμνεῖται καὶ ἐνδιάφθει ὁ πάντων ἔχουσιν ὑπήκοον τε καὶ ἄθροικόν τε καὶ γεννητόν τῶν καλῶν, νόμιμον ὁ ὄντος καὶ
θεικόν καὶ λόγος αἰώνιος, ὢδη τε εἰκάστως καὶ κοινὴ πάσιν εἰς ὧν συστή, δύο ὁ τῷ ὅντι
μονογενῆς, ὁ τῆς τοῦ παρασκελλέως καὶ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς δόξης χαρακτή, ἐναποφασιζόμενος
tὸ γνωστικὸ τὴν τελειὰν ἑξερέγανα θεωρίαν καὶ ἐκόνινα τὴν ἐκουσί, ὡς εἶναι τρίτην ἡ ὧν ἔχειν ἀκόνα
tὴν ὧν ὂντος ἑξερείαν ἐξομοιωθηκέν τῷ τῷ βῆτερον ἀκόν, πρὸς τὴν ὄντος ὑπήκοον, ὧν ὠν ὄντος
tὴν ἀληθὴ ψυχὴν, ὧν ὄντος ὑπήκοον τὸν γνωστικὸν <τύπον> γινόμενον ἡμῖν, περὶ τὰ βοῶν καὶ
παντελῶς ἀναλοίας ἀναστεφάνειον.”

Exc. ex Theod. 1.19.1: “Καὶ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο”, οὐ κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν μόνον
ἀνθρώπου γενόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ἀρχὴν ὁ ἐν ταυτότητι λόγος, κατὰ περὶγραφήν καὶ οὐ κατ’

See The Excerpta ex Theodoto. Trans. and ed. with introduction and notes by Robert Pierce
“The most fruitful of Clement’s criticism concerns the doctrine of the logos, for here a large measure of
sympathy for the philosophy underlying Valentinian theology is controlled by loyalty to Christian doctrine,
and he explains his own views with unusual clarity and vigour. Having discussed the Valentinian theory of
Monogenes, Jesus and the Deiurmi (Exc. 7), he states his own opinion, according to which

a) there is a divine logos which belongs to the Godhead as a part of its essential being;

b) this logos becomes an active principle in creation and is incarnate in the prophets and in Jesus; and

c) the logos of God and the logos in Jesus and the prophets are fundamentally and substantially the same,
but its activity acquires an individuality of its own and thus establishes a personal distinction within the
Godhead. The logos who creates and is incarnate becomes the offspring and conscious expression of
God’s rational nature, τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταυτότητι λόγου ὁ σωζὴ ἐνίοτος, Exc. 19, 2;
τὸν λόγον τοῦ λόγον ἐν ταυτότητι (19, 4).”
To support his argument Casey contextualized evidence of Clement with accounts from the first and second century philosophical and theological literature of such writers as Cornutus, Philo, Justin, Tertullian, and Valentinus, all of whom clearly distinguished between the two *logoi*: one internal (in the bosom of divinity or human mind) and the second one expressed/external (as God’s creation, the Incarnation of the *logos* in flesh or simply as an orally uttered word). I will revisit this article later several times for a more detailed analysis of its basic ideas. It should suffice here to say that the notion that Clement believed in the twofold generation of the *logos* has had, with several exceptions, a strong and significant voice in scholarship on Clement for most of the twentieth century.

When Harry Wolfson recreated the intellectual trends of the first centuries of Christian philosophy in general and Clement of Alexandria’s in particular, he took Zahn’s thesis for granted. For him Clement, as well as Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, Tertullian, Theophilus, Novatian, Lactantius, Hippolytus, and Zeno of Verona, believed in the so-called twofold stage theory of generation of the *logos*. On the other hand, according to Wolfson, only Irenaeus and Origen held the view of the single

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stage theory. This dichotomy also to some extent reflected what Wolfson called the single and double faith theory that corresponded to the more simple and unmediated faith in God (Tertullian and Origen) on the one side and faith mediated by faith and reason (Clement and Augustine) on the other side.48

Wolfson construed his argument slightly differently from Casey. He began his exposition by criticizing those conventional passages we find in Pade that speak about a) eternal unity of the *logos* with God,49 b) eternal generation (ἀναρχος γενόμενος),50 c) being timeless (ἀχρονον) and without beginning (ἀαρχή), the first principle (αρχή) and firstling (ἀρχή) of existences,51 and d) the eternal Son (υἱός αἰῶνα).52 Thus, the eternal unity of the *logos* with God, Wolfson contended, was also reiterated by Athenagoras, Hippolytus and Novatian and that does not prevent us from reporting the fact that they believed in the twofold stage generation of the *logos*. Why mustn’t that also apply to Clement? The meaning of the expression ἀναρχος γενόμενος Wolfson interpreted not as “was generated without beginning” but rather as “was impassable without beginning” shifting the sense from metaphysics into a moral sphere, i.e., Clement’s reinterpretation of the Stoic notion of *apatheia* and how it related to Christ’s impassibility even during his birth. Clement described the *logos* the Son in his relation to the Father, when Clement

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48 See Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, pp. 102-111 for the single faith theories and pp. 112-140 for the double faith theories.

49 *Paed.* 1.7.53, 1.8.62; *Strom.* 5.1.1.3.

50 *Strom.* 7.2.7.2.

51 *Strom.* 7.1.2.2-3.2.

52 *Protr.* 12.121.2.
spoke of the true Gnostic, who “judges all excellence to be honorable according to its 
worth,” of which the highest position is set for the “oldest in origin, the timeless and 
unoriginated First Principle, and Firstling of existences – the Son – from whom we are to 
learn the remoter Cause, the Father.”

Wolfson interpreted this passage as such that 
echoed Philo’s description of the logos in its second stage of existence. And finally, 
Wolfson interpreted the “eternal Son” in Philonic sense of “eternal logos” that could 
mean the “unending,” eternal a parte post, or continuous existence of the Son through all 
the stages of His existence taken together. In addition, Wolfson reminded us that the 

53 Strom. 7.1.2.2.5-3.2: τὴν ἄφρον ὑπὸν ἀναργυροῦ ἀρχῆς τε καὶ ἀπαρχῆς τῶν ἀντίων, τῶν ὑλῶν·
παρ’ οὗ ἐκμαν ἑστιν ναύπην τό ἐπέκεινα αἴτιων, τόν πατέρα τῶν ὅλων.

54 The question of Clement’s dependence on Philo is one of the most crucial for the study of 
Clement’s conception of the logos, since to a large degree depending on what conclusion a scholar makes 
with regards to the Philonian logos, he or she tends to portray Clement’s logos along the same lines. 
Wolfson previously interpreted Philo’s logos as a twofold emanation, see his Philo. Foundations of 
Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1968), pp. 226-294 and so it is reflected on his understanding of Clement’s conception of the logos. 
Walther Völker previously argued that despite large borrowings from Philo Clement independently 
developed his system of ethics, metaphysics, and anthropology; see the introduction of Der wahre 
Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen 
Literatur 57 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1952) and the treatment of Philo in his previous 
work Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit. 
Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 49 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1938). 
Similar conclusion made Annewies van den Hoek in her Clement of Alexandria and His use of Philo in the 
Stromateis. An Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model. Vigiliae Christianae Supplement 3 (Leiden: 
also a comprehensive and balanced treatment of the “evolution” of the concept of logos from Philo to 
Clement in Carsten Colpe, “Von der Logoslehre des Philon zu der des Clemens von Alexandrien,” in 
In this article, Colpe demonstrated that, on the one hand, Philo spoke of the logos as the idea, icon, power, 
and wisdom of God, the mediator between the world and its Creator, and allegorically as the servant, 
envoy and satellite of God, and on the other hand, Clement made one step further by personalization and 
christological elevation of this notion to the status of God’s Son. In addition, Colpe showed how in his 
association of logos/anthropos/nous/logismos/sophia Philo was instrumental for the Gnostic and Christian 
views on the Incarnation of Christ and divinization of man.

55 Philo De Plantatione 5.18.
generation of the *logos* and denies the slightest likelihood for a twofold theory of the
generation of the *logos*, is of dubious origin. Wolfson said that even if there was some
chance that it was a genuine work of Clement, it may reflect a later development of his
thought possibly under the influence of his student Origen (sic!).

On the other hand, Wolfson proposed several passages from Clement’s extant
writings that he believed clearly supported his argument that Clement held the view of
the twofold generation of the *logos*. As his first example, he analyzed the sentence
from the Fifth Book of *Stromata*, where Clement asserted that “the *logos*, the cause of
creation, came forth, and then generated himself, when the *logos* became flesh in order to
become visible.” Firstly, Wolfson said, Clement himself made a very clear distinction
between the two phases or stages of the emanation of the *logos*; the *logos* was with God,
then “came forth” (προελθών), and only then became flesh. Secondly, the utterance “to
come forth” was the technical term Apologists used to explain the twofold generation of
the *logos*. As his second example Wolfson took the passage from *Protrepticus* 10.98.4,
which we have already seen above employed by Casey.

Earlier Casey pointed out that the relationship between the paternal *logos* and the
logos in the Son could be signaled by the Stoic term *separation* (ἀπόρροια) between


57 This line of argumentation was adopted later also by Antonio Orbe, “La Unión del Verbo,”
*Anelecta Gregoriana* 113 (Romae, 1961).

58 *Strom.* 5.3.16.5: προελθών δὲ ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἵττιος, ἔπειτα καὶ ἔμαυτὸν γεννήθη, ὅταν ὁ λόγος σώμα γένηται, ἵνα καὶ θανήθη.

59 Cf. Tatian *Oratio ad Graecos* 5; Athenagoras *Supplic.* 10; Justin Martyr *Apologia* I, 6.
speech (δύναμις) and thought (φρόνησις), which Clement did not explicitly use in *Protrepticus* 10.98.4, yet he may have had in mind, since that was in accord with the Stoic theory of speech and he supposedly used it in the passage quoted by Photius. However, Wolfson avoided such speculation but rather pointed out the direct Philonic influence on the passage and contended that here one should interpret the *nous* as the first stage of the *logos* and the *logos* proper mentioned in the passage, as its second stage. As his third proof, without any doubt in the authenticity of its origins, Wolfson brought up the passage found in Photius that clearly supported his argument. Finally, the last piece of evidence is found in the passage from *Excerpta* 1.19.1, which Wolfson discussed in a similar manner as it did Casey.

Clearly, Wolfson advanced the twofold theory of the generation of the *logos* much further than Zahn and Casey, even though he mentioned Casey’s name only when he cited Casey’s English translation of Clement’s *Excerpta*. But at the same time, later in his article he acknowledged that for Clement the split or difference between the paternal *logos* and the emanated one was not fundamentally something different: “like all those who believe in the twofold stage theory, Clement tries to show that the *logos* in its second stage of existence, that which created the world and became incarnate and is the source of mind in man, is not something different from the *logos* in its first stage of existence; it is a continuation of the same *logos*, only under a different form of existence.”

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60 Philo *Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit* 48.230-231, 236; *De Cherubim* 14.49; *Legum Allegoriarum* 3.8.29.

importantly, Wolfson pointed out that Clement believed in the continuation between the paternal *logos* and the emanated one and this belief allowed him to assert that it was the first, paternal, *logos* to be incarnated by the divine power that ultimately derived from the first source, the Father. I will later return to the question of the specific difference between the two modes of the existence of the *logos* and the continuation between them and whether these are legitimate questions in the first place. By now I have collected the most controversial and critical of Clement’s passages that deal with the issue of the generation of the *logos*.

A similar approach, less radical with respect to the distinction of stages and phases in the emanation of the *logos* but still consistent with the general line of Casey’s and Wolfson’s thought is the treatment of the *logos* by Jean Daniélou. I briefly discussed this author in my introduction when I looked at the main tendencies of methods and approaches to the study of early Christianity in general and christology of Clement in particular. Now is the occasion to look closer at Daniélou’s arguments on the subject of Clement’s *logos* christology.\(^{62}\)

First of all, Daniélou had no doubts that Clement’s view on the *logos* is any different from that of the Apologists. Indeed, he claimed that Clement gives the key to understanding their theology.\(^{63}\) According to Daniélou, Clement like Philo and the Apologists used the notion of the *logos* mainly if not exclusively in connection with the creation of the world and thereby allegedly prohibited the possibility of believing in the

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\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 374.
Son’s eternal being before the creation.\textsuperscript{64} As the demonstration of this Daniélou cited Clement:

> Behold the mysteries of love, and then you will have a vision of the bosom of the Father, whom the only-begotten God alone declared (John 1:18). God in his very self is love (1 John 4:8, 16) and for the love’s sake he became visible to us.\textsuperscript{65}

And further:

> God manifested his righteousness through his \textit{logos}, who comes from above, from where also the Father is. For before he was Creator, God already existed and was good; and that is why he wished to be both the Creator and Father; and the power of this love became the source of righteousness.\textsuperscript{66}

Daniélou agreed with Wolfson’s interpretation of \textit{proe\ell\theta\omicron\nu} of \textit{Stromata} 5.3.16.5 in light of \textit{Excerpta} 1.19.1 as referring not only to the Incarnation of the \textit{logos} but also to the pre-historical event that marked a distinction between the Son who became visible

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Quis dives salvetur} 37.1-2: \textit{θεός τά τῆς ἀγάπης μυστήρια, καὶ τότε ἐποπτεύει σεις τῶν κόλπων τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅν ὁ μονογενὴς θεὸς μόνος ἔξηγήσατο. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἄγαπη καὶ δὲ ἄγαπην ἥμιν ἐδωκόθη.}

It is curious to observe that neither Wolfson nor Daniélou discussed the passage that follows this citation. It speaks of the Son’s “becoming visible” as the fruit of God’s love which then through the Son becomes the reason to create the world, see \textit{Quis dives salvetur} 37.2.1-3.1: “In his ineffability he is Father; in his compassion to us he became Mother. The Father by loving became feminine: and the great proof of this is he whom he begot of himself; and the fruit brought forth by love is love.” – καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ πατήρ, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἡμᾶς συμπαθεῖ γέγονεν μήτηρ. ἀγαπής ὁ πατήρ ἐθηλήθη, καὶ τούτου μέγα σημεῖον ἃν αὐτός ἐγέννησεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ τεξεῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς καρπὸς ἄγαπης.

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Paed.} 1.9.88.2: Τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἤμιν διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐνδείκνυται τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐκείθεν ἄναβεν, ὅτεν γέγονεν πατήρ. Πρὶν γὰρ κτίστην γενέσθαι θεὸς ἦν, ἄγαδὸς ἦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δημιουργὸς εἶναι καὶ πατήρ ἡμᾶς.
and the Father who remained invisible.\(^{67}\) As a remark: while looking closely at both of the above passages, one can hardly resist a thought clearly overlooked by Daniélou and most of the other scholars that Clement believed in a transformation that took place inside God, since apparently there was time when God was not the Father.\(^{68}\) Daniélou explained that the rationale for the twofold interpretation of the *logos* derived from Clement’s dependence on Philo, who interpreted the *logos* as the intermediary between God and cosmos in God’s creation of, and interaction with, the cosmos, the point when Daniélou once again agreed with Wolfson.\(^{69}\) Clement rather believed that God always had the power to create but never needed it, until at some point in eternity God decided to do it.

The Father remained unknown but gave the Son the power to reveal God.\(^{70}\) Clement came close to saying that the Son is the Father’s name.\(^{71}\) This assertion is made

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\(^{67}\) Here Daniélou again closely follows argumentation of Wolfson.

\(^{68}\) Or is this a metaphorical interpretation so often applied to Scriptures by our Alexandrians (Philo, Clement, and Origen) not be taken literally?

\(^{69}\) As he showed elsewhere, Daniélou believed that in their interpretation of the *logos* the Apologists to a large degree relied on the Philonic interpretation of the *logos*. See Daniélou, *Gospel Message and Hellenic Culture*, pp. 345-364. Besides the Jewish thinker, Daniélou also singled out the Stoics and Middle Platonists, who developed hierarchical (emanatory) metaphysical systems into which Clement inscribed the *logos* as God’s immanent reason, the world of ideas, and the world soul – a historiographical statement picked up and further developed by Salvatore Lilla. The passage from *Protr.* 1.5.2, which Daniélou quoted, was later discussed by Lilla in a broader context when he treated the *logos* in its third stage of emanation as the world soul (see below).

by the Valentinian author of the *Gospel of Truth* 38 and 39, a text with which Clement could have been familiar. Clement actually maintained that the *logos* is God’s countenance.\(^{72}\) Indeed, Clement explicitly called the Son τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ θεοῦ, the face of God that reveals the Father or rather reveals one aspect of the Father that humans are capable of perceiving only through the teaching of the Son:

The face [of the Father] is the Son; and those who have been taught by the Son behold it since it is the perceivable [aspect] of the Father. The remaining [aspects] of the Father, however, remain unknowable.\(^{73}\)

Daniélou saw a certain similarity between the terms πρόσωπον and *persona*. The relation between the *logos* as Father’s face and the unknowable Father may have become a model for the later trinitarian dogmatic formula, according to which God’s *personae* were revealed through Christ but the essence of God remained unknowable. However, according to Daniélou, the philosophical language at Clement’s disposal did not provide him the adequate terminology. Daniélou acknowledged Clement’s painstaking attempts

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71 Cf. *Strom.* 5.6.32-40 and *Exc.* 1.27.1-6. In these passages Clement in his interpretation of the Temple and High Priest intimates that the *logos* is the name of God pronounced by the High Priest in the Holy of Holies.

72 Cf. *Paed.* 1.75.2: The face of God is the *logos*, for God is revealed by Him and made known – πρόσωπον δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ λόγος, ὃ φωτίζεται ὁ θεός καὶ γνωρίζεται; *Strom.* 5.6.34.1-2: Hence the Son is said to be the Father’s face, being the revealer of the Father’s character to the five senses by clothing Himself with flesh – ἐνεπέθεν πρόσωπον εἴρημα τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, αἰσθήσεων πέντεν πεντάδε σαρκόφορος γενόμενος, ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ πατρός μηνυτῆς ἰδιώματος.

73 *Exc.* 1.23.5: Τάχα δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ἔστι μὲν καὶ ὁ Υἱός, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πατήρ καταληπτόν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἢ ὁ Υἱὸς δεδιδαχώμενος θεωροῦσιν τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἄγνωστὸν ἔστι τοῦ Πατρὸς.
to explain this intricate question but also pitied that the Alexandrian father could “never manage to pin down” this subtle metaphysical nuance.\textsuperscript{74}

Besides terminological limitation, Daniélou saw the main deficiency of Clement’s theology as stated above in the idea of creation, which Clement attached to the concept of the Son as the \textit{logos}. Daniélou recognized that the “reduction” of the Son to the sphere of creative activity of the Father does not take place at the level of substance (οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν) but rather at the level of preparation for the creative act. In order to create the cosmos, God’s \textit{logos} had to go forth from the Father. That act took place, as Clement indicated, by the circumference or delimitation (περιγραφή) of the identity of the \textit{logos}.\textsuperscript{75} Περιγραφή, according to Daniélou, is the best experimental technical word Clement devised. He was compelled to its use once again due to the lack of a better term. It is curious, however, to note that Daniélou did not single out the term \textit{απορροία} from \textit{Hypotyposes} (Fragment 23.16), which in a Stoic manner also clarified the separation of the spoken word (the utterance) from the unspoken word (the thought) as was proposed by Casey. Daniélou argued that the \textit{logos}, who preserved divine unchangeable oneness before the creation, later became in some sense manifold during God’s creative act by becoming the expression of God: “the Son is neither absolutely one as unity nor many as

\textsuperscript{74} Daniélou, \textit{Gospel Message and Hellenic Culture}, p. 373.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Exc.} 1.19.1: “Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο, οὐ χάρι τὴν παρουσίαν μόνον ἄθροπος γενόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν Ἄρχῃ ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγος, κατὰ περιγραφήν καὶ οὖ κατ' οὐσίαν γενόμενον οὐ] Υἱός. Cf. also further \textit{Exc.} 1.19.5: “He took the form of a slave not only by taking (the accident) flesh at the time of his coming on earth, but also in his substance by becoming the subject of a personal individuality; for substance is enslaved in so far as it is passive and subject to the action of the sovereign cause.” – Ὅθεν καὶ ἴσαρχα δοῦλου λαμβάνει ἐπήρησε, οὐ μόνον τὴν σάρκα κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκ τοῦ ὕποκειμένου δούλη σὲ ἡ οὐσία, ὡς ἐν πιθήκῳ καὶ ὕποκειμένῃ τῇ ὄρασιθρίᾳ καὶ κυριωτάτῃ αὐτῆς.
Daniélou acknowledged that the intimate primordial relation between the Father and the Son guaranteed the latter the absolute status of divinity and consubstantiality with the Father. However, the involvement of the *logos* with the world paradoxically reduced its status to the peak of the hierarchically arranged creation. Thus Daniélou concluded: “Clement unquestionably regards the *logos* of the Father as eternal and consubstantial with him. Nevertheless, in so far as he is begotten as Son, he is but the greatest among comparables, he is numbered in the category of intelligible beings, he is no more than “the eldest in the order of coming into being,” “the first fruits of all beings,” and “the closest in nature to him who alone is Almighty.”

As I demonstrated from the beginning of my analysis of the exposition Daniélou gave to Clement’s conception of the *logos*, he closely followed Wolfson and with him Lebreton, Orbe, and Aeby, all of whom viewed Clement’s logology as a theological project that stands on the edge of what was perceived as the mainstream of early Christian orthodox doctrine. Daniélou shared Casey’s and Wolfson’s arguments and doubts about the authenticity of *Adumbrationes*, a text that clearly expressed the eternal generation of the Son without reference to the creation of the world. Daniélou did not find any other passages, besides pseudo-Clement’s *Adumbrationes*, to support Clement’s

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76 *Strom.* 4.25.156.2: καὶ δὴ οὐ γίνεται ἀτεχνώς ἐν ὡς ἐν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ’ ὡς πάντα ἐν.

77 Daniélou, p. 371 with reference to *Strom.* 7.1.2.2.5-3.2. See also *Exc.* 1.11.3: “and just as, when compared with the bodies here below, the bodies (of these angels) are incorporeal and formless, so, when compared with the Son, they are measurable and sensible bodies; and the same is true of the Son compared with the Father.” – Ὡς πρὸς τὴν σύγκρισιν τῶν ἐνή χρίσας ἀσώματων (οὐδὲν ἄστρων) ἀσώματα καὶ ἀνείδα, ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς τὴν σύγκρισιν τοῦ Υἱοῦ σώματα μετεμφημένα καὶ αἰσθητά· οὕτως καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα παραμαθήμενος. Cf. *Strom.* 7.2.5.3-6.
belief in the eternal generation of the Son. By the same token, Daniélou referred to Casey and Wolfson to validate Clement’s passage of Hypotyposes that spoke of Clement’s two different logoi. Curiously, Daniélou referred to Casey as the scholar, who debunked the thesis of Clement’s belief in the two logoi, whereas as I showed earlier Casey did quite the opposite. Finally, Daniélou mentioned only once the name of Eric Osborn, a scholar who discounted the hypothesis of a twofold theory of the logos in Clement and maintained the absolute unity and uniqueness of the Son, a christological concept that was fundamental to Clement’s logology.

Perhaps the best and most influential work on the subject of Clement’s philosophy of the last century was the monograph by Salvatore Lilla. Lilla succeeded to a large degree in expounding Clement’s philosophical and cultural background, which was compounded of what he called Jewish-Alexandrian, Gnostic, Middle and Neo-Platonic trends of thought.78 As he himself stated in his introduction, Lilla’s main task was to challenge an allegedly dominant trend of thought in nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship. Lilla objected to portrayals of Clement “as a wise Christian philosopher who, being already enlightened by the truth of his own religion, is able to judge what is right and what wrong in the heathen philosophy, and deems it worthy to borrow from it elements, which are not in disagreement with his religious principles.”79 On the contrary,


79 Ibid., p. 3, Lilla had in mind the conclusions made by Walther Völker in his Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 57 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1952).
Lilla wanted to reexamine “in a comprehensive inquiry the question of the relationship between Clement and the prevailing philosophy of the second century A.D., namely Middle Platonism.” His analysis brought him to the conclusion that Clement’s use of Greek philosophical doctrines went far beyond borrowing some philosophical terms. Rather, Clement’s use of philosophical terminology signified a deep process of Christianity’s Hellenization parallel to the process of Judaism’s Hellenization, which was characteristic of Philo’s writings. According to Lilla, Clement’s views on the origins of Greek philosophy, ethics, and views on faith, gnosis, and the origin of the world have been studied without taking into account the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, Middle Platonism, and Neo-Platonism and thus did not produce satisfactory results. The only three exceptions are – not surprisingly – the studies on Clement’s views on God and the \( \text{logos} \) undertaken by Zahn, Casey, and Wolfson.

Then again, Lilla did not use Zahn’s, Casey’s, or Wolfson’s notions of the two \( \text{logoi} \) or the twofold stage theory of generation of \( \text{logos} \) without alteration. Rather, he developed them to another level, which allowed him to speak about Clement’s \( \text{logos} \) as a metaphysical principle that underwent three different stages of existence. According to Lilla, at the first stage the \( \text{logos} \) was identical to God; it was the mind of God, which contained God’s thoughts. At the second stage, the \( \text{logos} \) became a hypostasis separate from God. And finally at the third stage, the \( \text{logos} \) became the immanent law of the universe and the world’s soul. Oddly enough, Lilla limited his study only to the notion of

\[^{80}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{81}\text{Ibid., p. 200, n. 1.}\]
the \textit{logos} as a metaphysical principle and avoided the question of the \textit{logos} as anthropological and christological concepts. He thus downplayed the formation of Clement’s views on the Incarnation and human destiny. He did emphasize the fact that, for Clement, the \textit{logos} was both a metaphysical principle and an historical person, but the second part of the assertion needs much more clarification than Lilla proposed. Therefore, one might venture that if we followed Lilla’s line of logic it most likely would lead us to believing that Clement also conceived the fourth and fifth stages of the emanation of the \textit{logos} (the fourth in Jesus Christ and the fifth in a human being).

To demonstrate the argument of the first stage of the emanation of the \textit{logos}, Lilla compared the following passages of Clement’s \textit{Stromateis}: “mind is the place of ideas and God is mind”\textsuperscript{82} and “for the region of God is hard to attain, which Plato called the region of ideas”\textsuperscript{83} with the Philonic passages that speak of the notion of God’s place and the ideas contained in it.\textsuperscript{84} Lilla rightly followed the lead of Wolfson, who noted that when Clement quoted Plato in these cases, he actually relied on Philo’s interpretation of Plato, since Plato, and later Aristotle, only stated that ideas are located in our souls (\textit{ἐν νοστίμια}) and not in God’s mind.\textsuperscript{85} Lilla readily provided parallel texts of Middle

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{Strom.} 4.25.155.2: νοῦς δὲ χώρα ἰδεῶν, νοῦς δὲ ὁ θεός.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{Strom.} 5.11.73.3: δυσάλεως γὰρ ἡ χώρα τοῦ θεοῦ, δν χώραν ἰδεῶν ὁ Πλάτων κέκληκεν.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Philo \textit{De Cherubim} 49; \textit{De Opificio Mundi} 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Plato \textit{Parmenides} 132 b; Aristotle \textit{De Amina} 429a.27-28.
\end{itemize}
Platonists and Neo-Platonists who called the Platonic ideas the thoughts of God\textsuperscript{86} and with whom, including Philo, Clement was closely familiar.

After establishing the concept of the first stage of the \textit{logos}, Lilla proceeded to the second stage that defined the “coming forth” of the \textit{logos} in three different terms: a) as totality of ideas or powers of God, which constituted the realm of the intelligible world (κόσμος νοητός) and the monad (μονάς); b) as the principle or the intelligible pattern of creation (ἀρχή); and c) as the wisdom (σοφία) and image (ἐικόνα) of God. To demonstrate the totality of the ideas or powers of God, Lilla referred to the illustrious passage of \textit{Stromateis}, which deserves a deeper analysis:

\begin{quote}
All the powers of the divine spirit, gathered into one, complete the same thing, namely the Son; he does not call up the thought of powers exhibited singly. The Son is neither absolutely one as unity nor many as divisible, but one as all is one. Hence he is all. He is the circle of all powers being bound and united in one point.\textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

Based on the above quotation, Lilla went on to show that Clement could find in Philo the doctrine of the \textit{logos} as the totality of the powers and ideas. Philo similarly spoke of the \textit{logos} as the benchmark of the intelligible world.\textsuperscript{88} Moreover, Lilla suggested that the

\textsuperscript{86} Cf. Albinus \textit{Didaskalikos} 163.12-13, 27-30, 164.27; Attikus in Eusebius’ \textit{Praeparatio Evangelica} 15.13.5; pseudo-Plutarch \textit{Placita Philosopherum} 882 d; Hippolytus \textit{Refutatio omnium haeresium} 1.19.2; Plotinus \textit{Enneades} 5.1.4, 5.9.5, 5.9.8.

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Strom.} 4.25.156.1.4-2.3: πάσαι δὲ αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ πνεύματος συνελήφθησαν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, τὸν υἱόν, ἀπαρέματος δὲ ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκκάστης αὐτοῦ τῶν δυνάμεων εννοίας, καὶ δὴ ὦ γίνεται ἀτεχνής ἐν ὑς ἐν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ’ ὡς πάντα ἐν. ἐνθὲν καὶ πάντα κύκλος γὰρ ὁ αὐτοῦ πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς ἐν εἰλισμένων καὶ εννοιμένων.

\textsuperscript{88} Cf. \textit{Opificio Mundi} 24-25; \textit{De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini} 83; \textit{De confusione linguarum} 172; \textit{De somniis} 1.62.
above passage may correspond to both the second hypothesis of Plato’s *Parmenides* and Plotinus’ *mind* (νοῦς), a center by which and unto which the universe, both the intelligible and the material, is directed. The similarity between Clement and Plotinus, according to Lilla, can be explained by a common text they may have both read, i.e., a Neopythagorean interpretation of Plato’s *Parmenides* that circulated in Alexandria in the first and second century C.E. Another suggestion that Lilla acknowledged lacks direct evidence is the assertion that the common source for Clement and Plotinus may have been Ammonius Saccas’ adaptation of the Neopythagorean treatment of *Parmenides*. However, Lilla still concluded that the similarity of thought between Philo, Clement, and Plotinus can explain why Clement was inclined to identify the intelligible world with the monad just as did Philo. Moreover, Clement and Philo placed the highest divinity above the monad.

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89 *Parm.* 145 c 1-5.

90 *Enn.* 5.3.11.20-21, 5.4.2.40-41, 5.9.6.1-2 and 8-10, 5.9.8.3-4.


92 *Strom.* 5.14.93.4: “The Barbarian philosophy knows the world of thought and the world of sense – the former archetypal, and the latter the image of that which is called the model; and assigns the former to the Monad, as being perceived by the mind, and the world of sense to the number six. For six is called by the Pythagoreans marriage, as being the genital number; and he places in the Monad the invisible heaven and the holy earth, and intellectual light.” – Κόσμον τε αἰθές τῶν μὲν νοητῶν αἴδες ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, τὸν δὲ αἰσθήτον, τὸν μὲν ἄρχετον, τὸν δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοκαίρινος παραδείγματος· καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀνατίθησι μονάδι, ὡς ἄν νοητόν, τὸν δὲ αἰσθήτον ἐξάδε· γάμας γάρ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγόρειοις, ὡς ἀν γόνυμος ἁριθμός· ἡ ἑξάς καλείται, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ μονάδι συνιστήσαι σφαιρῶν ἁφρατῶν καὶ γῆν ἀειδὴ καὶ φῶς νοητόν.

93 *Opif. Mundi* 15 and 35.

94 Cf. Clement *Paed.* 1.8.71.1-2: “because God is one and beyond the one and he above the monad itself” – ἐν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἔπεκεινα τοῦ ἢνος καὶ ἔπορ αὐτὴν μονάδα; Philo *De Vita contemplativa* 3.1-3: “the one is is superior to the good, and more simple than the one, and more ancient than the monad.” – τὸ
The status of the *logos* as the totality of ideas and powers of God, for Lilla, also corresponded to what the Middle and Neo-Platonic philosophers of the second century called the principle or pattern of intelligible world, i.e., ἀρχή. Lilla substantiated this argument with the two references Clement gave to the *logos*, which directly call the *logos* the ἀρχή and the principle of creation. Lilla again quite rightly observed a direct correspondence of Clement with Philo, who also spoke of the *logos* as God’s instrument of creation. In addition, Lilla found his last argument for the concept of the *logos* as the second emanation in Clement’s association of *logos* with divine Wisdom. We find such

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95 *Strom.* 5.6.38.7: “since, as the Son sees the goodness of the Father, God the Savior works, being called the first principle of all things, which was imaged forth from the invisible God first, and before the ages, and which fashioned all things which came into being after itself.” – ἐπεὶ ὡς βλέπει τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ἁγιότητα, ὁ ὑλὸς ἐνεργεί, θεὸς σοτήρ κεκλημένος, ἢ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή, ἢτης ἑπεκκαίνεται μὲν ἐκ “τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀφράτου” προτή καὶ πρὸ ἀιῶνων, τετεύποκεν δὲ τὰ μιᾶ ἑαυτήν ἀπάντα γενόμενα.

96 *Strom.* 6.7.58.1: “since the unoriginated Being is one, the Omnipotent God; one, too, is the First-begotten, “by whom all things were made, and without whom not one thing ever was made” (John 1:3) – ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀγέννητον ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεός, ἐν δὲ καὶ τὸ προγενενηθὲν, δὲ οὗ τὰ “πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οἴοδ ἐν” (John 1:3).

97 Cf. Philo *Leg. Alleg.* 1.19; *De Conf. Ling.* 146, where Philo spoke of the *logos* as the arché of everything. Cf. also *Leg. Alleg.* 3.96; *De Cher.* 127; *De Sacr. A. et C.* 8; *Quod D. sit imm.* 57; *De Fuga et Inventione* 95; *De Prov.* 1.23, where Philo spoke of the *logos* as the instrument of creation. Compare also Clement *Strom.* 6.16.45.5 and Philo *Leg. Alleg.* 1.19 for a similar interpretation of the words ἥ ἡμέρα of Gen 2:4 that are interpreted the divine *logos* as the principle of creation. See also Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 208, n. 1.

98 *Strom.* 7.2.7.4: “For He was the Wisdom “in which” the Sovereign God “delighted” (Prov 8:30). For the Son is the power of God, as being the Father’s most ancient Word before the production of all things, and His Wisdom.” – αὐτὴ γὰρ ὁν ἀπὸ σοφία ἡ προσέχεισθαι ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεός (Prov 8:30): “δύναμις” γὰρ τοῦ “θεοῦ” ὁ νόης, ἀπό πρὸ πάν τῶν γενομένων ἀρχικοτάτος λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ “σοφία” αὐτοῦ κυρίως. Cf. also *Strom.* 5.14.89.4.
identification in Justin, but it ultimately goes back to the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in general and Philo in particular, for whom the *logos* and the *sophia* were absolutely one and the same thing. This tradition of associating *logos* with Wisdom most likely reflected the intention ventured by the Jewish authors themselves when they spoke of the divine Wisdom who assisted God to design and create the world.

Even though in general Lilla did reflect on Daniélou’s proposal to view the *logos* in its second stage as God’s expression, i.e., a personalized or anthropomorphized agent (God’s wisdom, God’s face), he did not elaborate on this question nearly as extensively as he did with the other stages. Only by means of a reference did he point out to the

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99 Dial. 61; Apol. 1.23 and 2.6. See also Col 1:15-18, where Paul, when spoke of the *logos*, used the language very close to that of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy.

100 Leg. Alleg. 1.65.

101 Cf. Eccl 1:4; Prov 8:22, Wis 9:9. I will briefly return to this question, when I discuss Alexandros Koffas’ proposal to interpret Clement’s teaching on the *logos* in the context of his understanding of the divine *sophia*. See below, chapter III, p. 185ff.

102 John Egan in his “Logos and emanation in the writings of Clement of Alexandria,” in *The Trinification of the World*, ed. Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Marc Laporte (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978), pp. 176-209, attempted to complement Lilla’s treatment of the emanation of the *logos* with the supplementary scholarship. He suggested that the second emanation of the *logos*, the divine ἀνατροπα, is best interpreted, in accordance with Casey and Daniélou, as the divine sparkle sowed in the human mind, which, on the one hand, in a way is a model for Clement’s view on the Incarnation (not only the historical event of the “*logos* became flesh” (John 1:14), but as Clement intimated in his *Exc.* 1.19.1 also the pre-historical event of delimitation of the Son and the Father), and on the other hand, the prelude to the later doctrine of the deification (and Augustinian “trinification” (sic!) of human being; cf. Frederick E. Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity* (Willowdale, Ontario: Regis College Press, 1965-66), p. 178. Despite a summative and blurred nature of the article with anachronistically inadequate conclusions, Egan brought up two interesting perspectives on the interpretation of the *logos*. The first belongs to Raoul Mortley who argued that the Incarnation was critical for the Gnostic (both orthodox and heterodox) theology, for it was the epitome of God’s revelation and the epistemological key to the study of Scriptures; see “The Mirror and I Cor. 13, 12 in the Epistemology of Clement of Alexandria,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 30.2 (1976): 109-120. And the second christological-anthropological approach is that of Peter Schwanz. Schwanz contended that, according to Clement, the human being was created according to the image and likeness of God; however, after the loss of the likeness due to Adam’s fall the *logos* was incarnate to restore God’s likeness in humanity proleptically in baptism and Christian study of Scriptures and
relationship of the terms πρόσωπον and περιγραφή discussed in Clement’s *Excerpta* and in Daniéloü’s section on Clement.  

The third emanation of the *logos*, according to Lilla, followed from the two stages mentioned above, in which the *logos* at first was identical with the highest divinity and then became the circle of all powers, the origin or the principle of the creation of the world, and God’s wisdom. In its third stage, the *logos* is not only the totality of the transcendental intellectual world but also the immanent part of the created world. It is world’s existence, administration, and the power that holds the world together. Even though Clement did not explicitly speak of it, Lilla clearly saw in his description of the *logos* what other philosophers of the time called the supreme *anima mundi*, i.e., the world’s soul. Lilla identified the idea of world’s soul along these sentences of Clement: “[the new Song of God, i.e., the *logos*] the support of the whole and the harmony of all, – reaching from the centre to the circumference, and from the extremities to the central part, has harmonized this universal frame of things,”

“the Word and God governs all things,”

“the first administrator of universe, who by the will of the Father governs

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104 *Protr.* 1.5.2: ἔρεισμα τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἀρμονία τῶν πάντων, ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκρῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα διαταγέν, ἠμόρσατο τὸ τὸ πᾶν.

105 *Strom.* 5.14.104.4: τοῦ διοικοῦντος λόγου καὶ θεοῦ τὰ σέμπαντα.
everything,” he is the closest to everything by his power, which encompasses all things,” and also the following striking passage:

The nature of the Son, which is nearest to him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, most holy, most potent, most princely, most kingly, and most beneficent. This is the highest excellence, which orders all things in accordance with the Father’s will, and holds the helm of the universe in the best way, with unwearied and tireless power, working all things, in which it operates, keeping in view its hidden designs. For from his own point of view, the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere, and being contained nowhere; complete mind, the complete paternal light; all eyes, seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things, by his power scrutinizing the powers. To him is placed in subjection all the host of angels and gods; he, the paternal *logos*, exhibiting a holy administration for him who put [all] in subjection to him.108

In these passages there are many images and concepts that are similar to the Stoic perception of the world soul, but these images undoubtedly may be tracked back to Plato’s thoughts on the structure of the universe in his *Timaeus*. Lilla recreated the

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106 *Strom.* 7.2.9.2.: τὸν πρῶτον διοικητήν τῶν ὅλων ἐκ θελήματος πατρὸς κυβερνῶντα.

107 *Strom.* 2.2.5.4: ἐγγυτάτερον δὲ δυνάμει, ἢ τὰ πάντα ἐγκεκόλλητα. Lilla remarks that Clement maintained God’s comprehension of everything in himself without being comprehended by anything. Cf. *Strom.* 2.2.6.2, 5.11.73.3, 5.12.81.3; Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 210, n. 1.

108 *Strom.* 7.2.5.3-6: τελειότατη δὲ καὶ ἀγιότατη καὶ κυριότατη καὶ ἣρμονικοτάτη καὶ βασιλικοτάτη καὶ εὐεργετικό τάτη ἢ υἱοῦ φόσος ἢ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχεστάτη, αὐτῇ ἡ μεγίστῃ ὑπεροχῇ, ἢ τὰ πάντα διατάσσεται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πα τρός καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἁρίστα οἰκίζει, ἀκαμάτω καὶ ἀτρόποτο δυνάμει πάντα ἐγκατασχεμένη, δι’ ὅν ἐνεργεῖ τάς ἀποκρύφους ἐννοίας ἐπιβλέπουσα. οὐ γὰρ ἐξετασάται ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιεχόμενης ὧν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ μερὶ ζομένου, οὐκ ἀποτελομένου, οὐ μεταβαίνου εἰς τόπον εἰς τόπον, πάντῃ δὲ ὧν πάντως καὶ θεμαμή περιεχόμενος, ὄλος νοῦς, ὄλος φῶς πατρέως, ὄλος ὀφθαλμός, πάντα ὄροι, πάντα ἄκωσιν, εἰδῶς πάντα, δυνάμει τὰς δύναμις ἔρευνόν τε, ποτε εἰς ἐκκαθάρισμα στρατιά ἀγγέλου τις καὶ διεκ, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πατρικῷ τῆς ἀγίας οἰκονομίαν ἀναφεδεμένη ἢδίᾳ τὸν ὑποτάσμαν (I Cor 15:27).”

109 *Timaeus* 34b 3-4, 36a 6-37a 1, 897c. Cf. *Philebus* 28d-e.
context of similar thinking based on the Jewish-Alexandrian milieu, in which the book of
Wisdom of Solomon spoke of the sofia in similar terms. For Clement, however, the
most immediate source must have been Philo, whom Clement closely followed,
especially in the passage of Protrepticus 1.5.2. Lilla offered other parallel texts of the
same period by the authors, such as Plutarch, Albinus, Numenius, and Atticus, who spoke of the concept of world soul.

While in many regards Lilla’s seminal work remains a good source for the
Jewish-Alexandrian, Middle and Neo-Platonic, and Gnostic contexts of Clement’s ethics,
metaphysics, and theology as such, Lilla’s methods and conclusions have been criticized
by later scholars. One can not deny, however, the brilliance, clarity, and erudition of
Lilla’s collection of parallel texts that put Clement’s views on the logos in a broader
perspective. The most recurring correspondence of Clement’s ideas is found in Philo.

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10 Wis 8:1, 8:24.

11 Compare Protr. 1.5.2 and De Plant. 9. See other passages of Philo that speak along those lines: Quis rer. Div. Her. 188; De Fuga et Inv. 110 and 112; De Conf. Ling. 137.

12 Quest. Plat. 1001b; De Is. et Os. 373d; De An. Procr. in Tim. 1026c.

13 Did. 165.3-4, 170.3-6.

14 In Eusebius Praep. Ev. 11.18.24.

15 Ibid., 15.12.1-3.

Indeed Clement cites the man whenever he needs to find a proper expression of certain philosophical concepts that explain the ways of divine realities. It once again proves a continuity of the so-called Alexandrian tradition of philosophizing and interpretation that went beyond one or two religious and philosophical schools.\footnote{The need for a study of the philosophical and linguistic continuity between Clement and Philo has been to a large degree met by a well-written monograph of Annewies van den Hoek, \textit{Clement of Alexandria and His use of Philo in the Stromateis. An Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model}. Vigiliae Christianae Supplement 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Hoek provided an excellent review of scholarly discussions on how much Clement “borrowed” from, and how much he independently “interpreted,” Philo. See esp. pp. 1-22.}

Nevertheless, the way Lilla distinguished the three stages of the emanation of \textit{logos} needs to be revisited. Even though Clement used many philosophical concepts derived from the Middle Platonist and Gnostic systems of his time that spoke of the manifold emanatory stages of divinity, he never \textit{explicitly} spoke of the three stages of the \textit{logos}. On the contrary, Clement stressed the unity of the \textit{logos} and its absolute identification with the only-begotten Son of God, the Christ, and \textit{didaskalos}. I have not yet discussed Lilla’s elucidation of Clement’s view of Christ as the Teacher and the High Priest, who transmitted the divine knowledge (\textit{gnw\textsigma}) and salvation (\textit{swthri/ia}) to people. But in his minute treatment of this question, he was more interested in showing the Gnostic rationale of the significance of \textit{gnw\textsigma} and the esoteric character of its transmission than the identity of its transmitter, the Christ. In fact, Lilla unreservedly agreed with Philipp Vielhauer and Adolf von Harnack, who contended that just as in Gnosticism the nature of secret knowledge defined the identity of the one who transmitted this knowledge, so also unequivocally Clement was more interested in
attracting his students to study the secret mysteries than to follow Christ.\textsuperscript{118} Lilla claimed that, according to Clement, the \textit{logos} was both a metaphysical principle and an historical person\textsuperscript{119} but again this connection between the two categories was only to emphasize the esoteric nature of \(\gamma\nu\omega\sigma\varsigma\), which by definition is accessible to each human being endowed with the intellect. Thus, Lilla omitted a discussion of Clement’s view on the Incarnation and reiterated the conclusions of T.E. Pollard, who maintained that for Clement it did not play a decisive role in the history of salvation, a case made by many other scholars as well.\textsuperscript{120} As a proof, Lilla demonstrated how Clement believed in the endowment of every

\textsuperscript{118} See Lilla, \textit{Clement of Alexandria}, pp. 158-163, esp. p. 163, where he concluded his section on the esoteric knowledge transmitted only by the Son with the words of Philipp Vielhauer who in his study of the Gnostic background of the Gospel of Thomas suggested that it is a common tendency to seek the revelation and knowledge that, in turn, can bring the revealer to those who seek answers to the mystery of the higher world. See Vielhauer, “\textit{ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΣ. Zum gnostischen Hintergrund des Thomasevangeliums},” in \textit{Apophoreta. Festschrift für Ernst Haenchen zu seinem siebzigsten Geburtstag am 10. Dezember 1964} (Berlin: Velag Alfred Töpelmann, 1964), p. 282. See also Adolf von Harnack, \textit{Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte}. 1 Band (Tübingen: Mohr, 1893), pp. 644-5: “Der Logos ist wesentlich … der Lehrer, aber in Christus ist er zugleich der Hierurge, und die Güter, die er spendet, sind ein System von heiligen Weihen, an denen die Möglichkeit, sich zu höherer Erkenntnis und göttlichem Leben zu erheben, allein haftet. Tritt hier schon die Verwandtschaft des Clemens mit gnostischen Lehrern, namentlich mit den Valentinern, bestimmt hervor, so lässt sie sich auch in der ganzen Fassung der Aufgabe (das Christentum als Theologie), in der Bestimmung des Formalprinzipes (einschliesslich des Recurses auf Geheimtradition...) und in der Lösung der Probleme nachweisen.”

\textsuperscript{119} Lilla, \textit{Clement of Alexandria}, pp. 113, 158, 199.

\textsuperscript{120} That Clement underestimated the value of the Incarnation has been a major argument in the study of his christology. T. E. Pollard, in his \textit{Johannine Christology and the Early Church} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 79, asserted that “like his [Clement’s] conception of God, his conception of the \textit{logos} is philosophical rather than biblical, and his attention is concentrated not on Jesus Christ, the \textit{logos} made flesh, but on the pre-existent \textit{logos} whom he describes largely in terms derived from philosophy.” “For Clement the purpose of the incarnation seems to be simply an accommodation on the part of the \textit{logos} to the weakness of those who cannot accept anything without sensible proof… to make the truth of God plain to those who cannot perceive it spiritually” (p. 84). See also Henry S. Nash, “The Exegesis of the School of Antioch,” \textit{Journal of Biblical Literature} 11 (1892): 32, who ridiculously contended that, according to Clement, “the only superiority of the New [Testament] is its kindergarten method of teaching through the Incarnation, so that even children might understand.” Cf. also Johannes Quasten, \textit{Patrology. The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus}, vol. 2 (Utrecht: Spectrum Publishers, 1965), p. 21; James F. Bethune-Baker, \textit{An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon} (London: Methuen, 1903), p. 134; Einar Molland, \textit{The Conception of the...
human being with the indwelling divine sparkle (ἀπόρροια)\(^{121}\) that enabled the human to achieve the highest levels of perfection and contemplation of God. However, one is left to believe that only the elect – the great sages of the past such as Prophets, Moses, Pythagoras, Plato, Philo, and finally Jesus and through him his true followers, true Gnostics – had the access to the γνώσις and the true interpretation of Scriptures that gives a key to understanding the true knowledge.\(^{122}\) To argue against such an approach, I will turn my attention later to the article by Erich Fascher who demonstrated that the search for the Teacher and the find of him in the church/school, Christian educational

\(^{121}\) Note that Casey interpreted the ἀπόρροια in terms of the differentiation of the immanent logos from the paternal logos.

\(^{122}\) As a result, Lilla did not discuss Clement’s christological passages on the Incarnation, which in a complex way made the connection between the metaphysical and immanent (we shall return to this question later). A striking example is his treatment of Strom. 6.7.58.1.3: “since the unoriginated Being is one, the Omnipotent God; one, too, is the First-begotten, “by whom all things were made, and without whom not one thing ever was made” (John 1:3)” – 5: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐγένετον ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεός, ἐν δὲ καὶ τὸ προεγεννηθέν, δ’ οὐ τὰ “πάντα ἐγένετο καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν;” which Lilla interprets as a demonstration of the second stage, in which logos is represented as totality of all ideas and powers of God, as well as the principle of God’s creation. Lilla overlooks the first half of the sentence, which clearly states the uniqueness of God and uniqueness of God’s First-begotten Son. Moreover, the context of the passage is Clement’s search for identity of the didaskalos, who is clearly identified with the Son, and it is signaled by the words which precede the above Strom. 6.7.58.1.1: “It remains, then, for us, ascending to seek their teacher” – λείπεται τοῖς ὑπαξιωμένοις ἰμάς καὶ τὸν τοιούτων παντοκράτορα παθεῖν. The second example is found in Strom. 7.2.7.4: “For He was the Wisdom “in which” the Sovereign God “delighted” (Prov 8:30). For the Son is the power of God, as being the Father’s most ancient Word before the production of all things, and His Wisdom, He is then properly called the Teacher of the beings formed by Him.” – ἀυτῇ γὰρ ἦν <ὁ> θεός “ἡ θεματικὴ” ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεός (Prov 8:30): “δύναμις” γὰρ τοῦ “θεοῦ” ὁ υἱός, ἀτε πρὸ πάν τῶν τῶν γεγομένων ἀρχικῶτατος λόγος τοῦ πατρός, καὶ “θεός” αὐτοκράτορός ἸΩΑΝΝΗΣ καὶ διὸ δικαίωτας λειτουργήν τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ πλασθέντων.
curriculum is the decisive factor that defined the secret tradition, which Clement used along with his metaphysics as a framework to his christology.\textsuperscript{123}

Arkadi Choufrine has recently pointed out that a scholar, who studies Clement, can no longer simply look at Clement’s texts to find the sources, with which he worked, and claim Clement’s dependence on those sources.\textsuperscript{124} Rather, Choufrine insists in agreement with David Dawson, that such a scholar should look instead for the broader context of the author’s sources and original concepts and find ways they relate to each other in terms of appropriation, (re)interpretation, and evolving meanings of the thoughts and ideas that function in the text of an author. Choufrine identified three case studies that demonstrated the shift of meaning of the original and secondary sources in Clement’s writings, namely, Clement’s interpretations of the themes of baptismal initiation, the “Day” of Abraham, and assimilation to God.

In his second case study, which is found in the second chapter that he called \textit{A Background of Clement’s Interpretation of the “Day” Abraham Was to See}, Choufrine undertook an excursus into the question of Christ’s Incarnation, which directly deals with the concept and identity of the \textit{logos}. I will return to this important issue with further analysis in the following chapter of the present study. It will suffice to note, however,

\textsuperscript{123} I will make this case in the next chapter on Clement’s \textit{Christos Didaskalos}.

that Choufrine signals the crucial problem that is to understand what was for Clement the value and necessity of the Incarnation.\textsuperscript{125}

Choufrine distinguished two stages of the Incarnation: “horizontal” and “vertical,” in Clement’s christology. According to the “horizontal,” i.e., “historical,” Incarnation, the Son of God, the \textit{logos}, intensified its presence in the creation in different times and in different degrees, as the world’s creator, the voice spoken through the prophets, as the redeemer who appeared in his incarnated form as Jesus Christ, as well as the driving force that acts through the Christians (true Gnostics) in the church and that achieved the highest levels of divine Gnosis:

Just as the Savior was speaking and healing through his body, so, on the one hand, [had he been doing] even formerly through his prophets; now, on the other hand, [he is doing this] through his apostles and teachers. The church provides service to the Lord’s action; so that, when he assumed a human being, he could serve the will of his Father. And the humanity-loving God always invests himself with a human being for the salvation of human beings – formerly with the prophets, now with the church.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} See also Choufrine, \textit{Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis}, p. 100. Choufrine rightly pointed out that the scholarship on Clement has two tendencies of interpreting Clement’s views on the Incarnation. On the one hand, Clement is viewed to believe in the Incarnation that had no special significance in the history of salvation, since the \textit{logos} was present in different degrees in the created world since its conception, as it was suggested by Einar Molland. See Molland, \textit{The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology} (Oslo: I Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1938), p. 74. On the other hand, the event of Incarnation is the central event for Clement’s theology. See also Claude Mondésert, \textit{Clément d’Alexandrie: Introduction à l’étude de sa pensée religieuse a partir de l’Écriture} (Paris: Aubier, 1944), p. 213.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Eclogae propheticae} 23: ὢσπερ διά τοῦ σώματος ὁ σωτὴρ ἔλαλη καὶ ἱάτο, οὕτως καὶ πρότερον μὲν διά τῶν προφητῶν, νῦν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν διδάσκαλων ἡ ἐκκλησία γάρ ὑπηρετεῖ τῇ τοῦ κυρίου ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔνθεν καὶ τότε ἄνθρωπον ἀνέλαβεν, ἵνα δὲ αὐτοῦ ὑπηρετήσῃ τῷ θελήματι τοῦ πατρός, καὶ πάντως ἄνθρωπον ὁ φιλάνθρωπος ἐνδύεται θεός εἰς τὴν ἄνθρωπον σωτηρίαν, πρότερον μὲν τούτῳ πρὸ φήτας, νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. Cf. also \textit{Strom.} 4.18.117.1; 6.6.49.2; 6.7.58.2; 7.16.95.3; 7.16.101.4.
On the other hand, Choufrine contended that in order to understand better Clement’s conception of the Incarnation one has to look into its “vertical” stages, which had two stages. The key passage for the “vertical” stage, according to Choufrine, is *Excerpta* 1.19.1-15, and Choufrine discussed it along the same lines as we have seen in Casey, Wolfson, Daniélou, and Lilla. This passage interprets the Johannine “flesh” (σαρξ) in two ways, first, with regards to the pre-temporal “circumscribing” (περιγραφή) of the logos, which gave it its distinct identity within the Father’s bosom; and second, with regard to the bodily Incarnation of the logos in Jesus Christ. Here the horizontal meets the vertical. Accordingly, the disputed passage from *Hypotyposeis* cited by Photius fits well into Choufrine’s interpretation of Clement’s theory of the Incarnation.127

In addition, Choufrine noted another important trend of Clement’s thought, which interprets the Incarnation of the logos as the illumination of the world or as a series of salvific theophanies. In other words, the logos, for Clement, is the highest expression of light that descends unto God’s creation. This trend of thought is a development of Philo’s theme of light, which has three different qualities even though it derives from one source. Philo speaks in his *De Abrahabmo* 70, 78f of a) the light that is seen by the physical eyes and reveals only the external forms of objects; b) the light of the soul and mind, which is inherent to them and gives Abraham the knowledge of the meaning of objects, when his mental eyes are inverted inside, purified of mere opinions, and enriched by knowledge; and c) the pure light that comes not from physical or mental light but

directly from God. Clement adopted the imagery of light to the *logos* that in different degrees, according to human capabilities, revealed himself to the world and humanity, but the *logos*, who is the Son of God, was the “light in the proper sense,” and it revealed himself not only as an intelligible light perceivable by the human mind, but also as an incarnate human being that carried the uncreated light inside himself. Furthermore, Choufrine pointed out that Clement construed the Incarnation of the *logos* coextensive with the history of salvation or the historical Incarnation, which means that the divine illumination/theophany that Abraham witnessed in his body also took place in the body of Jesus Christ and in that of any Christian neophyte. Choufrine concluded that “this gives one grounds to believe that the *logos*, for Clement, ‘becomes’ any ‘flesh’ It illumines by Its presence.”

As we could see, Choufrine made a new turn in the study of Clement’s *logos* especially by treating the question of the Incarnation, which – be it central or indecisive for Clement – played some role in his theology. However, Choufrine followed Wolfson and Lilla in their interpretation of the generation of the *logos*, which had several stages. Yet disagreeing with these authors, he classified this generation not as a “descent,” which would imply a Neo-Platonic emanation scheme and open doors for Arian theology, but as a pre-temporal generation that had no spatial associations, since Clement explicitly denied to the Son any possibility of spatial transition:

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128 Cf. also Philo *De Mutatione Nominum* 3-6.

129 *Paed.* 1.28.2; see also *Exc.* 1.18.2; *Eclogae* 21.

130 Choufrine, p. 122.
For from his own point of view the Son of God is never displaced; not being divided, not severed, not passing from place to place; being always everywhere, and being contained nowhere; complete mind, the complete paternal light; all eyes, seeing all things, hearing all things, knowing all things, by his power scrutinizing the powers.\textsuperscript{131}

An important qualification is Clement’s “from his own point of view” (τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς), i.e., from the point of view of the logos, who prohibits any special extension, separation, or even self-generation. Such distinction within the realm of the logos is only possible from the point of view of the created world, namely, human perception of the divine realm. I will come to the distinction of the two perspectives at the beginning of the next chapter.

Until now I have been looking at the works of several authoritative scholars of Clement’s logology who treated the subject of the logos along the lines of the Middle and Neo-Platonic metaphysical philosophy that tended to explain the relationship between the ultimate divinity and the world through a mediatory hierarchy, at the summit of which stood the logos. As we could see, in order to carry out the complex mission of the mediator, according to Zahn, Casey, Wolfson, Daniélou, Lilla, and Choufrine, the logos underwent several (or at least two) stages of generation. For Wolfson, therefore, Clement was the predecessor of the Arian theology, and for Lilla, Clement was a forerunner of Plotinus’ emanatory scheme of divine being. Even though for these authors, unlike for

\textsuperscript{131} See Strom. 7.2.5-6: οὐ γὰρ ἔξισται ποτὲ τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς οὐ μόνον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ μεριζόμενος, οὐ ἀποτελομένος, οὐ μεταβαίνων εἰς τόπον εἰς τόπον, πάντη δὲ ἐὰν πάντοτε καὶ μηδὲν περιεχόμενος, ὅλος νος, ὅλος φωςπατρῆρον, ὅλος ὀφθαλμός, πάντα ὄρον, πάντα ἄρτιν, εἰς ὅλος πάντα, διόνυστα τὰς δυνάμεις ἐρευνῶν.
Pade, the question of “orthodoxy” was not the main motivation to study Clement’s *logos* and christology, their conclusions contribute much to this problem.\(^{132}\)

\(^{132}\) On the other hand, Choufrine in the last chapter of his book ventured an argument that Clement can still be considered an orthodox theologian. The question of Clement’s orthodoxy for Choufrine has also to do with the right of Clement to belong to the ranks of Saints. Choufrine makes his case with additional explanations and qualifications and – in his own words – “squares” Clement into the tradition of the Eastern Orthodox theology. However, such “squaring” can hardly be appreciated when one attempts to understand Clement in his own work and time.
b) The Shift of Approach

Alongside the above trend of research on Clement we also find scholars, who did not consider it necessary to make the emanatory schemes of the contemporaneous philosophy decisive for Clement in order to explain his logology. At the beginning of the above review of scholarship on Clement’s notion of the *logos*, I gave one example of such an approach found in the monograph by Pade. Walther Völker, as a critique of whom Lilla wrote his monograph, even though he did not exemplify this argument on Clement’s doctrine of the *logos*, construed his treatment of Clement along the same lines. The approach was used and further developed by the ensuing authors, who sought to study Clement’s conception of the *logos* not from the philosophical perspective of the divinity that emanates through different stages, but rather from a more strict theological perspective of the relation of the *logos* to the one and unique God.

The complexity and difficulty of the concept of the *logos* and of the derivative terms such as *λογικός* and *λογικός* were pointed out by Claud Mondésert, who is

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133 See Walter Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus*. Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 57 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952).

134 At this point, I must simply signal out the problem of Clement’s scholarship that reflected a general status quo of the scholarship in the field of humanities of the first half of the twentieth century. The problem consisted in the differences of approaches and the structuring of departments in the Western universities such as those of classical studies, history, philosophy, and theology that studied different authors and literary texts of the same period while being not necessarily well informed of the tendencies and studies in the other departments.

renowned by his fundamental introduction to Clement’s theology per se. In his brief article Mondésert reaffirmed the importance of understanding Clement’s holistic view on the *logos*, which is present not only in metaphysical realms but also as the immanent component of the world, society, science, religion, and especially anthropology. Mondésert reminded us that, when we work with Clement’s text in its original, we have to be very careful with the term λογικός for in different contexts it can be translated differently as the “human” (as opposite to animal), “intelligible” (opposed to sensible), “reasonable,” “logical,” “rational,” “decent” (pertaining to etiquette), “symbolical,” pertaining to the “reasoning of the divine *logos*,” and finally “spiritual” and “mystical.” The list of possible renditions of the term λογικός can be extended and it only reflects the richness and profundity of the term *logos*, from

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136 Clau\d Monsé\r. Clé\nm d’Alexandrie. Introdu\c \d à l’étude de sa pensée religieuse à partir de l’Écriture (Paris, Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1944).

137 Protr. 10.104.2; Paed. 1.12.100.3; 1.13.102.1; 2.5.46.2; 2.8.64.2; 3.4.30.3; Strom. 2.20.111.2; 2.21.127.1; 3.2.7.1; 4.18.163.2; 7.6.18.7; 7.6.21.1.

138 Strom. 4.3.9.4; 5.14.94.3.

139 Paed. 1.12.100.1; 1.13.102.3 and 4.

140 Strom. 6.17.156.2.

141 Protr. 4.57.4; Strom. 5.8.44.1; 6.12.96.2; pertaining to memory Paed. 3.11.76; fear Protr. 1.8.2; Strom. 1.7.32.4 and 33.2; temperance Strom. 2.18.81.2; free assent Strom. 5.1.3.2; knowledge Strom. 2.18.77.5; 8.5.16.2 and Fragment 40.

142 Paed. 2.2.33.2; 2.7.60.1.

143 Strom. 6.6.36.4; Exc. 3.53.5 and 3.54.6.

144 Protr. 1.6.4; 10.98.4; Strom. 4.25.162.5; 5.1.6.3.

145 Paed. 1.12.100.3; 2.4.40.1; 2.7.53.3; 3.12.94.1; Strom. 4.18.117.5; 6.16.136.3; 8.3.7.4.
which it derives. The examples demonstrated by Mondésert stimulated a more comprehensive logological study that took its departing point not in the schemes and models of Clement’s religious and philosophical milieu, but rather in Clement’s broad adaptation of them to what he conceived as a normative Christian theology.

A brief and yet, in its general scope, more comprehensive study of Clement’s concept of *logos* is found in the work of Eric Osborn.\(^{146}\) Without delving into too many details, Osborn managed to present a general picture of the *logos* based not only on several passages of Clement but on his works in general. Osborn’s study of Clement’s metaphysical principles led him to conclude that “Clement both distinguishes and unites the Father and the Son.”\(^{147}\) Clement envisioned the identity of the *logos* based on this dual process of distinction and unity. Osborn did not specify what exactly made the Father and Son one and what made them separate. Rather, he simply called it the confusion that Clement did not seem eager to resolve. Osborn pointed out that, for instance, Aristotle distinguished six different principles that may have been the cause of Clement’s casual mix of the Father’s and Son’s functions. While Lilla, as I indicated previously, divided the identity of the *logos* in three stages and assigned each stage a certain role and function in the structure of divinity and universe, Osborn simply assigned


the function and identity of the *logos* in three categories of its relation to a) God, b) the world, and c) human race.

Osborn began his treatment of the subject of the *logos* with the passage from the Fourth Book of *Stromata* that deals with the distinction Clement made between the Father and the Son:

God, then, is indemonstrable and consequently can not be the object of knowledge; but the Son is wisdom and knowledge and truth and whatever else is akin to this. Indeed, proof and description can be given of him.\(^{148}\)

Osborn did not call his attention to the fact that Clement clearly referred here to John 1:18.\(^{149}\) He simply pointed out that here our early Christian theologian described God in terms of absolute transcendence, inexpressibility, and unreachable distance for human understanding, yet on the other hand, he called the Son accessible, conceivable, and perceptible, someone who enabled approximation of the Father to humanity and creation. In addition, Osborn rightly pointed out that the proper philosophical context for such a statement is of a Platonic nature because of its reference to the idea of a transcendent mind (God) that requires demonstration (knowledge) of divine matters mediated by philosophy in Plato and the teaching of the Son, in Clement. Thus, according to Clement,

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\(^{148}\) *Strom.* 5.25.156.1: ο μὲν οὖν θεός ἀναπόδεικτος ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τέ ἔστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα τούτων συγγενή, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει καὶ διέξοδον. The same idea is also expressed in Clement’s *Exc.* 1.7.

\(^{149}\) John 1:18: “No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he Has made Him known.” - οὐχὶ ονοίησε ἔναρακεν πόποτε: μονογενὴς θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκείνος ἔξηγησατο.
the *logos* of the Son is the glory and truth of the Father; the *logos* is the image, the thought, and the face of God; the light (the Sun) by which we gaze on God and revealer of God’s nature (identity); the servant, the instrument, and God’s perfect imitator; primordial wisdom, the will and arm of God, and the Father’s power and activity. The descriptions of the *logos* that Osborn collected define his understanding of the identity of the *logos* construed on the basis of the distinction and relation between the Father and the Son. Osborn also cited evidence to show the unity of the Father and Son. This evidence speaks of the *logos* as God in God, God Almighty; furthermore,
the *logos*, in its unity is inseparable from the unity and being of the Father;\textsuperscript{164} the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son.\textsuperscript{165}

The absolute status of the *logos* in its relation to the ultimate divinity and its accessibility and visibility to the world as opposed to the transcendence of God warranted it the ultimate position in its relation to the created world. Osborn demonstrated this relation of the *logos* to the world on the basis of certain passages that rendered the *logos* as the ultimate center of the universe, e.g., “All the powers of the divine spirit, gathered into one, complete the same thing, namely the Son; he does not call up the thought of powers exhibited singly. The Son is neither absolutely one as unity nor many as divisible, but one as all is one. Hence he is all. He is the circle of all powers being bound and united in one point.”\textsuperscript{166} A similar idea is also expressed in Clement’s *Protrepticus*, in which he speaks of the *logos* as the Teacher (ὁ διδάσκαλος) who filled all things with his holy powers.\textsuperscript{167} These powers derive from and return to one Center “called the Alpha and Omega (Rev 1:8); in him alone the end becomes the beginning and ends again at the original beginning without any gaps.”\textsuperscript{168} On the one hand, the powers are the extensions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} *Paed.* 2.8.75.2.
\item \textsuperscript{165} *Paed.* 1.5.24.3; cf. *Paed.* 1.2.4.1.
\item \textsuperscript{166} *Strom.* 4.25.156.1.4-2.3. See above to see this passage interpreted by Lilla who associated the *logos* spoken of here with the world soul.
\item \textsuperscript{167} *Protr.* 11.112.1: ὁ διδάσκαλος ὁ πληρώσας τὰ πάντα δυνάμεις ἁγίας.
\item \textsuperscript{168} *Strom.* 4.25.157.1: ἀλφα καὶ ὥτι ὁ λόγος εἰρήται, οὐ μόνον τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ γίνεται καὶ τελευταῖ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀρχήν, οὐδὲμο διάστασιν λαβέων.
\end{itemize}
of the power of God, and on the other hand they are the powers of the Holy Spirit who works together with the Father and the Son through the prophets in the olden days and the holy people today. Osborn pointed out that the doctrine of “powers” was part of the second hypostasis of Middle and Neo-Platonism. Despite the similarity of Clement’s line of reasoning to that of Posidonius, Stoics, and Plotinus, Osborn did not, however, infer that Clement followed their philosophical solutions. Osborn simply stated that Clement emphasized the unifying significance of the notion of “powers.” As a final remark on the subject of the relation of the *logos* to the world, Osborn quoted two passages. The first one was from the Seventh Book of the *Stromata* and the second one from the *Paedagogus*. Both emphasized the ultimate role of the *logos* in its relation to the world and God. In the former citation Clement called the *logos* “the Almighty One, the most perfect, most holy, most potent, most princely, most kingly, and most beneficent.” In the second one Clement eulogizes the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the form of a prayer emphasizing their trinitarian unity and eternal glory.

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169 *Strom.* 2.2.5.4.

170 *Strom.* 5.6.38.5, *Paed.* 1.6.42.1.


172 *Strom.* 7.2.5.3. See above p. 73, n. 70 on Lilla’s interpretation of this passage as one of the proof texts of the concept of the *logos* as *anima mundi*.

173 *Paed.* 3.12.101.2: “Grant that we may sing a thankful song of praise to the one Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son who is educator and teacher, together with the Holy Spirit. All things to the One, in whom all things are, through whom all thing are one, through whom eternity exists, whose members we all are, to whom belong glory and the ages of eternity – all things to the Good, all things to the Wise, all things to the Just. To Him be the glory both now and forever. Amen.”
After he demonstrated the identity of the *logos* in its relation to God and the world, Osborn also summarized the identity and role of the *logos* in its relation to humanity. Moreover, he divided this question into two categories: first, the salvation of an individual human being and, second, the salvation of humanity taken as a whole. Osborn stressed the fact that the recurring emphasis on the unity – be it of God or of the Son – laid a metaphysical foundation for Clement’s anthropological integrity of the human being in moral, physical, epistemological, religious, and mystical senses, a process of unification that culminated in absolute unity with God. In other words, the unity of the human with God is what other scholars called Clement’s doctrine of human deification. In addition, the stress on the unity was explicitly construed as a critical response to the dualistic and deterministic views of contemporaneous Gnostics, such as Basilides and Valentinus. Osborn based his understanding of Clement’s notion of the salvation of an individual human being on the passages from the Fourth Book of

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pάντα τῷ ἀγαθῷ, πάντα τῷ καλῷ, πάντα τῷ σοφῷ, τῷ δικαίῳ τά πάντα. Ω̑ι ἕ δοξα καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. Ἱ.Μή.
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Stromata, chapters 25 and 26; and of the salvation of the human race on the passages from the Seventh Book of Stromata, chapters 2 and 3.

Osborn duly established the link between the unity of the Son and the unity (integrity) of the human being in the above cited passage of Stromata 4.25.157.1, in which the Son is called the “Alpha and Omega.” When we continue reading the next line of the passage, we find the precise connection of both concepts: “to believe in and through him [the Son] is to become one and to be indissolubly made one in him; while to disbelieve is to be separated, estranged, and divided.”

Clement further explains that μοναδικός γινέσθαι means to be pure, to be born again, to serve God, to exchange an “earthly” for a “heavenly” life. In order to achieve this goal, the Son competently instructs, sanctifies, and saves individuals, for he is the true Teacher/Rabbi, Priest, and the Savior-Mystagogue.

The unity of God and the Son is also the foundation for the unity of the church, to which the true followers of the one and only Teacher and Archpriest belong. This connection opened Osborn’s discussion of the salvation of not only individual Christians but also of the salvation of all humanity. The unity of the church and accessibility of

176 Strom. 4.25.157.3: διὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ δ’ αὐτῷ πιστεύσαι μοναδικόν ἢστι γενέσθαι, ἀκεραιστάσις ἐνομένον ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ἀπιστήσαι διαστάσαι ἢστι καὶ διαστήματι καὶ μερισθῆναι.

177 Strom. 4.25.162.4-5: ὄθεν καὶ διδάσκαλος μόνος ὁ λόγος, ὑάς τοῦ νοῦ πατρὸς, ὁ παιδεύων τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

178 Strom. 4.25.161.3: ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἴησου.

179 Strom. 4.25.162.3: αὐτὸς οὖν ἡμᾶς ὁ σωτὴρ ἀτεχνός ... μυστάγωγεί.

180 Strom. 7.17.107.2-6.
salvation to all humanity was Clement’s response to Gnostic-Christian sects, especially those of Basilidians and Valentinians, who taught an exclusive salvation of a limited number of elect individuals. Needless to say, Gnostic religious congregations existed separately from the “one, ancient (primeval), and catholic church,” and much of Clement’s theology, as well as that of other early Christian Apologists and theologians, was elaborated in response to, and as criticism of, the rival theological syntheses. Osborn accurately observed that in this particular case Clement reacted to what some scholars called the “natural determinism” of Gnostics, who as I pointed out earlier, limited salvation only to those pneumatics (οἱ πνευματικοί) who carried inside themselves a salvific sparkle of the logos. Therefore, Clement asks: “how could he be a Savior and Lord if he were not the Savior and Lord of all”? Clement did not agree or accept a Gnostic perspective, according to which God chose only a few for salvation and let others be doomed. On the contrary, he reversed the chances for salvation into his Christian perspective, according to which God called everyone to salvation, and it is up to each person to freely choose it and, accordingly, conduct a virtuous lifestyle free of sin, “for

Gnostics divided the human race into three categories of people of body, soul, and spirit, and the salvation was only accessibly to the people of spirit who possessed the inborn salvific seed/knowledge of the logos; some exceptions to the people of soul could be made if they worked hard on their purification and perfection, however, they still had no equal chance to be at the same level as the pneumatics. See p. 39 above and Judith Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis: Clement of Alexandria’s Interpretation of the Tabernacle,” Studia Patristica 31 (1997): 414-37.

181 Strom. 7.17.107.5: [μὴ] ἀρχαῖαν καὶ καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν.
182 Strom. 7.2.7.6: πῶς δ᾿ ἂν εἶη σωτῆρ καὶ κύριος, εἰ μὴ πάντων σωτῆρ καὶ κύριος;
this is the law from above, that the one, who wants virtue, must choose it.”

Furthermore, Osborn used the passage about the human intellect as the third image of God to substantiate the argument that, in fact, the logos dwells within each and every human being endowed with a soul. Specifically, the essential indwelling of the logos made him the Savior of all humanity without exceptions. Being human – i.e., being created in the image and likeness of God – includes a preinstalled theoanthropological, or as I would like to call it christological, relation with the logos and God through participation in, presence of, and communion with the logos and God.

In his treatment of the identity of the logos Osborn referred to several key passages that we already saw employed by previous scholars. One might expect this

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184 Strom. 7.2.9.4: νόμος γάρ άνθρωπον ούτως, άφρωσθαι τόν βουλόμενον ἄρετήν. See also further Strom. 7.2.12.: “Everything, then, which did not hinder a man’s choice from being free, He made and rendered auxiliary to virtue, in order that there might be revealed somehow or other, even to those capable of seeing but dimly, the one only almighty, good God – from eternity to eternity saving by His Son. And, on the other hand, He is in no respect whatever the cause of evil.” – Πάντ’ οὖν δια μηδέν ἐκόλουθον ἐκολοθεος εἶναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ άφρωσθαι, συνεργά πρός ἀρετήν εποίησαν τι καὶ ἐξελέξαν, ὅπως ἐμβάλλει καὶ τούτῳ διερχόμενος διοίκησιν δυναμένοις τῷ ἐν τῷ μόνῳ ἐν παντὶ κράτῳ ἄγαθός ἀναφαίνεται Θεός, εἴς αὐνόν ἐν αὕνον σύμφων διά ζωήν, κακίας δ’ αὐ τῇ πάντῃ πάντως ἀναίτιος. Cf. William E. G. Floyd, Clement of Alexandria’s Treatment of the Problem of Evil (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

185 Strom. 7.3.16.5-6.

186 Clement clearly followed the Pauline anthropology, according to which the human being consists of the body, soul, and spirit that undergo essential regeneration into a new human being through initiation in Christ. See Strom. 7.3.14.2 with reference to Rom. 6: 6-7; II Cor. 10: 5; Eph. 4: 22-24; Col. 3: 8-9.

author to enter into a dialogue with previous scholarship, especially such authors as Casey and Wolfson, who prior to Osborn’s monograph undercut several of Osborn’s main arguments especially those questioning the unity of the *logos*. Yet, this apparently was not Osborn’s main intention. As I noted above, instead of “slicing” the *logos* into different entities or stages, he maintained its unity, which he believed was Clement’s fundamental characteristic of the *logos* who is the Son. The differences of Clement’s descriptions of the *logos* derive, according to Osborn, not from the different stages of the *logos* but rather from its relation to different phenomena: God, cosmos, and humanity. Such an approach clearly advanced Pade’s insight but still required further clarifications.

The article by Erich Fascher is another example of a study of Clement’s view on the *logos*, which is extremely insightful yet (nearly) free of references to the previous and contemporaneous scholarship. In it, the author made a fundamental link between the concepts of the *logos* and the *didaskalos* and rightly pointed out that almost each time when Clement spoke and theologized about the *logos* he also spoke and theologized about the *didaskalos* – a red-letter linkage that recurred throughout Clement’s entire

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work. Fascher believed that the verse from Matthew 23:8, “but do not be called ‘Rabbi,’ for One is your Teacher, [the Christ,] and you are all brethren,”\textsuperscript{190} is “eine Fuge” of Clement’s entire written corpus.\textsuperscript{191} Evidently, the link had not been unknown before Fascher and I will return to this question in the next chapter, in which I will treat the identity of Christ in terms of the Pedagogue and Teacher.\textsuperscript{192} But the connection between the \textit{logos} christology and the study of the notion of a teacher needed (and I believe still needs) much clarification and research.

Such scholars as Jaeger and Chadwick stimulated Fascher to develop further the view of the continuation of the classical tradition and \textit{paideia} following the example of Clement’s construal of Christ’s identity in terms of the Teacher who offers the true education.\textsuperscript{193} Fascher organized his article in the form of a collection of passages and

\textsuperscript{190} Mt 23:8: ιμείς δὲ μὴ κληθῆτε Ραββί, ἐξ γὰρ ἡστιν ιμῶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, πάντες δὲ ιμείς ἀδελφοὶ ἔστε.

\textsuperscript{191} Fascher, “Der Logos-Christus als göttlicher Lehrer bei Clemens von Alexandrien,” p. 205; cf. Protr. 1.7.3; Paed. 1.6.25.2; 3.12.98.1; Strom. 1.20.97.4; 5.1.1.3; 5.14.98.1.


\textsuperscript{193} The first serious attempts to bring together the two notions of the \textit{logos} and the \textit{didaskalos} in the previous century were made by such prominent historians of philosophy as Werner Jaeger and Henry Chadwick. Jaeger gave his general exposition of the most important trends of late antique philosophical thought – above all the notion of Greek \textit{paideia} – and the impact they made on the early Christian theology, see Jaeger’s programmatic Carl Newell Jackson Lecture given in 1960 at Harvard University, \textit{Early Christianity and Greek \textit{Paideia}} (Cambridge; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 46-67. Jaeger believed that the long classical tradition of Hellenic education which he previously explored in his fundamental work entitled \textit{Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture}, 3 vols. Trans. by Gilbert Highet. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, first published in German as \textit{Paideia: die
their interpretations excerpted only from Clement’s *Stromata* and *Paedagogos*. He began his exposition with an interpretation of Clement’s treatment of the true philosophy in *Stromata*, in which Clement invited his reader to seek the true teacher who is, exclusively, eligible to reveal it.\(^{194}\) Fascher pointed out that to make the case, Clement built his argument on the juxtaposition and synthesis of a) the traditions of Scriptural revelation and Greek philosophy; b) the concepts of faith and reason; and c) obedience to the authoritative person(s) of the divine Savior and instructional Teacher. For this, Clement established a connection between the apostolic and early Christian traditions and his own relation to them,\(^ {195} \) and the tradition of Greek philosophy,\(^ {196} \) which according to his view of the history of human civilization just as the Jewish Scriptures was a

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\(^{194}\) *Strom.* 5.9.57.3f.

\(^{195}\) *Strom.* 1.1.11.1-12.1ff.

\(^{196}\) *Strom.* 1.1.16.2.
propaedeutic preparation for the *parousia* of Christ. Accordingly, Clement subordinated the philosophical intellectual traditions led by renowned Greek teachers of rational methods such as Heraclitus, Pythagorus, Epictetus, Plato and Aristotle to the Jewish-Christian tradition of faith and wisdom granted by God that were encapsulated in the fundamental notion of the fear of God (Prov 1:7). Clement fostered the reconciliation of the seemingly opposing notions of the faith in, and fear of, God and the Greek intellectualism by subverting the former to the latter. As indicated by Clement, the *logos* ignites the faith (πίστις) and, in turn, faith becomes the fundamental condition or axiom, in the Aristotelian sense, of any epistemological pursuit. Finally, Clement ventured his theological agenda apropos the role of philosophy in the drama of salvation by identifying the stature of teacher with the Savior the Son of the Father:

The Savior always saves, “and always works, as he sees the Father (John 5: 17, 19).” By teaching, one learns more; and in speaking, one is often a hearer along with his audience. But “the Teacher is one” (Mt 23:8) of the speaker and listener. He is the one who provides nutrition for the mind and speech (*logos*).

197 *Strom.* 1.5.28.3. Fascher justly noticed that Clement extended the sense of Gal 3:24, “so that the law is become our tutor (*παιδαγωγός*) to bring us to Christ that we might be justified by faith,” also to the Greeks and not limited only to the people of law, Jews, as Paul originally intended in his epistle.

198 See *Strom.* 1.19.91.5, where Clement positively interpreted Paul’s preaching on Areopagus in Acts 26:17ff and reconciled, on the one hand, the revelation of Jewish Scriptures and New Testament (faith), and on the other hand, the Greek philosophical intuitiveness (reason). Cf. also Cf. *Strom.* 2.4.16.1.

199 *Strom.* 2.2.9.4: “Knowledge, accordingly, is defined by the sons of the philosophers as a habit that can not be overthrown by reason. Is there any other true condition such as this, except piety, of which alone the *logos* is teacher? I think not.” – τὴν γονὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζονται φιλόσοφοι πα//ιδες δι' ἑαυτὸν ἀμετάπτωτον ὡς λόγον. ἔστιν οὖν ἄλλη τῆς τοιούτης κατάστασις ἀληθής θεοσεβείας αὐτῆς, ὡς μόνος διδάσκαλος ὁ λόγος: οἷς ἔγγος οἴμαι. A very informative monograph on this issue is the dissertation by Elizabeth A. Clark, *Clement’s Use of Aristotle: the Aristotelian Contribution to Clement of Alexandria’s Refutation of Gnosticism* (New York: E. Mellen Press, 1977).

200 *Strom.* 1.1.12.3: ἐτι τε καὶ ὁ σωτήρ σύζει αὐι καὶ αἰι ἐγκατεί, ὡς βλέπει τὸν πατέρα.
Revelation provided Clement with the meaning of the history of salvation. The philosophical tradition, in turn, especially that of Plato provided Clement with the ontological architecture of the universe, the primeval motivation of human activity, i.e., the yearning of good, and philosophical terminology that discusses these questions. Thus, when once again Clement emphasized the subordination of philosophy to revelation and their inseparable unity he is able to demonstrate the identification of the Son and the true Educator:

Now God, who is without beginning, is the perfect beginning of the universe, and the producer of the beginning. As, then, he is being, he is the first principle of the department of action, as he is good, of morals; as he is mind, on the other hand, he is the first principle of reasoning and of judgment. Therefore also he alone is the Teacher, who is the only Son of the Most High Father, the Educator of people.

We already saw the above passage used by Mondésert when he pointed it out as an example of a translation of λογικός as reasoning (“the first principle of reasoning…”) and by Osborn when he referred to this place as an example of Christ’s aptitude to help humans achieve the goal of unification with God. Fascher, however, took notice of the first half of the quotation, which he called “griechisches Urtext” that defined the First

διδάσκαλον τις μαθήματι πλέον καὶ λέγων συνακρούται πολλάκις τοῖς ἐπικούρισιν αὐτῶν: “πεῖ γὰρ ὁ διδάσκαλος” καὶ τὸ λόγον καὶ τὸ άκροσμένον, ὁ ἐπιπηγάζων καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον.

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201 Cf. Strom. 5.1.6.3.

202 Strom. 4.25.162.5: ὁ θεὸς δὲ ἀναρχός, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅλων παντελῆς, ἀρχῆς ποιητικῶς. ἠ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν οἰσία, ἀρχὴ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τόπου καὶ οὐκ ὀσίον ἡγαθόν, τοῦ θείου. ἦ δ’ αὖ ὅτι νοῦς, τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ κριτικοῦ τόπου οὐδὲν καὶ διδάσκαλος μόνος ὁ λόγος, νῦς τοῦ νοῦ πατρός, ὁ παιδεύων τὸν ἀνθρώπον.
Principle and Creator of the world and associated it with the *didaskalos* the Son of God. Such identification gave Christ the highest authority in both fields of metaphysics (θεωρία) and ethics (πράξις). This kind of Teacher with this kind of teaching, therefore, is not just another philosophical or religious sectarianism. Rather, for Clement, Christian religion is the ultimate synthesis of all constituents of truth that are scattered in different schools of thought. Christian dogma holds the fullness of truth. It is organized by the principles of wisdom and experience. It explains the matters of the human and divine. It pertains to the human intellect and senses. It deals with the question of the purpose and meaning of life. In a word, it reveals the true divine knowledge about eternity as well as accounts of the past, present, and future. Fascher cited *Stromata* 6.7.53.1-3 as an extraordinary example of how Clement envisioned the content of Christian theology and its synthetic and all-embracing nature.

203 Clement clouded Christ with the transcendental status of the First Principle, yet at the same time in Platonic manner he maintained the balance by reminding Christ’s “brotherly and friendly” proximity to humans, see *Strom.* 5.14.98.1; 7.16.93.5; cf. Plato *Republic* 415a.

204 *Strom.* 6.7.53.1-3: “As we have long ago pointed out, what we propose as our subject is not the discipline which obtains in each sect, but that which is really philosophy, strictly systematic Wisdom, which furnishes acquaintance with the things which pertain to life. And we define wisdom to be certain knowledge, being a sure and irrefragable apprehension of things divine and human, comprehending the present, past, and future, which the Lord has taught us, both by His advent and by the prophets. And it is irrefragable by reason, inasmuch as it has been communicated. And so it is wholly true according to [God’s] intention, as being known through means of the Son. And in one aspect it is eternal, and in another it becomes useful in time. Partly it is one and the same, partly many and indifferent – partly without any movement of passion, partly with passionate desire – partly perfect, partly incomplete.”–ως πάλαι παρεσημειωσάμεθα, οδ τὴν κατὰ έκκαιστὴν άφρην ἀγωγὴν φαμεν, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ άντιος ἐπὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ ὀρθὸς σοφίαν τεχνικῆν, τὴν ἐμπείριαν παρέχουσαν τῶν περὶ τον ζων, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐμπέδον γνώσιν θείον τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, κατάληγον τοια βεβαιαν οὗσαν καὶ ἀμετάπτοτον, συνει ληφνιαν τα τε άντα καὶ τα παροχεχοῦτα καὶ τα μέλλοντα, ἡν ἐδι δάκτιον ήμας δια της παρουσίας δια τα των προφητών ο κύριος καὶ έστιν ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, παραδοθέας τη αὐτή; <έ> καὶ πάντως άληθῆς ὑπάρχει, βουλήσει, ας δια τοῦ ὑπὸ ἐγκωπυμένη, καὶ ή μὲν αιώνιος εστιν, ή δὲ χρόνω λογισμός, καὶ ή μὲν μια καὶ ή αὐτή, οδ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐμπράγοροι, καὶ ή μὲν ἄνευ παθητικῆς τινος κινήσεως, ή δὲ μετὰ παθητικῆς ὑπέξεως, καὶ ή μὲν τέλειος, ή δὲ ενδείκης.
After he analyzed the passages that he found most illuminating for the discussion of the *logos*, who is the Christ divine Teacher, in the Books of *Stromata*, Fascher continued to settle on the passages relevant to this issue from Clement’s *Paedagogus*. He rightly pointed out that in the first thirteen chapters of *Paedagogus* Clement laid out a program of the educational activity of divine the *logos*. This program was devised to purify the human being from sin and to express divine love towards humanity. Purification and the expression of love took place from the beginning of the olden days but especially in recent times, when God revealed God’s will in the most emphatic, i.e. incarnate, way. Clement crowned his exposition of Christ the Educator of his *Paedagogus* in an elevated prayer. In his prayer, Clement called upon God in the trinitarian formula of “the one Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son who is Educator and Teacher (παιδαγωγός και διδασκαλός), together with the Holy Spirit.” Fascher noted an important aspect of Clement’s program, namely, his optimism about the human capability and *Leistungsfähigkeit* (effectiveness) to undergo the educational curriculum

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206 *Paed.* 1.2.

207 *Paed.* 1.3.

208 *Paed.* 1.11.

209 *Paed.* 1.12.

210 *Paed.* 3.12.101.2. At the conclusion of his article Fascher made also a reference to *Hymnus Christi salvatoris* which is also furnished in a form of a prayer and speaks about the *logos* in, among others, pedagogical terms. The *Hymn* was preserved at the end of the Third Book of *Paedagogus* but most scholars agree that this may have been an independent liturgical piece, possibly but not certainly composed by Clement.
offered by the *logos*. As in his *Stromata* so also in *Paedagogus*, Clement endowed the *logos* with the absolute authority since the *logos*, for Clement, is the Creator, Educator, and Teacher of the world and humanity. But even more importantly, at the conclusion of his *Paedagogus* yet still prior to the conclusive prayer, Clement correlated and identified the church with the school, a teaching-place, which in turn is allegorized as the mystical chambers of the *didaskalos* who is the Bridegroom:

> And now, in truth, it is time for me to cease from my pedagogy, and for you to listen to the Teacher. And he, receiving you who have been trained up in excellent discipline, will teach you the oracles/Scriptures (τὰ λόγια). The church is here for the good, and the Bridegroom is the only Teacher, the good will of the good Father, the true wisdom, the sanctuary of knowledge.

The allegorization of the church as school or the school as church is extended by Fascher in a Philonian and Platonic manner to the cosmic level. Since Christ is not only the teacher of his pupils/followers but as the *logos* also the Maker of the world, the world is accordingly turned into a cosmic school. Fischer writes:

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212 *Paed.* 3.12.99.2 and 3.12.100.2.

213 *Paed.* 3.12.97.3-98.2: Καὶ δὴ ὄρα γε ἤμοι μὲν πεπαύσθαι τῆς παιδαγωγίας, ὦμᾶς δὲ ἀκροβύσθαι τοῦ διδασκάλου. Παραλαβόν δὲ ὅστοι ὦμᾶς ὑπὸ καλὴν τεθραμμένον ἀγαθὴν ἐκδιδάσκεται τὰ λόγια. Διδασκαλεῖ δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἢ ἢ καὶ ὁ νησφός ὁ μόνος διδάσκαλος, ἀγάθου πατρὸς ἀγάθων βουλήμα, σοφία γνώσεως, ἀγάθων γνώσεως.

214 Lilla accused Fascher of entirely overlooking the Gnostic influence on Clement’s conception of the *logos*. See *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 163, n. 2. It is not surprising, however, that Fascher left this question out of the horizon, for his understanding of Clement’s view of the *didaskalos* is opposed to Lilla’s. For the latter, in a Gnostic manner, the gnosis defined its transmitter: whereas for the former it was the transmitter, who defined the nature of knowledge.

215 Clement must have been familiar with Plato’s pedagogical project which is Plato’s fundamental premise of his book of *Laws*. See *Leg* 897b; cf. Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia*, p. 66.
In a comprehensive way the notion of Hellenic paideia proved to be useful. It emerged from the concept of the polis and was extended to the concept of the cosmos. By means of the doctrine of the logos it obtained a grand ample unity of the past, present, and future, and, at last, it was deeply rooted in the will and wisdom of the Almighty One.\(^{216}\)

Furthermore, Fascher pointed out that the concept of Polis (πόλις, civitas) is universalized to heavenly and earthly scopes and educational curriculum taken on civitas terrena is further carried on to civitas coelestis, towards which Clement exhorted his neophytes and faithful.

Fascher put his finger on several fundamental trends of Clement’s thought that introduced an important and long-overdue shift in the study of Clement’s notion of the logos. Instead of entering the discussion of how many logoi Clement counted in his contemplations, Fascher rightly contextualized this notion by actions and mission of the concrete tangible figure of the didaskalos. The concept of the didaskalos made an equally important impact on the formation of Clement’s christology as did the conception of the logos. Indeed, as we clearly saw in Fascher’s article, in his description of Christ, Clement employed references to the divine logos and the relation of the logos with God to absolutize and cement the authority of Christ as the Teacher, who stands above all other teachers and religious leaders of Greco-Roman and Jewish philosophico-religious

\(^{216}\) “In umfassender Weise ist der Gedanke hellenistischer Paideia nutzbar gemacht, aus der Enge der Polis in den Kosmos geweited und mit Hilfe des Logosgedankens eine großartige, Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft umfassende Einheit geschaut, welche letztlich in des Allmächtigen Willen und Weisheit wurzeln” (the emphases are mine). See Fascher, “Der göttliche Lehrer bei Clemens Alexandrinus,” p. 207.
schools. On the other hand, Fascher’s brief fifteen page study could not possibly exhaust all nuances of the relation between the two notions of the *logos* and the *didaskalos*. It also did not show the broader context of Clement’s logology and christology or of the late antique perception of the statue of a teacher. These and many more questions call for a further study of the subject.

A deeper shift in scholarly interest in Clement’s logology was introduced one decade later by another German scholar of Clement, Adolf Knauber. This author forcefully challenged the fundamental argument of such scholars as Zahn and Casey who endorsed the authenticity of the Photian quotation of Clement’s *Hypotyposes*. Even though Knauber’s main and overarching task was to show the perception of Clement’s legacy throughout the history of Christian theology, the conclusions he made were startling. He demonstrated that until the eighth century CE Clement enjoyed a highly respectful position in the cohort of early Christian thinkers. Such prominent churchmen as Alexander of Jerusalem, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret of Cyprus, Maximus the Confessor, and John Damascene read the works of Clement and deemed him a great

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father of Christian antiquity.\textsuperscript{218} It was – and long thereafter is even until today– with the publication of the famous Bibliotheka (Μυριόβιβλος, “thousand books”) by Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople, that the reputation of our Alexandrian catechist was maligned. In the centuries following Photius’ review of Clement’s theological legacy, theologians seemed to lose their interest in the study of the early Alexandrian theologian.\textsuperscript{219}

Photius was a church leader, prominent teacher, and encyclopedist of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, and he left a sizeable literary legacy that holds the Lexicon, Amphilochia, Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, numerous letters, and his famous Bibliotheka.\textsuperscript{220} The latter work consisted of 280 codices containing 386 books that surveyed both pagan and Christian authors. In it, Photius also mentioned Clement and, as Zahn and Casey noted, was rather reluctant to believe in Clement’s “impious and fabulous doctrines” that just as in the case of Origen may have been interpolated into his writings by malicious editors and copyists.\textsuperscript{221} Yet again just as in the case of Origen, he argued that one can not confidently establish what the genuine writings of the first

\textsuperscript{218} Knauber in fact collected most of the references in his article “Die patrologische Schätzung des Clemens von Alexandrien bis zu seinem neuerlichen Bekanntwerden durch die ersten Druckenilation des 16. Jahrhunderts,” see pp. 289-293.


\textsuperscript{220} On life and literary legacy, see Despina S. White, Patriarch Photios of Constantinople: His Life, Scholarly Contributions, and Correspondence together with a Translation of Fifty-Two of his Letters (Brookline, Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1981); Francis Dvornik, Photian and Byzantine Ecclesiastical Studies (London: Variorum Reprints, 1974).

\textsuperscript{221} Needless to say, by the time of the eighth century the theology of Origen or rather Origenists had undergone a dogmatic scrutiny and plausible condemnation at the Fifth Ecumenical Council.
Alexandrian had been. Therefore, one should restrain oneself from studying those texts altogether and waste no time on deciphering their theology based on extant manuscripts that were apparently irreversibly corrupted.

Knauber had nothing against this kind of argumentation. However, independently of Osborn, he merely questioned the accuracy of the report on Clement we find in Photius’ codex 109. It was generally accepted that Photius wrote the bulk of his Bibliotheka prior to his embassy to the “Assyrians” (Arabs). In addition, he actively participated in the domestic and foreign politics of the Byzantine Empire. It would, therefore, be a titanic undertaking to compile the Thousand Books, unless he had a circle of colleagues and students who assisted him in his work. Knauber contended that the analysis of the style and formulation of phrases and sentences in the codes of Bibliotheka clearly showed that the introductions and conclusions as well as many articles came from the pen of the great Byzantine. However, the bulk of other articles and in our case the codex 109 was prepared by someone who most likely belonged to the Photian academic circle.²²² It was due to the inaccuracy or misunderstanding of the one who prepared the summary on Clement for Photius that “Photios hat ihn [Clement] also mißverstanden und allzu schnellfertig heterodox mißdeute.”²²³


Furthermore, Knauber revisited and candidly critiqued Casey’s view of Clement’s manifold logology, according to which Clement believed in the three distinct *logoi*: a) λόγος that belongs to the Godhead; b) λόγος the active principle of creation; and c) λόγος that acquired a personal distinction within the Godhead and worked in Jesus, prophets and Christians.  

Firstly, Knauber responded to Casey’s arguments in the way Pade and Osborn did, i.e., even though Clement, like the Apologists, indeed connected the creation of the world with the generation of the Son, as is demonstrated in the passages of *Stromateis* 6.16.147.2 and 5.14.92.1-3, he nonetheless firmly maintained the “one, consubstantial and eternal” divinity of the *logos* and God, as is shown in the passages from *Protrepticus* 12.120.3; *Paedagogus* 1.6.41.3; 2.8.75.2; *Stromateis* 1.29.182.1-3.

Secondly, Casey’s dwelling on Photius’ suggestion that not even paternal *logos* but the one that dwells in the human intellect that was incarnate in Jesus is a grotesque misunderstanding. Clement, like the Apologists, was certainly aware of the Stoic rhetorical and metaphysical terminology of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (δύναμις πανκρατής) and λόγος προφορικός. However, unlike the Apologists he did not use the distinction to demonstrate the divine act of creation and the Incarnation but rather clearly denied it with reference to the *logos*, who is the Son of God, as the passage from *Stromateis* 5.1.6.3

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positively approves. On the contrary, Clement believed in the full-value Incarnation of Christ which he held, in fact, in his reproof of Docetism.

Knauber’s meticulous critique of Photius, and subsequently his critique of Casey, was aimed to reverse in a drastic way the contemporary perception of Clement’s theological legacy in general and of his logological theologizing in particular. As I will show later, only a very limited circle of scholars, to name just Choufrine and Kovacs, referred to his work. This is a striking fact, since for a significant amount of time the passage from *Hypotyposes* was the strongest witness to Clement’s alleged “blunt heterodoxy” that set up a black eye and indeed a harmful hermeneutic framework for scholars who studied Clement. *Fragment 23* found in Photius’ *Bibliotheka*, codex 109, was a point of departure for Casey’s interpretation of Clement’s conception of the *logos*. This fragment was also conclusive for such respected professors of early Christian thought as Wolfson and Daniélou, who expressed their skepticism about the unity of the *logos* in Clement’s writing. Consequently, they dismissed Clement’s christology from the formation of the “orthodox” Christian christological dogma. What such authors as Pade and Osborn held without the acute defense against their critics, Knauber at last was able to demonstrate with the necessary scholarly gear. Wolfson’s other critical arguments against Pade’s and Osborne’s interpretations of the *logos* still remain...

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227 *Strom*. 5.1.6.3: “For the *logos* of the Father of the universe is not the uttered word, but the wisdom and most manifest kindness of God, and His power too, which is almighty and truly divine.” – ὁ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων λόγος οὐχ οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ προφορικός, σοφία δὲ καὶ χριστότης φανερώτατη τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις τουτοῦ παγκρατής.

228 See *Strom*. 3.17.102-103.3; 6.9.71.2; 7.17.108.2. Cf. also Theodor Rüther, “Die Leiblichkeit Christi nach Clemens von Alexandrien,” *Theologische Quartalschrift* 108 (1926); 231-254.
unaddressed, but those were resolved in the publication of the article by Marc Edwards, to which I return below. Obviously, Knauber did not explicitly exhort Clement’s reinstatement in the Calendar of Saints, even though from his conclusions one may get a hint that this would not be a bad idea. Notwithstanding, he did make a significant contribution to “reinstate” Clement to the cohort of early Christian theologians, who contributed to the formation of christology that now appears no less orthodox as intricate, complex, and inventive.

My discussion of the scholarship on Clement was aided with a broader understanding of the current state of research on the subject of Clement’s logology. It shows how complex, polemical, and somewhat contradictory the subject and its study are. However, this discussion will not be complete without taking into consideration of two more scholars who attempted to present Clement’s doctrine of the logos and its implication for christology, namely, Aloys Grillmeier and Marc Edwards. By now, when looking at their (or anyone else’s) bibliographical references to the research on Clement one can anticipate the conclusions these authors will be inclined to draw.

For many students and scholars of patristic christology (including the present author), one of the first books of reference on the subject is the *Christ in Christian Tradition* by Aloys Grillmeier. It has been revised numerous times and translated in different languages.\(^{229}\) It has also been criticized as often as it has been praised.

\(^{229}\) I referred to the English translation of Grillmeier’s *Christ in Christian Tradition* previously, see first chapter of the present study, p. 22-23ff. In the newest German revised edition of *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche* (Freiburg im Breisgau; Basel; Wien: Herder, 1979) the section on Clement was not significantly changed despite the new studies that I discussed above. *Cf.* also Grillmeier’s latest *Fragmente*
However, while revising his grand monograph Grillmeier seemed not to have changed his mind much at all in his brief section on Clement. His treatment of Clement on the whole was, as he himself acknowledged, influenced by Lilla’s monograph. Lilla’s philosophical framework was the blueprint headlines for Grillmeier’s understanding of Clement’s christology, which, in turn, characteristically but not exclusively of the “special Alexandrian prism” is based on the doctrine of the logos and the Incarnation.230

For Grillmeier just as for Lilla, the logos of God “acts both as a metaphysical principle and as an historical person.”231 We could see earlier how Lilla consummately substantiated the first half of the proposed thesis, but his statement about the logos as the historical person indispensably lacked further explication, which Grillmeier recognized and elaborated. The bridge between the former and the latter, according to Grillmeier, is Clement’s conception of the Incarnation.232 The Incarnation of the logos is the

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230 Grillmeier summarized Lilla’s philosophical framework of Clement’s theology in the following features: a) Clement’s writings have an esoteric character; b) Clement dwells on the role of the logos as the source of the created world and the teacher as transmitter of gnosis (the sacred teaching); c) he aims at the ideal of contemplative life; d) he recognizes the role of the encyclical disciplines and philosophy in the construction of Gnosis; e) he extensively uses the allegorical interpretation of the Jewish Tabernacle; and f) his theology is guided by vision of the journey of the Gnostic soul to heaven and ultimate divinization. In defining the “special Alexandrian prism” Grillmeier followed Lilla and distanced himself from Daniélou in the view that Clement derived his ideas mainly not from Jewish-Christian apocalyptic sources. Rather, he claimed, the sources are Gnostic and Valentinian to be more specific. The question of the relationship between the apocalyptic literature and the literature of varying groups of Gnosticism is yet to be answered. I agree, however, with Choufrine that the synthesis of Clement goes much deeper than simply relying on his sources, whatever they may be. In light of this the question of sources is not secondary but also not decisive.


232 In his conclusions about Clement’s understanding of the Incarnation, Grillmeier relied also on the works of Gervais Aegby, Les missions divines de Saint Justin à Origène (Fribourg: Editions
fulfillment of the Scriptural theophanies of Jews yet at the same time it is something completely new:

Who could teach with greater love for people than he? In other times, the older people had an old Covenant: as law, it guided them through fear; as the *logos*, it was a messenger (Angel). But the new and young people have received a new and young Covenant: the *logos* has become flesh, fear has been turned into love, and the mystic messenger of old has been born, Jesus.\(^\text{233}\)

Grillmeier pointed out that Clement took one step further away from the Apologists when he retained the transcendence of the *logos* even after the Incarnation,\(^\text{234}\) even though, as it was stated also by Daniélou, the Incarnation was God’s “step into visibility” through the *logos*.\(^\text{235}\) Grillmeier restated Casey’s thesis that the *logos* begot himself but at the same time stipulated that the *logos* did not become twofold.\(^\text{236}\) Oddly enough and similarly to Daniélou, Grillmeier referred to Casey’s article as a proof of the “rejection of a doubling of the *logos*” despite the fact that Casey’s goal was to demonstrate that very “doubling.” As we saw earlier the only proviso Casey made was

\(^{233}\) Paed. 1.7.59.1: Τίς ἂν οὖν τούτου μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς φιλανθρωπότερον πανδείσαι; Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον τῷ πρεσβύτερῳ λαῷ πρεσβύτερα διαθήκη ἦν καὶ νόμος ἐπαιδεύοντος τὸν λαὸν μετὰ φόβου καὶ λόγους ἄγγελον ἦν, καὶ καὶ νέῳ λαῷ καινή καὶ νέῳ διαθήκῃ δεδώρηται καὶ ὁ λόγος γεγένητο καὶ ὁ φῶς εἰς ἀγάπην μετατρέπεται καὶ ὁ μυστικὸς ἐκεῖνος ἄγγελός Ιησοῦς τίκτεται. See also Protr. 11.116.1; Paed. 1.3.8.2.

\(^{234}\) Exc. 1.7.4; 1.8.1.

\(^{235}\) Strom. 5.3.16.5; 5.6.39.2.

\(^{236}\) Grillmeier, 135, n. 100.
that the procession of the *logos* the Son from the paternal *logos* was – in light of *Excerpta* 1.19.1 – not essential but by certain circumference. Thus despite his explicit reference to, and reliance on, Casey’s and Lilla’s study of the influence of Middle Platonism, Grillmeier maintained that Clement subordinated these influences to his Christian view of the personal pre-existent *logos* and the historical person of Jesus Christ as one integrated and undivided person: “the *logos*, then, the Christ, the source (*aιτίος*) of our being in the primeval past (for he was in God) and of our well-being (this very *logos* has now appeared to people), he himself alone is both, God and man, the source of all blessings to us, by whom we, being taught to live well, are sent on our way to life eternal.”

Grillmeier argued that Clement’s most acute solution to the problem of the ontological identity of, and relationship between, the Father and the Son was found in the conception of πρώσπον. The Son revealed the Father in the most vivid, tangible, and expressive (visible) way when he became incarnate. The incarnate Son, therefore, was identical to the pre-existent *logos*, who was God’s Countenance and Name from eternity as Clement demonstrated in his Fifth Book of *Stromata*, in which he interpreted the Jerusalem Tabernacle and the higher meanings of its components and boldly concluded that the name engraved on the plate of the High Priest was the Name of God who is God’s Son:

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And it is the name of God that is expressed [on the plate of the High Priest], since, as the Son sees the goodness of the Father, God the Savior works, being called the first principle of all things, which was imaged forth from the invisible God first, and before the ages, and which fashioned all things which came into being after him.  

According to Grillmeier, Clement’s preoccupation with the notion of the *logos* was aimed at the greater emphasis of the descent of the *logos* into human flesh. Unlike the majority of the scholars I discussed so far, Grillmeier not only mentioned the normative importance of the Incarnation in Clement but also went on to explicate it in some detail. We just saw above his first reference to Clement on this subject in his interpretation of *Paedagogus* 1.7.59.1. Clement compared Christ’s Incarnation to the descent of the soul into the body as an act of falling asleep, whereas the Resurrection is compared to the awakening of the soul. Furthermore, Clement clearly thought of the Incarnation in the above mentioned analogy of the Jerusalem Tabernacle when he inferred that the name inscribed on the plate and revealed to the human senses is the symbol of the Son’s descent on earth to make the Father’s Name accessible to the

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238 *Strom.* 5.6.38.7: ἐπεί, ὡς βλέπει τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ὥς ἐνεργεῖ, θεός στήρι κεκλημένος, ἢ τῶν ὄλων ἁρχὴ ἢτις ἀπεικονίσταται μὲν ἐκ "τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου" πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰῶνον, τετύπωκεν δὲ τὰ μεθ ἑαυτῆ άπαντα γενόμενα. Cf. also *Paed.* 1.7.57.2; *Strom.* 5.6.34.1.

239 In this aspect of Clement’s Christology Grillmeier predominantly referred to Theodor Rüther’s article “Die Leiblichkeit Christi nach Clemens von Alexandrien,” *Theologische Quartalschrift* 108 (1926): 231-254.

240 *Strom.* 5.14.105.4: “For he [Psalist] not only figuratively calls the resurrection of Christ rising from sleep; but to the descent of the Lord into the flesh he also applies the figurative term sleep.” – ως γάρ τὴν ἀνάστασιν μόνην τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐξ ὑπον ἐγερσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν εἰς σάρκα κάθοδον τοῦ κυρίου ἐπον ἀλληγορεῖ. Cf. *Ps* 3:6; Plato, *Phaedo*, 95; Heraclitus, fragment 21DK (49 Marcovich).
senses.\textsuperscript{241} At the end of his \textit{Protrepticus}, Clement explained the reason why the first humans were expelled from Paradise and what the Lord had to do in order to deliver them from that “expelled” state of existence. In order to accomplish his mission, the Lord had to become a human and to take on the human body.\textsuperscript{242}

Grillmeier demonstrated that Clement believed in the reality of the human flesh assumed by the \textit{logos}. However, Grillmeier was aware of some ambiguities in Clement’s explanation of the tensions between the \textit{logos} and human soul. The principal focus of Grillmeier’s \textit{Christ in Christian Tradition} was to demonstrate the theological traditions and conceptions that led to the formulations at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The major developments of this tradition came from Alexandria, which also produced the Arian and Apollinarian controversies. Despite his reliance on Lilla’s interpretation of the \textit{logos} in Clement, Grillmeier saw no Arian danger in Clement, for he found in Clement no trace of the twofold \textit{logos}. However, the relation of the \textit{logos} to the soul of the human being and the soul’s import to the historical person Jesus Christ in Clement’s christological arrangement commanded Grillmeier’s attention and caution. Grillmeier believed that precisely Clement’s view of human emotions and sensation (\textit{πάθη}) obscured his christology with non-Christian material. One of the central passages that deal with

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Strom.} 5.6.38.6 – αἰσθήτη παρουσία.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Protr.} 11.111.2: “The Lord then wished to release him [the human being] from the bonds and clothed Himself with flesh – O divine mystery! – vanquished the serpent, and enslaved the tyrant death; and, most marvelous of all, man that had been deceived by pleasure, and bound fast by corruption, had his hands unloosed, and was set free.” – Τὸν δεσμὸν ἔλυσε τοῦτον ὁ κύριος αἰθής ἡθέλησεν, καὶ σαρκὶ ἐνδείξεις (μυστήριον θείον τούτο) τὸν φόβον ἐγκράτεσαν καὶ τὸν τίματον ἐδοξήσατο, τὸν θάνατον, καὶ, τὸ παραδοξόστατον, εκεῖνὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπον τὸν ἠθόπη πεπλάνημένον, τὸν τῇ φθορῇ δεδημένον, χερσίν ἡπλωμένας ἔδειξε λελιμένον.
\end{quote}
a broader perspective of Clement’s ideal Christian, the Gnostic:

The Gnostic is such that he is subject only to the affections that exist for the maintenance of the body, such as hunger, thirst, and the like. But in the case of the Savior, it would be ludicrous [to suppose] that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order to its duration. For he ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with him to entertain a different opinion of him; in like manner as certainly some afterwards supposed that he appeared in a phantasmal shape. But he was entirely impassible; inaccessible to any movement of feeling, either pleasure or pain. While the apostles, having most gnostically mastered, through the Lord’s teaching, anger and fear, and lust, were not liable even to such of the movements of feeling, as seem good, courage, zeal, joy, desire, through a steady condition of mind, not changing a whit; but ever continuing unvarying in a state of training after the resurrection of the Lord.²⁴³

Grillmeier noted that Clement in fact distinguished two kinds of sensation (πάθη):

one necessary for the body and the other one necessary for the soul. Thus, even though Jesus Christ had a real and not an ephemeral body – Clement ventured this thesis against Docetists – he also felt the pain and suffering of the body: “the Son of God – who made the universe – assumed flesh, and was conceived in the virgin’s womb (as his material

²⁴³ Strom. 6.9.71.1-3: Τοιούτος γὰρ ὁ γνωστικός, ὡς μόνοις τοῖς διὰ τὴν εἰσαγωγὴν τοῦ σώματος γνωστικοῦ πάθης περιπίπτειν, όποιον πάθη, δίνει καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ σωτήρος τὸ σῶμα ἀπαιτεῖν ὡς σῶμα τὰς αἰναγκαίας ὕπηρειας εἰς διάμονην, γέλας ἐκεῖ ἐκεῖνον γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχομένων ἀγίων, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς μὴ τοὺς συνάντες ἄλλας περὶ αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπειδήθη, ὡςπερ ἐμελεῖ ἐστεροῦσιν δοκήσας τινὲς αὐτῶν πεφαινοῦσθαι ὑπὲλαβον αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπαξεπλάθος ἔπαθεν ἡν, εἰς ὅν σιδέν παραεὐθύγει κίνημα παθητικόν οὕτω ἱδρυνον οὕτω λύπη, οὐδὲ ὑποστολικὴν ὑπῆρξεν καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ φύσεως καὶ εἰσαγωγῆς διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας γνωστικότερον κατεργάσατο καὶ τὰ δοκοῦσα ἀγαθὰ τῶν παθητικῶν κινήματος, όποιον ἀράχος, ἔμφαν, χαρᾶν, εὐθὺ μιᾶν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰ ἀνεκδεξάμενο, ἐμπέδῳ τινὶ τῆς διανοίας καταστάσεις μηδὲ καθ᾽ ὅποιον μεταβαλλόμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἐξεῖ ἀσκήσεως αἰει μένοντες ἄναλλοις ἑστι μέτα γε τῆς τοῦ κυρίου ἀνάστασιν.
body was produced), and subsequently, as was the case, suffered and rose again.\footnote{Strom. 6.15.127.1-2: τὸν ύπόν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ τά πάντα πεποιηκότος σάρκα ἀνειληρώτα καὶ ἐν μήτερ παρθένου κυοφορθέντα, καθὸ γεγένηται τὸ αἰσθητὸν αὐτοῦ σαρκίον, ἀκολούθως δὲ, καθὸ γέγονεν τούτο, πεπονθότα καὶ ἀνέστα μένον. Cf. also 7.2.6.5; 7.5; 8.1.}

The nature of his suffering, however, remains ambiguous.\footnote{Clement seemed to agree with Valentinus, whom he cited with affirmation but also with some reservation as is indicated by “as for ourselves” that can mean simply the humanity or Christian point of view, see Strom. 3.7.59.3-60.1: “And Valentinus says in the letter to Agathopus: ‘Jesus endured’ all things and was continent. It was his endeavor to earn a divine nature; he ate and drank in a manner peculiar to himself, and the food did not pass out of his body. Such was the power of his continence that food was not corrupted within him; for he himself was not subject to the process of corruption.” As for ourselves, we set high value on continence which arises from love to the Lord and seeks that which is good for its own sake, sanctifying the temple of the Spirit. It is good if for the sake of the kingdom of heaven a man emasculates himself from all desire, and ‘purifies his conscience from dead works to serve the living God.’ ” – Οὐαλεντίνος δὲ ἐν τῇ πρός Ἁγαθόποδα ἐπιστολῇ “πάντα” φησίν ὑπομείνας ἐγκρατείας ἡν θεότητα Ἰησοῦς εἰργάζετο, ἢπειραμένη καὶ ἔπινεν ἑαυτὴν ὑδάτας σακεδονίας τὰ βρῶματα. τοσοῦτο ἡν αὐτὸς ἐγκρατείας δύναμις, ὡστε καὶ μη φωτιάζεται τὴν τροφὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἕπει τὸ φθείρουμαι αὐτὸς ὅπως ἔχειν.” Ἡμᾶς μὲν οὖν δὲ ἀγαπήν τὴν πρὸς τὸν κέριον καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἐγκράτειας ἰσαζοῦμα, τὸν νεώς τὸν πνεύματος ἀγαπητοῦς καλὸν γὰρ ὁ χῶρ τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν εἰσοχθέν εὐφυτοῦ πάντης ἐπιθυμίας καὶ καθαρᾶτει τὴν συνειδήσειν ὑπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν θεὸ ἑνώτι. Cf. also Adumbrationes 210, where Clement reported of traditions according to which John could thrust his hand into the inside of the Lord’s body and feel the divine power.} Furthermore, Christ could not have any emotions such as courage, zeal, joy, and sexual desire because Christ was “not a usual man,” and all his emotions he subdued so to say by the control of his ruling principle of the soul.\footnote{Cf. Strom. 3.6.49.3.} Grillmeier cautioned that if in Clement’s anthropology the role of the ruling faculty of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν) is substituted or utterly subjugated by the divine logos then the christological implications are clearly negative. Such substitution clearly creates a precedent for a christology that later will be defined by Apollinarius, who believed that...
during the Incarnation of the divine *logos* in man that act of the Incarnation took the place in the human intellect. Grillmeier acknowledged that Clement “enriched” Stoic anthropology with Scriptural allusions, as well as with an important influx of Pauline ideas pertaining to the notion of the *inner man* and *spiritual* body (1 Cor 15:44).

However, Grillmeier did not investigate this issue further and so did not see the important connection between the anthropology of Paul and Clement that sheds light on the positive and progressive (προδοκοπτόν) nature of Clement’s view of human soul, in general, as well as the human soul assumed by the divine *logos* in the Incarnation, in particular.\(^{248}\)

Grillmeier merely cited the passage from *Paedagogus* discussed by Theodor Rüther where Clement informed his readers that the Lord who was the Pedagogue of the old Israel now rules (καθηγεμόν) the new people, new Israel.\(^{249}\) Based on the quotation, Grillmeier concluded that *logos* must be the predominant ruler (γαμων) of Christ’s human nature. However, in this passage Clement seems to interpret the history of salvation and the bridging role of Christ the Pedagogue for the old and new Israel and not necessarily the anthropological and christological nuances. Be that as it may, Clement is

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\(^{248}\) In light of 1 Cor 15:44 the human soul of Christ can be interpreted as having been “matured” at once at the Incarnation. Christ “trained” it to the ultimate perfection, *Strom.* 7.2.7.5-6: “he, having assumed flesh, which by nature is susceptible of suffering, trained it to the condition of impassibility.” – δε γε και την σαρκα την εμπαθη φοσει γενομενην άναληβον εις την άπαθειας επαλθεισεν. This process takes place in a Christian, too, although during a considerably longer period of time and requires the application of training and participation in Christ who is a typological paradigm for a Christian. Cf. Tomáš Špidlik, *The Spirituality of the Christian East* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications), p. 66.

\(^{249}\) Cf. *Paed.* 1.7.58.1: “the Lord of the ancient people was the Educator of his children. It is in his own person, however, face to face, that he is the guide of the new people.” – παιδαγωγος ο κυριος του λαου του παιδαιων, δι αυτου δε του νεου καθηγεμον λαοι, προσωπον προς προσωπον. Cf. Rüther, *Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Clemens von Alexandrien: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des christlichen Vollkommenheitsbegriffes* (Freiburg: Herder, 1949), pp. 58-60.
very close to interpreting the “lower” soul of Christ at the service to the λόγος ἤγεμιν and as a form of mediation between the ἤγεμονικόν and body, which as was indicated above undermines the theological meaning of Clement’s christology.

To sum up Grillmeier’s treatment of Clement’s logology, it must be pointed out that he introduced two important distinctions. The first one concerns the unity and distinctiveness of God and the logos; and the second concerns the logos becoming a human being that consists of the body and soul. The former problem Grillmeier resolved positively: despite his close dependence on Lilla, he interpreted the unity of the logos as more decisive than the emanative metaphysics of the Middle Platonic sources Clement was personally familiar with and whose terminology he frequently used. Alternatively, the latter problem of the Incarnation of the logos was observed historically from an anachronistic point of view as if testing Clement’s christology with Apollinarian litmus paper. Clement’s Stoic anthropology (un)successfully adapted to the Christian anthropology gave, according to Grillmeier, ambiguous results: on the one hand, Clement claimed the presence of the logos in the human mind as the sparkle of the divine which is the rational principle of human life. On the other hand, in the event of the Incarnation it remained uncertain whether or not, according to Clement, the human mind was substituted or subdued by the divine presence of the logos. Having pointed it out as the question, Grillmeier left it unanswered. I will return to this question in the next chapter, when I discuss the issue of the Incarnation of the logos.

The author, with whom I will conclude this discussion of the scholarship that deals with Clement’s logology is Marc Edwards. He recently challenged not only the
particular trend of previous scholarship that held Clement believing in what is commonly called the two-stage emanation theory but also presented an intriguingly fresh reconsideration of the basic Clement’s sources that were decisive for the interpretation of Clement’s conception of the *logos*. Without referencing Osborn’s or Knauber’s analysis of the Photian quotation, Edwards targeted most explicitly the scholarly findings of Casey, Wolfson, and Lilla in their conclusions that Clement paved the way for the Arian controversy. Similarly to Osborn, he built his response to the two-stage theory of the *logos* allegedly held by Clement in the three following steps: a) he revisited the belief that the two-stage theory of *logos* was predominant in the early phase of formation of Christian theology that drew the line between the paternal *logos* (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and the uttered *logos* (λόγος προφορικός) while making the latter proceed in time from the former; b) from a philological and philosophical points of view he reconsidered the sources, upon which the arguments for Clement’s two-stage theory were established; and c) he referred to the extant sources of Clement that demonstrate his belief in the eternal

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251 Edwards referred to George C. Stead, “The Thalia of Arius and the testimony of Athanasius,” *Journal of Theological Studies* 29 (1978): 20-52, esp. 31-4, and ventured that even “Arius did not maintain the doctrine of emanation and perhaps not even the doctrine of two *logoi*... Arius’ extant writings never assert that the title *logos* is equivocal, and the confession which he and Euzoiius presented to Constantine in 327 speaks of Christ as the *logos* in juxtaposition with clauses to the creation. That is, he is the *logos* of the world, not of the Father. Since Nicene council did not insist on the title *logos*, and it figures in a different place in the formulary of Eusebius (Socrates, *HE* 1.8), we must assume that Arius set some store by this sense of the term,” see Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria,” 159, n. 3.
and non-emanatory generation of the *logos* the Son from God the Father as his argument against the Valentinian teaching of the descent of Christ through different complex stages of emanation.

Thus, to answer Casey’s and Wolfson’s conjectures that the two-stage theory was the best that the Apologists and earliest fathers of church could produce, Edwards showed that the two-stage theory was, in fact, simply one of several solutions to the question of the relationship between the transcendental God and the created cosmos. No doubt, such early Christians as Tatian,\textsuperscript{252} Theophilus of Antioch,\textsuperscript{253} Hippolytus of Rome,\textsuperscript{254} and Tertullian\textsuperscript{255} did explicitly use the language that reflects the two-stage theory of the generation of the *logos*.\textsuperscript{256} Athenagoras, in turn, may also be included in the above cohort, but for him the nature of the *logos* was eternal with the Father. It was only the person of the *logos* that was created prior to the creation of the world, even though it was immanently or potentially in the Father.\textsuperscript{257} Ignatius of Antioch, on the other hand, if one follows the Middle Recension of his letters, resembled the theory but not automatically, since the “silence,” in which the *logos* proceeds from the Father, does not have to be necessarily interpreted as the middle emanation stage between the Father and the

\textsuperscript{252} *Oratio* 5.

\textsuperscript{253} *Ad Autolycum* 2.10 and 2.22.

\textsuperscript{254} *Refutatio* 10.33.1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{255} *Adversus Praxeum* 5.

\textsuperscript{256} See Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria,” 160.

\textsuperscript{257} *Legatio* 10.
A different kind of uncertainty apropos of the two-stage theory is applied to Justin Martyr, who affirmed the generation of the *logos* from the Father but did not discuss the stages or phases of that generation. Finally, there is no doubt that Irenaeus did not hold the theory but, in fact, argued against Gnostic adversaries that there is only one Son coeternal with the Father. He used the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός to formulate his case.

Since the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός were repeatedly attributed to Stoics, Edwards checked their use in Stoic sources. He found only one example of their use by Sextus Empiricus who simply stated that the human being differs from animals not by the uttered word (λόγος προφορικός) but by the indwelling intelligence (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος). For Stoics, therefore, this distinction did not cause the two phenomena of thought and speech to oppose one another and did not signify the

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259 Trypho 61.1.

260 Adversus Haereses 2.12.5: Thus where there is Silence there will be no *logos*, and where there is *logos* likewise there is no Silence. If, however, they say that the *logos* is indwelling, Silence too is indwelling, and yet she will be divorced from the indwelling *logos*. Since in fact it is not indwelling, this sequence of theirs indicates an emission. – sic ubi est Sige, non erit logos, et ubi logos, utique non est Sige. Si autem endiatheton Logon dicunt, endiathetos est et Sige, et nihilominus solvetur ab endiatheto Logo. Quoniam autem non est endiathetos, ipsa haec ordinatio ipsorum emissionis significat. One must give credit to Wolfson who singled out Irenaeus and Origen as the two exceptions from the rule; cf. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, pp. 198-204.

261 Adversus Mathematikos 8.275: They say it is not by the uttered *logos* that man differs from the irrational beasts (for crows and parrots and jays also emit connected sounds), but by the indwelling one. – φασιν, ὅτι ἀν ἄρωμας οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων (καὶ γὰρ κόρικες καὶ γυπτίκαι καὶ κάτω ἐν αὐθαίρετος προφέρονται φωνές), ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιάθετος; see also two other locution in Johannes F.A. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Vetterum Fragmenta*, vol. 2 (Studgardiae: B.G. Teubneri, 1968), 43.18 and 74.4.
succession in time of the latter from the former but simply registered their existence carrying no theological value. Edwards further noted that for Philo, who studied Stoic philosophy, cosmology, and allegory and was most certainly the nearest source for the Apologists and other early Christian writers, this distinction was also reserved only for the *logos* operative in human minds.\(^\text{262}\) In fact, by attributing the two terms to the human faculties of communication it was contrasted to the divine *logos* of God whose ways of communication and function were ontologically different both in nature and purpose.\(^\text{263}\)

Having considered the textual evidence from the philological point of view, Edwards went on to revisit the philosophical grounds that Clement might have elaborated in order to formulate his stand on the issue of the generation of the *logos*. To this end, Edwards brought up Lilla’s proposal to distinguish three stages of the *logos*, which as I showed above render the *logos* as a) the totality of God’s ideas (divine powers); b) the cosmic metaphysical principle (*\(\alpha\rho\chi\iiota\)); and c) the world-soul (Edwards called this stage the cosmocratic or hegemonic wisdom of God). Our author saw no objections to such a threefold categorization of the *logos* but found exceptionable Lilla’s insistence on the partition of the *logos* as not merely three aspects of its existence but as three successive stages. Edwards agreed that some contemporaneous Platonic philosophers, such as

\(^{262}\) See an extremely informative recent article by David T. Runia, “Clement of Alexandria and the Philonic Doctrine of the Divine Power(s),” *Vigiliae Christianae* 58 (2004): 256-276, in which the author argues that Philo’s double interpretation of God’s powers (justice and goodness) are christologically reworked by Clement to unify them in one power embodied in God’s one and only *logos* giving both God and the *logos* an equal status of operating a unified divine δύναμις. The article is dedicated to Eric Osborn, who as Runia informs us is about to produce a new monograph on Clement of Alexandria, which was eventually published two years ago, when the present dissertation was near to its completion.

\(^{263}\) Cf. *De Migratone Abraham* 83 and *De Specialibus Legibus* 4.127-9.
Alcinous, Apuleius or Plotinus, construed a hierarchy of the noetic world and its emanatory relation to cosmos with its objects. However, according to Edwards, Clement seems to be closer in his interpretation of Platonic ideas and powers to Numenius who believed in two eternal intellects – the first, Plato’s Form of the Good, and the second, a “noetic world” containing ideas. The two intellects are interrelated, but indeed the latter one is contingent upon, but not derivative of, the former. To support this argument, Edwards turned to, and reinterpreted, the passage of *Stromata* 5.3.16.3-5, which was used previously by scholars to demonstrate the gradations of the emanation of the *logos*. As we saw earlier, in this passage Clement spoke of the *logos* as a “barbarian” term for God: “now an idea is a thought of God; and of this the barbarians spoke of God as the *logos.*” Edwards thus noted how tepidly Clement shifted the meaning of the Platonic/Philonic notion of idea to his own conception of the *logos*, which allowed Edwards to suggest that the contents of God’s thought, just as according to Numenius, are not some pure noetic entities suspended in potentiality but rather God’s powers (δυνάμεις) eternally identical to their properties requiring no residual substratum that needs an

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265 *Strom.* 5.3.16.3-5: ἢ δὲ ἴδεα ἐννόημα τοῦ θεοῦ, ὀπερ οἱ βάρβαροι λόγον εἰρήκασι τοῦ θεοῦ. For the use of the passage by Wolfson, see above p. 67, n. 39; by Daniélou, p. 71; by Osborn, p. 95, n. 135. “Even if the *logos* were the realm of ideas, therefore, this would not imply that he ever possessed the static and unproductive mode of being which proponents of the two-stage theory attribute to him while he was merely immanent and potential in the Father.” See Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria,” p. 166.

266 Here Edwards followed the remark made by Osborn that Clement, in fact, used the term “idea” only when he cited Plato. See Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria,* p. 41, as well as *Strom.* 4.25.155.2 and 5.11.73.3.
intermediary conversion into essence. The *logos* as God’s thought or idea is the “paternal power” that administers cosmos. This line of argumentation is, therefore, closer to Clement’s view of the *logos* as one integrated reality with no internal divisions and processions.

Now as I noted above, the main cause that stirred the more than a century long discussion, and the central obstruction to a reconciliation of Clement’s view of the *logos* as one being and as two- or threefold emanation, is the legendary quotation of Photius who caught Clement in a “strange” belief in two *logoi* of the Father. Edwards noted that if the passage is found authentic as it was by Zahn, the concept of two *logoi* in the Father is in a direct contradiction to what Clement had to say elsewhere. Most importantly it deviates from Clement’s insistence and strong belief in the *logos*, the one and only power of God (*πατρική ἐνέργεια ὁ ψιός*) that created, permeated, and administered cosmos. Therefore, Edwards argued, the Photian reference to the *logos* as “a certain power of God” (*δύναμις της τοῦ Θεοῦ*) that was not the one that became flesh, was simply mistaken for the human faculty of reason and communication (*λόγος προφορικός*) that has an entirely different relation to the original *logos*. In his Fifth Book of *Stromata*, Clement clearly warned his readers that the *logos* ought not to be confused with an uttered word (*λόγος προφορικός*):

The one who gave us a share in being and life has also given us a share in the *logos*, wishing us at the same time to live rationally and well. For the *logos* of the Father of all is not this uttered word but is the most manifest wisdom and

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267 *Strom.* 7.2.5.2; 7.2.7.7; 7.2.9.1.
goodness of God, an almighty power indeed and truly
divine, nor is it incomprehensible even to unbelievers,
being the will of the Almighty.\textsuperscript{268}

Edwards noted that this passage is indeed very similar to the one cited by Photius
from Clement’s lost \textit{Hypotyposes}. It speaks of the Son, the paternal \textit{logos}, and of the
uttered word, which Photius could rightly associate with the human mind
(\textit{λόγος ἐνδιάθετος}) that “permeated the hearts of men.” However, Photius could have
kept in his mind familiar hypothesis of Theophilus as well as the later Arian controversy,
and thus he confused Clement’s anthropological term with the christological one, which
caused the misunderstanding. Similarly to, but at the same time independently of,
Knauber’s and Markschies’ analyses of the same issue Edwards concluded that Photius
was capable of misreading Clement as he did in this case.

Having given a plausible solution the problem of two \textit{logoi} in Clement, Edwards
was able to argue more strongly in favor of the authenticity of the Latin translation of
Clement’s \textit{Adumbrationes}, which as most scholars today agree is most likely attributed to
Clement but may also have had some affinity with his lost writings as the allusion to a
certain \textit{presbyter} indicates:

\begin{quote}
That, which was from the beginning, which we have seen
with our own eyes, which we have heard.\textsuperscript{269} In accordance
and in keeping with the Gospel according to John, this
letter also contains a spiritual principle. Thus when it says
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Strom.} 5.1.6.3: \textit{ο̄ δὲ μεταδόος ἦμιν τὸν εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν μεταδέδοκεν καὶ τοῦ λόγου, λογικῶς τε ἡμα καὶ εὖ ζῆν ἔδελεν ἡμᾶς τὸ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων λόγος οὐχ ὤντος ἔστιν ὁ προφορικός, σοφία δὲ καὶ χρηστότης φανερωτάτη τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις τε αὐτοῦ παγκρατῆς καὶ τῷ ὄντι θείᾳ, οὐδὲ ταῖς μη ὁμολογουσίς ἀκατανόητος, θέλημα παντοκρατορικὸν.

\textsuperscript{269} 1 John 1:1.
“from the beginning”, the elder explained it in this way that the origin of his generation is not separated from the origin that is [or maybe “is in”] the Creator. For when it says “from the beginning”, it alludes to the generation without beginning of the Son who exists coevally with the Father. For the word was indicative of an eternity with no beginning, just as the logos himself, that is the Son of God, in accordance with the equality of their substance, exists as one with the Father, is everlasting and uncreated. That logos existed always is what it indicates by saying: “the logos was in the beginning” (John 1:2).

Here, just as in Pade’s interpretation discussed previously, Edwards is convinced that Clement argued in favor for the eternal generation of the logos from God. Edwards recognized the notion of the aequalitas substantiae as a clear anachronism in the third century, which was most probably formulated by the sixth century Latin translator. But the very concept of the eternal generation that stands behind it was not foreign to Clement. It is only natural that Clement shaped this conception of the logos in reaction to the teaching of the opposite Christian fraction. Clement was well acquainted with the construal of the identity of the logos by Basilides, Valentinus, their followers, and most certainly with Theodotus who elaborated on it in his commentary on John’s Gospel as Clement himself attested in his notes to Theodotus’ and other Gnostic speculations recorded in his Excerpta ex Theodotus.

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This brought Edwards to the final discussion of the passage from *Excerpta* 1.19.1, which we saw a number of times earlier thoroughly discussed by Casey, Daniélou, and Choufrine. In this passage Clement stated that “not only by his presence did he [the *logos*] become man, but the essential *logos* became Son by limitation, not essentially.”

With full confidence Edwards asserted that the passage can scarcely be part of Clement’s own opinion. Edwards’ confidence is both radical as well as innovative. Not even the most advanced studies can determine with full certainty which passages of the *Excerpta* belong to Theodotus, which to other Valentinians, and which to Clement himself. The fact is that the critical editions of the text by both Robert Casey and François Sagnard attribute this passage to Clement. For the former, it was easy to inscribe it within the larger christological doctrine, since he accepted the Photian (mis)reading of *Hypotyposes* and could entertain the successive stages (modes) of the existence of the *logos*. For Sagnard, however, it required a great deal more of “harmonization” – however successful or unsuccessful it was is perhaps up to Clement himself to decide – to explain it away as Sagnard did in a fairly obvious dependence on Daniélou’s interpretation of Clement’s struggle to pin down a concept of *persona* and personhood through Clement’s term of

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272 It would not be too comforting to learn that Photius himself compiled the *Excerpta*.

Edwards consented that on the level of semantics the passage of Excerpta 1.19.1 certainly corresponds to the passage quoted by Photius. Therefore, if Clement wrote this passage, then the charges of Photius as well as of those scholars, who accepted its Clement’s authorship and asserted that Clement believed in the two logos rather than in one divine logos, are fair and correct. However, the becoming of the logos flesh not only at the dawn of a new historical era in the moment of Incarnation but also by a certain circumference in the prehistoric phase contradicts the saying of Excerpta 1.8.1, where Clement explicitly stated that “the logos in his identity (ἐν ταύτητι) is God in God, as it has been said ‘in the bosom of the Father’ (John 1:18), inseparable, indivisible, one God.” Moreover, it is also discordant with Stromata 7.2.5.3-6 and 7.2.8.3-6, where the logos is said to be compelled to take flesh only one time, while he was the one and only one who, by the wish of the Father, ruled the world and became incarnate in it. Then again, these were the Basilideans and Valentinians, who divided the figure of the Savior in different stages, such as the higher logos and its lower image; the Son and the Monogenes; the psychic Christ and heavenly Jesus. Thus, echoing Osborn’s inference, Edwards concluded his article by saying that Clement countered the Valentinian dichotomy between Christ on earth and the only-begotten Son in the Pleroma by

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274 Extrait de Théodote, p. 16-19.

275 Exc. 1.8.1: Ἡμᾶς δὲ τὸν ἐν ταύτητι Λόγων Θεῶν ἐν Θεῷ φαμεν, ὥς καὶ ἐς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐξηλίτεται, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμέριστος, ἐς Θεός.

276 Exc. 2.32; 2.35; 2.41; 3.62.
reasserting time and again the unity and uniqueness of the *logos*, who is the Son of God incarnate in Jesus Christ.
3. Summary and Conclusions

With Edwards’ findings I complete the discussion about Clement’s logology. I began my survey with Pade and his attempt to study the concept of the *logos* in a comprehensive manner. Even though he was not certain how to interpret the passages from *Excerpta* or *Hypotyposes*, he categorized them as dubious and dwelled on the more reliable texts of *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus*, *Stromata*, and *Quis dives salvetur*, as well as *Adumbrationes*, which even though carry the same weight of suspicion as *Excerpta* and *Hypotyposes* confirm his arguments based on the more trustworthy textual evidence. In the end, Pade found Clement believing in the *logos*, who is fully divine, consubstantial and coeval with the Father – all theological characteristics that make Christ the ultimate figure in the history of the world and humanity, which in turn is in full agreement with the later Orthodox formulations of Nicaea and henceforth. Casey and Wolfson critically attacked the views of such scholars as Pade. Casey and Wolfson based their argumentation on a linguistic analysis of Zahn apropos the authenticity of Photian citation of Clement’s *Hypotyposes* and by harmonizing it to other logological passages from the Clement’s “secure” texts they postulated that Clement believed in two *logoi* or two-stage theory of its emanation. For Daniélou, the notion of περιγραφή was decisive as to how one should interpret the conception of the *logos*. He pointed out that Clement’s conception of the *logos*, just as the *logos* of the Apologists, is strictly bound to the business of the creation of cosmos, and just as the *logos* of Philo of Alexandria has a two-fold nature: a) as a potentiality inside God’s mind and b) as the firstling of God’s creation, standing at the peak of cosmic hierarchy of created beings. The line of
argumentation of these authors was taken up by Lilla, who further claimed that there are not only two but three successive stages of the emanation of the logos (the totality of ideas, the principle of creation, and the world-soul). As Choufrine rightly pointed out recently, Lilla made a great accomplishment when he placed Clement’s theology, ethics, and metaphysics in a broader context of a philosophical and religious discussion and yet at the same time Lilla’s failure was to make an overly strong emphasis on Clement’s borrowing from his contemporaries. Choufrine, in turn, despite his distancing from Lilla still followed the paradigm of viewing Clement’s conception of the logos as possessive of certain gradation and distinguished “vertical” and “horizontal” Incarnations of the logos that correspond to the περιγραφή of the prehistoric phase and παρουσία of the birth of the historical Jesus Christ. In fact, Excerpta 1.19.1 as Choufrine acknowledged in accordance with Daniélou was for him the single and most decisive passage for understanding Clement’s logos. Per contra, rather than to search for different degrees of the emanation of the logos, another group of scholars, jointly and independently, looked at Clement’s logology as one integrated agent, the Son of God, which fits well into Pade’s outline. Völker keenly argued that Clement did know the Greek and Gnostic system well enough to be able to incorporate them into his genuinely Christian setting. Osborn, in turn, recognized certain confusion in Clement’s formulation of the identity of the logos but underscored the most important dynamic of Clement’s logology expressed precisely in the contraposition of the unity and distinction between the Father and the Son. If the Father is one, the Son must also be only one, which is reconfirmed by Clement’s polemics against the Valentinians and other Gnostics who viewed the figure of
the Savior in different hypostases. Instead of insisting upon successive stages of the
*logos*, as did Lilla and his predecessors, Osborn claimed that the relation of the *logos* to
the Father, cosmos, and humanity reflected different facets of its identity, which is
defined in the relation with the Father and then applied in the relation of the *logos* to
cosmos and humanity. Thus for the Father the *logos* is the Son. For cosmos it is its
Creator. And for humanity at large and for humans in particular, the *logos* is the divine
Redeemer, Instructor (*didaskalos*), and High Priest. The relation of the *logos* to humanity
as the Teacher was extensively discussed by Erich Fascher and recently by Judith
Kovacs.\(^{277}\) They followed such historians of philosophy as Overbeck, Bousset, Jaeger,
and Chadwick, who argued that Clement attempted, quite successfully, to integrate a
classical Greco-Roman *paideia* into the nascent Christian religion. Clement’s synthesis
of the Teacher in the Greek sense and Rabbi in a Judeo-Christian sense led Fascher and
Kovacs to conclude that Clement modeled the Christian way of initiation, indoctrination,
and deification as different stages of a learning process. Thus the Christian way of life
inculcates Christianity as a kind of curriculum, where the final graduation will take place
in the heavenly school/church/God’s Kingdom. Moreover, Clement directed his
metaphysical speculations about the *logos* to the central dynamics of Christ’s identity,
which emphasized the absolute competence and authority of Christ the *didaskalos*. This
one true Teacher educates, teaches, heals, and saves humanity. Grillmeier also took the
unity and uniqueness of the *logos* as an obvious fact. Even when he closely followed

\(^{277}\) See also Judith L. Kovacs, “Divine Pedagogy and the Gnostic Teacher according to Clement of
Lilla’s study in his portrayal of Clement’s *logos*, Grillmeier still believed that the ontological union between the Father and the Son was more decisive than some of Clement’s experimental speculations in the field of metaphysics. Völker, Mondésert, Osborn, Fascher, and Grillmeier did not delve into philological discussions of the authenticity of Clement’s works, yet the last word in the field was not said. Knauber was perhaps the first scholar who openly addressed the arguments made by such scholars as Zahn, Casey, Wolfson, and Lilla, by venturing to reexamine the well established claim that Clement believed in the two *logoi* or two (three) stage emanation of the *logos*. Knauber’s main target was the very Photian citation from Clement’s lost *Hypotyposes*, which Fascher persuasively proved as a misread or misunderstood quotation by Constantinopolitan patriarch or more likely by his pupils who would prepare for their master a sketched summary of Clement’s theology. A hitherto final word in the philological and philosophical reassessment of Clement’s study of the conception of the *logos* was expressed by Edwards. As I demonstrated above Edwards argued, that first of all the two-stage theory of the emanation of the *logos* was not a predominant belief of the early Christian theologians, as was claimed by Casey and Wolfson. At the same time, independently of Knauber and Osborn, Edwards questioned the authenticity of the Photian quotation and similarly concluded that it was a misreading by the nine-century Byzantine scholar. Edwards revisited the passage of *Excerpta* and demonstrated that it contradicts other, unquestionable and better elaborated, formulations of Clement. Clement’s *Adumbrationes* may seem, therefore, more genuinely to reflect Clement’s thought than was previously thought.
Now, if we ask ourselves again the question whether Clement of Alexandria believed in one divine *logos* or in its two (three, “n”) stage emanations, our answer clearly depends on the three presuppositions that I outlined at the beginning of this scholarly overview. First, one needs to establish a certain hierarchy of “authority” of Clement’s own texts. The philological and philosophical discussions I reviewed above confirmed Pade’s acceptance of the texts of *Proprepticus, Paedagogus, Stromata* (8 vols.), and *Quis dives salvetur* (to this list I should also add *Hymnus Christi Salvatoris*) as undisputed. At the same time the fragments of *Excerpta ex Theodoto, Eclogae Propheticae, Hypotyposes, and Adumbrationes* need to be treated with caution. Photius’ quotation from *Hypotyposes*, as Knauber and Edwards clearly demonstrated, reflects Clement’s thought but is utterly misunderstood. *Excerpta ex Theodoto* has always been recognized as an extremely difficult text overall, and the attribution of the passage 1.19.1 to Clement is conjectural and should not be positioned as a key passage to define Clement’s christological understanding of the identity of the *logos*, as was strongly suggested by Daniélou, Egan, and Choufrine. Once one establishes the boundaries of Clement’s textual evidence, one must explain the issue of how Clement utilized the understanding of the *logos* by his Jewish, early Christian, Middle Platonic, and Gnostic predecessors and contemporaries. Again, the above discussions clearly showed that Clement’s renowned erudition and “syncretism” go beyond the category of “borrowing” and, as Osborn, van den Hoek, Choufrine, Kovacs, Edwards, and most recently Runia proved. Clement’s ideas mirror the contemporaneous concepts and theories of his sources in careful adaptations to what Clement believed to be a genuinely Christian
theological program. Finally, I indirectly raised a question whether one ought to treat the christological interpretation of the *logos* as a separate category or to see Clement’s teaching on the *logos* in a broader project of the christological search for the identity of Jesus Christ. Several studies of the *logos* in Clement, such as by Casey, Wolfson, Egan, Lilla, and Colpe focused on the subject with no or minimal interest in the connection of the conception of the *logos* with other Clement’s christological building stones. It proves the assumption I made in the introduction to this chapter that the subject of logology has created its own independent field of interest in the history of philosophy. Such domain of research is rightly justified but only to the degree when one buoys in a strictly philosophical realm of enquiry. However, as soon as one ventures into the field of christological and theological enquiry, a broader perspective is inevitable and imperative, despite the plausible overt domination of the notion of the *logos* over other christological elements that, for Clement, constitute a significant component of the identity of Christ.

A closer reading of Clement’s extant works shows that he never discussed the divine *logos* unconnectedly. In fact it is always linked to such christological topoi as the interpretation of the New Song; the entrance of the High Priest in the Holy of Holies; and most importantly the search for the true *didaskalos*. Thus, I believe and will further demonstrate in the following chapter that Clement subordinated his doctrine of the *logos* to his larger christological image based on such culturally permeating notions of the New

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278 It seems that John Kenny had this in mind when he argued that Clement’s Platonic inheritance can be more amply appreciated “from the wider perspective of the comparative history of religion, concentrating upon the complex development of these [Platonic] closely related, though significantly distinct, traditions of philosophical monotheism.” See John Peter Kenney, “Divinity and the intelligible world in Clement of Alexandria,” *Studia patristica* 21 (Louvain: Peeters, 1989): 308, 308-315.
Song, Teacher (Rabbi) and High Priest. In other words, I agree with Fascher and Kovacs that Clement’s metaphysics – his doctrine of the *logos* – served the purpose of establishing a connection between God and humanity that mediated the salvation to humanity. Moreover, this salvation given as the gift of love of the Father towards humanity\textsuperscript{279} is contextualized with the human gradual proximity towards God through several stages of conversion, formation of human character, and achievement of a higher knowledge of God. For this, the *logos* incarnate in Jesus Christ was endowed with absolute authority as the Educator, *didaskalos*, and High Priest. Clement’s christological conception of the *logos* becomes clearer only when looked at it in one integrated perspective of the *logos* as the Son, Wisdom, and Countenance of God, on the metaphysical level, as well as the Maker of cosmos, the incarnate Educator, *didaskalos*, Savior, New Song, and High Priest on the level of created world, and not merely as a gradual emanation/generation from the First Source.\textsuperscript{280}

\textsuperscript{279} Cf. Paed. 1.7-8, 1.94.8ff; *Quis Dives Salvetur* 37.3.183ff.

\textsuperscript{280} Thus the recent unreasonable assumption made by Michael Brown that Clement held “an emanationist concept of God” can not be supported by evidence in Clement’s writings, cf. Michael Brown, *The Lord’s Prayer Through North African Eyes. A Window into Early Christianity* (New York: T & T Clark, 2004), pp. 123 and 127.