Editor’s Introduction

Beginning in 2015, our journal’s publisher, Taylor and Francis, has sponsored the annual Canadian Association of Slavists’ Taylor and Francis Book Prize. It is awarded annually for the best academic book in Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies published in the previous calendar year by a Canadian author (citizen or permanent resident). The winner of the 2016 prize, to be awarded at the annual conference of the Canadian Association of Slavists at Ryerson University in Toronto in May, is Myroslav Shkandrij of the University of Manitoba for his book, *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956* (Yale University Press, 2015). To mark Professor Shkandrij’s achievement and to further the discussion of his important work, *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* invited three major Ukrainian scholars of literature and history (and the relationship between the two) to comment on the book. Following interventions from Yaroslav Hrytsak, Tamara Hundorova, and Oleksandr Zaitsev, Professor Shkandrij offers a response.

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Comment by Yaroslav Hrytsak

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My review of Myroslav Shkandrij’s book is inevitably subjective. He cites me several times in his book and those mentions are always made in a positive context.\footnote{This shows that in many, if not in the majority of aspects our views are very similar.}

I would like to emphasize one detail. Shkandrij did in his book the same thing I tried to achieve in my biography of Ivan Franko: he demonstrated that the Ukrainian nationalism cannot be reduced only to politics or ideology but is also connected to literature. As a result, the main ideological principles are often formed by writers and in the literary field. As I tried to show, some of Franko’s verses are simply rhymed political statements. Franko died one year before the revolution of 1917. The literary aspect of Ukrainian nationalism, if not strengthened, definitely did not weaken from the time of his death. It is no coincidence that two leaders of the Ukrainian national revolution, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Semen Petliura, were a writer and journalist and that one of the most influential ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov (and,
appropriately, one of the main heroes of Shkandrij’s book), was a literary critic. The other six heroes of the book, Olena Teliha, Leonid Mosendz, Oleh Olzhych, Iurii Lypa, Ulas Samchuk, and Iurii Klen, were writers and poets. According to the author, “[a]s a group they best represented in literature the authoritarian brand of nationalism, one that is most closely associated with the integral nationalism of the OUN.”

Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi called this phenomenon “literary Ukraine.” It was obvious to him that the Ukrainian national leaders had a predisposition to develop their political programs based on the literary-cultural perceptions. Of course, this strong interdependence between nationalism and literature was not an exclusively Ukrainian phenomenon and scholars and theorists of nationalism have drawn attention to it for a long time. What is strange is that scholars of Ukrainian nationalism have studied this aspect so little and so rarely; for them, the intellectual history of Ukrainian nationalism was almost exclusively the history of political texts and military doctrines. Shkandrij has filled a very important gap and as a result, he has extensively broadened and changed prospects for research.

I will not focus in detail on the book’s other achievements such as the incorporation of the new sources, for instance, the texts that are deposited in the Canadian libraries and achieves and the Dontsov’s achieve that remains unexplored. However, I would like to emphasize other aspects that make his book different from other works. First of all, Shkandrij analyses in depth the attitude of the Ukrainian nationalists towards the Jewish question. Secondly, he tries to examine whether this attitude was based on a racial approach and, as a result, whether it is possible to consider interwar Ukrainian nationalism to be a variety of fascism or Nazism. Thirdly, another achievement of the book is its detailed analysis of Ukrainian nationalists’ attitude towards Adolf Hitler and Nazism.
As a result of his research, Shkandrij challenges the view, widespread in the historiography, that Ukrainian interwar nationalism aimed at ethnic purity, was based on racial principles, and proclaimed violence. He suggests an alternative vision of this nationalism as not a homogeneous current but as a broad spectrum of views and opinions. The opposite poles in this spectrum were respectively strong anti-Semitism or its denial, the use or rejection of the concept of race, a positive or negative attitude towards fascism or Nazism, and ethnic or political concepts of the Ukrainian nation. Obviously, there were ideologists who gravitated to one pole or the other. However, there we also those who held a moderate position or changed their views. Although the Ukrainian nationalists aimed to become a homogeneous group, this aspiration was never achieved. It remained an unachievable goal. On the contrary, we can consider the internal heterogeneity and struggle as a constant element of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Thus, its history should be presented in accordance with the current that was dominant at one period or another.

Shkandrij argues that such features as anti-Semitism, a racial approach, and a fascination with fascism, which are usually seen as an essential part of Ukrainian nationalism actually became influential on the eve of the Second World War and remained important during the first years of the German occupation. However, the experience of this occupation and in particular, the rejection of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology by the population of former Soviet Ukraine caused revision, which then continued among nationalist groups in emigration.

Oleksandr Zaitsev, another prominent scholar of interwar Ukrainian nationalism, came to a similar conclusion. This integral nationalism was not as integral as it presented itself as being or as other scholars have presented it. It was, rather, integral in its intentions—but we must always check whether it was so in reality. I suppose that after the publication of Shkandrij’s
book, this view will become if not paradigmatic then one of the most important. At the very least no future scholar will be able to ignore it.

I do not have any serious points of disagreement with the author. What follows is not a critique but rather an attempt to formulate the new research questions that arise after reading Shkandrij’s book.

One of them is about the reading audience. Who actually read Ukrainian nationalist ideologists’ works and what influence did these works have? From time to time Shkandrij mentions that their works were very popular among readers and that they produced an important mobilizational influence. At the same time, he argues that at least some works were read by a very small group of readers and that Evhen Konovalets, the OUN leader, stated that fiction was not important for national mobilization. I know from my research experience that the influence of literature is highly overestimated. For instance, in my interview with Evhen Stakhiv, the latter explained that even Nationalism (1926), one of Dontsov’s most influential interwar texts, was too difficult for him and his generation to understand. Moreover, it should be mentioned that Stakhiv was talking about people like him who were gymnasium graduates and were educated.

A related question is how many Ukrainian nationalists actually read Hitler’s Mein Kampf and also understood what Nazism meant for the Ukrainians. According to the memoirs that I have heard, it was clear that very few read Hitler and those who tried to talk publicly about Hitler’s attitude towards the Ukrainians and other Slavs were forced off the stage as enemy agitators. This issue concerned not only ordinary nationalists but even Dontsov himself. He was accused of superficiality because he used quotations but he had never read the actual authors he cited (a result, his opponents nicknamed him “Mit'ka Shchelkoperov”. If Dontsov really did read Mein Kampf, then his political short-sightedness and immorality was enormous indeed.
Anyway, it could be suggested that ideologists’ works were not the most important factor in the process of the conversion of Ukrainian youth to integral nationalism. A crucial element was the life circumstances such as the lack of job and career opportunities, the constant experience of “nationalizing state” practices (to use Rogers Brubaker’s term)⁵ and also the specific experience of this generation. In the middle of the 1920s a poll of Ukrainian school children revealed that during the First World War and the wars that followed it, they had witnessed terrible scenes, for example, when the enemy murdered their friend, a brother was taken off to be shot, enemies raped a sister, and so on.⁶ These scenes formed their experience. It was completely different from the experience of their parents who had grown up in an atmosphere of political autonomy and liberalism in Habsburg Galicia during the “long” and calm nineteenth century. On the other hand, Polish educational policy among other things promoted the cult of national heroes. The young Ukrainians studied in Polish schools and gymnasiums, where Polish literature and history were compulsory subjects. They felt the shortage of their own national heroes and tried to become them.⁷

If we developed a hypothesis about the crucial influence of life circumstances, we could suggest that Ukrainian youth was influenced not only (or not so much) by Dontsov’s works but more so by his personal charisma, which was always emphasized in the memoirs of the people who knew him. Thus, the analysis of the text also means more scrupulous examination of the context. In the case of my biography of Franko, this allowed me to rethink the influence of his writings. It turned out that a relatively small group of people read his works and other factors were crucial for his conversion into “a national prophet.” Above all, the circumstances of his private life helped to create the image of a charismatic leader.
Obviously, I cannot suggest that there is a direct connection between “Franko’s era” and “Dontsov’s era.” Indeed, Ukrainian nationalism changed radically after the First World War and scholars have dubbed this change “the turn to the right.” In addition, the interwar ideologists tried to deepen this difference and distance themselves as much as possible from their prewar predecessors. The best example was Dontsov’s ruthless critique of Mykhailo Drahomanov and his epigones (one of whom was Franko). However, prewar and postwar nationalism preserved continuity in some structural features and ideological principles. Thus, continuity is seen in the strong paligenesis myth that, according to Roger Griffin, explains the strong attractiveness of nationalism as an ideology “that seems capable of symbolically defeating death and thereby overcoming existential malaise.” Shkandrij studies in depth how this myth is represented in the works of ideologists of Ukrainian integral nationalism. However, the cult of death is missing from his interpretation; yet without death, rebirth is impossible. He mentions, for instance, that Teliha “celebrates death” including her own and she dreams “May God send me the greatest gift: A fiery death – not a cold expiration.” However, he does not examine this topic further.

I think that analysis of this cult would help with the classification of Ukrainian nationalism. On the one hand, it would help in understanding the ideological difference between prewar and interwar nationalism. Although the topic of the purifying death can be found in the works of the Ukrainian national ideologists of the nineteenth century (for instance, in Taras Shevchenko’s “Zapovit” [Testament] or Franko’s “Kameniari” [The Stone Cutters]), it plays a marginal role in their mainly positivist and rational philosophy. The cult of death holds one of the central places in interwar nationalism, with its irrationalism and ambitious aim to create “an ersatz-religion.” On the other hand, such an analysis would allow scholars to show the
typological similarity or difference of interwar Ukrainian nationalism to other nationalisms which, like it, also came close to Nazism and fascism.\footnote{11}

Shkandrij broadens the study of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism by adding fiction to the political works; the analysis of metaphysics should become the next step. Without doing so, it would be impossible to understand why the Ukrainian nationalists were able not only to exterminate recklessly the lives of others but also to sacrifice their own lives.\footnote{12}

To conclude I would like to turn from the academic to the public aspect. In problematizing the history of Ukrainian nationalism, Shkandrij shows no inclination to relativize the responsibility of the Ukrainian nationalists for the violence or mass killings. In contrast, he believes that these crimes have to be admitted. Thus, he cites me and expresses solidarity with my opinion.\footnote{13} It is not a secret that the reluctance of Ukrainian politicians and public intellectuals to dissociate themselves from the ideology and practice of the OUN creates serious problems inside and outside Ukraine. We have problems not only in relations with Russia, which does not miss any opportunity to depict the new Ukrainian authorities as nationalistic direct successors of the OUN, but also with other “historical neighbours” such as Israel, Poland, and Germany.

I think that Shkandrij’s book increases the chances of overcoming the heritage of Ukrainian nationalism. It does not merely provide the facts and analysis that enable a serious discussion, but it emphasizes the necessity to differentiate the three main currents of Ukrainian nationalism (the national-democratic and the two authoritarian currents represented by the OUN and Dontsov), even if they influenced one another or were sometimes mixed one with another.\footnote{14} I have no doubt that Dontsov’s ideology has to be condemned and overcome. In addition, the part of the OUN heritage that led to xenophobia and mass violence must be overcome too. However, there is a part connected to democratic traditions and resistance to Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians can, if not be proud, at least identify themselves with these traditions when they struggle against the Russian aggression and proclaim their pro-European position.

Reconciliation with one’s neighbours and one’s own past is easier when alongside the recognition of the national guilt there remains space for the preservation of one’s own dignity. Shkandrij’s interpretation of the interwar Ukrainian nationalism as a very heterogeneous phenomenon outlines such a space and, as a result, increases the chances of overcoming the past (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*).

1. I have to clarify here. Shkandrij attributed to me the view that the anti-Jewish pogroms in summer 1941 took place on the territory that was occupied by the USSR in 1939-1941 and that the experience of rapid “sovietization” made the population more prone to violence. But this was Mark Mazower’s argument (Mazower, *Hitler’s Empire*, 178) and I just repeated it. Timothy Snyder developed this argument in his last book: Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, New York, 2015.
2. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 135
3. Cit. in Pelenski, “V. Lypyn’s’kyj”, 339.
4. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 168
5. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*
8. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 137
9. Ibid., 178
10. For example, this is visible in *The Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist* and even in its first and most famous postulate, “You will attain a Ukrainian state or die in the battle for it.” If we consider that every young man who became an OUN member had to learn this by heart, it is possible to conclude with little exaggeration that it was the most well-known work among the Ukrainian nationalists. See Lenkavs’kyi, *Ukrains’kyi natsionalism*, 454-458.
11. About the cult of death in the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael and the Iron Guard see Mikoleiko, “Slipyi v lassakh”
12. See the example of Mykhailo Kolodzins’kyi, who was one of the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism at the end of the 1930s. In his *Military Doctrine of the Ukrainian Nationalists* (1938) he wrote that “the more Jews who die during the rebellion, the better it will be for the Ukrainian state.” Kolodzins’kyi died the next year as the Carpathian Sich Chief of General Staff. Although the Hungarian army outnumbered the Ukrainian troops in numbers and weapons, he rejected the German consul Goffman’s offer to capitulate. See Zaitsev, “Voenna doktryna,” 244-256
13. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 376
14. Ibid., 371-372

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Myroslav Shkandrij’s book *Ukrainian Nationalism. Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956* is a very important contribution to contemporary Ukrainian Studies and to scholarship on the Eastern European intellectual context of the first part of the twentieth century. First of all, it is worth noting the courage and academic ambition of a scholar who writes such a general work and explores the complex and ambiguous Ukrainian nationalist movement between 1929 and 1956. Shkandrij’s research covers a large time period and is based on a detailed and scrupulous study of the primary sources. His innovative approach shows that the politics, ideology, and literature linked to Ukrainian nationalism complement and explain one another. Unfortunately, previous studies of the Ukrainian nationalism have omitted either the political or the literary, or the aesthetic components entirely or partly, although these factors are interconnected and illustrate not only the process of politicization of literature but also the aestheticization of politics that became a characteristic feature of the twentieth century.

Undoubtedly, Ukrainian nationalism is one of the most important issues in Ukrainian Studies nowadays but not only because of its complexity and the lack of scholarly works. This topic is still painful and politically relevant because it relates to the current situation in Ukraine. I agree with Shkandrij that the most complex task is to define the meaning of “nationalism” and of
“Ukrainian nationalism” in particular. The author of *Ukrainian Nationalism. Politics, Ideology, Literature, 1929-1956* complicated this task when he chose a lengthy period, which saw the most active nationalistic discussions and programs in the twentieth century. He focused not only on the political, organizational, and institutional forms, sources, and ideas of the Ukrainian nationalists but also analyzed the differences between the various types of nationalism. I think that this shift of emphasis from nationalism to the various types of nationalism is the main methodological innovation, as well as the main problem of the research. Indeed, it would better to speak not of Ukrainian nationalism as a single homogeneous ideology but of Ukrainian nationalisms.

Shkandrij studies two types of nationalism: democratic and authoritarian nationalism. In order to demonstrate the significant difference between those two types, he suggests differentiating them grammatically into small-n nationalism and capital-n Nationalism. Thus, he writes, “the first refers to supporters of an independent Ukraine or an autonomous Galicia who generally favored a Western-style parliamentary system and democracy. The second refers to integral nationalists who were members of the OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] and who adhered to an extreme version of authoritarian nationalism”.

1 The author’s intention to show the difference even visually between those two types of the nationalism is understandable. Though Nationalism with a capital N constitutes an almost homogenous ideology and Shkandrij’s book excellently demonstrates this point, small-n nationalism is heterogeneous and has many aspects. And here some problems arise.

Shkandrij rightly points to the necessity to contextualize the term *Ukrainian nationalism* as an important methodological aspect of his work. The author argues rightly that it is necessary to distinguish the various meanings of the term “Ukrainian nationalism” in different periods.
Thus, in his work he writes about the difference between “the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth century and first two decades of the twentieth century,” which Shkandrij calls “democratic and liberationist,” and the “authoritarian” OUN nationalism of the 1930s.² Although I agree with this statement in general, it should be mentioned that it is misleading to define the national movement as clearly democratic in the nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century. It was not homogenous and the understanding of the nation/narodnost' among activists substantially varied in different periods. We should mention Panteleimon Kulish and his idea about the role of an elite in developing national consciousness or the image of the “narod” (people/nation) in Mykola Kostomarov’s historiography and criticism. In general, when we think about the main representatives of the national movement of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries (and whether it was indeed nationalistic -- an additional question to ask), it is obvious that the theories of Kostomarov, Kulish, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, or the criticism in M. Sriblians'kyi’s journal, Ukrains'ka khata (Ukrainian House) and others are very different. In addition, during different periods of their life these activists changed their conception of nationalism. For instance, Franko was interested in socialism, radicalism, and nationalism at various stages. Although the main ideas that determined the evolution of and controversies within Ukrainian nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century ranged from autonomism to federalism, enlightenment to the cult of leader (vozhdizm), modernism to populism (narodnytsvo) and sought to define the role of the elite and the people, yet Shkandrij considers this a liberationist and democratic movement.

In general, Shkandrij’s book often refers to the previous era of the national movement and he usually describes this period in terms of “struggles for individual enfranchisement, popular enlightenment, and political unification, struggles that were conducted in the face of
foreign domination and imperial rule”. I think that in every case it would be useful to contextualize these general characteristics and to analyze the link between the democratic movement and socialism, anti-colonialism, imperialism, radicalism and modernism in the era before Dmytro Dontsov’s integral authoritarian nationalism.

Modernism is one of the most important issues that the author emphasizes in the introduction and then revisits many times. He considers the works of the writers connected to Dontsov’s *Visnyk (Herald)* and the OUN to be modernist. In fact, this is one of the aspects that shows Shkandrij’s original approach. The scholar writes about the contribution of seven authors who were actively linked to the OUN and the nationalist movement (Olena Teliha, Leonid Mosendz, Iurii Lypa, Ulas Samchuk, Iurii Klen and Dokia Humenna) to modernism. He also argues that a differentiation between postwar modernism, with its democracy, pluralism, and formal experimentation, and the works published in the 1930s, which are characterized by populism, traditionalism, and archaic forms of literary realism, is traditional (or even dogmatic) in contemporary Ukrainian Studies. As a result, the author intends to supply “the missing link in this genealogy of modernism in the body of writing outside the Soviet Union in the 1930, which has been overlooked or dismissed as retrograde.”

This idea needs to be explained. First of all, the author does not refer us to the studies that suggest such a difference between the postwar literature and works written in the 1930s. Secondly, it is not clear whether he addresses the literature that developed as a part of the Socialist Realist canon or that that was published in emigration. Other scholars (Mykola Ilnyts'kyi, Oleksandr Astaf’ev, Natalia Lysenko and others) link the “Prague School” or the works of Evhen Malaniuk, Oleh Olzhych and Klen to modernism (in various combinations with neo-romanticism, neoclassicism and other tendencies). It is true that the period of the 1930s has
been omitted in studies of Ukrainian modernism, for instance in Solomiia Pavlychko’s famous book, *The Discourse of Modernism in Ukrainian Literature*, where the author defined the various waves of Ukrainian modernism. However, other scholars do analyze the works of the interwar writers and stress the aesthetic resemblance in their poetics and culturosophy (mythology) with the modernist movement. Undoubtedly, the 1930s writers studied by Shkandrij belong to the modernist movement because of their critique of the previous literary stylistics (for instance, symbolistic stylistics), the strong mythopoetic aspect of their work, and their active stylistic experiments.

However, the peculiarity of this type of modernism and its main stylistic aspects should be mentioned. Maybe it would have been useful to focus more on the stylistic features of those writers who combine expressionism, neo-romanticism, and neoclassicism in their works. It seems that Shkandrij distinguishes between new classicism (neoclassicism?) and modernism. So, he argues that “the new classicism was seen as a rejection of modernism’s ‘anarchic’ individualism, its self-indulgent and often-frivolous experimentation”.6 At the same time, the author refers to Roger Griffin’s work, *Modernism and Fascism*, and in contrast he tries to loosen the difference between modernism and neoclassicism by arguing that “[t]he interest in neoclassicism in the 1930s must therefore be seen not simply a rejection of modernism, but as part of the symbiosis of modernity with the ‘eternal’ that lies at the heart of an alternative modernist aesthetics.”7 Meanwhile, debates about the neoclassicism of the 1920 to 1940s are still intense among Ukrainian comparative literature scholars and the majority of them consider neoclassicism to be one of the stylistic forms of modernism. One of the main features of the modernism of this period is a strong mythical and cultural aspect that was an essential part of *Visnyk* literature and which mostly determined its neoclassical orientation.
The author did not focus much on neo-romanticism, which was another important aesthetic and stylistic feature of these writers’ work; indeed, it was a characteristic element of Teliha’s writing or Dontsov’s ideology and the aesthetic that influenced their critique of the decadent literature of the previous period. As Skhandrij skilfully demonstrates using the examples of many writers, the paligenesis mythology was a substantial component of Visnyk authors’ works and it certainly had neo-romantic sources inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche’s “eternal recurrence.”

The difference between the types of modernism that emerge at the intersection of nationalism and modernism is another important issue. Thus, the author rightly argues that Dontsov and his circle were opposed a modernism that they associated with leftist ideas and cosmopolitanism. The active, voluntaristic, and nationally-oriented modernism of the Visnyk writers set itself up in opposition to this type of modernism. Maybe it is worth defining the modernism of the new Visnyk generation as a special type of “conservative modernism.” The author mentions Jeffrey Herf’s term “reactionary modernism,” but he does not discuss the issue in depth. However, contemporary theoretical and methodological studies raise the question of the differentiation of the various model and types of modernism. In other words, they stress that ideas about the totality and universalism of modernism that do not consider its national, gender, and local variations, are misleading.

As modernism is seen as non-political but rather aesthetical phenomenon, it is important to analyze the connection between modernism and politics. Shkandrij tries to show some evolution in the views of the Ukrainian nationalists on modernism and particularly on futurism. Their opposition to modernism and the avant-garde increased because of the so-called critique of degenerative art during the Nazi period. Shkandrij splits up the 1930s, pointing out that the main
nationalist activists started to object to modernism under the influence of the antimodernist rhetoric from Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s. However, despite mentioning a whole list of painters and artists who considered themselves modernists and analyzing the aesthetic principles of the various journals (My [We], Novi Shliakhy [New Ways], Meta [Aim], Almanakh livogo mystetsva [Almanac of Left Art]) (on page 141-143), Shkandrij avoids discussing specific literary examples of Visnyk authors’ modernist writing; yet he asserts in the conclusion that, “[t]he seven Nationalist writers who were associated with Visnyk shared modernism’s belief in achieving transcendence though cultural, social, and political transformation”. In general, the lack of discussion of the theoretical (methodological) approaches (for instance the differentiation of modernism and its features) in the introduction results in contradictory statements later.

This missing theoretical introduction causes further problems. For instance, one such issue is the relationship between the nation and race, or racial theory in OUN Nationalism. The author studies the race theory of Rostyslav Endyk, elitism and the contribution of Dontsov to the spreading of Nazi biological racism, and the views of Olzhych on the Antes as the predecessors of the Ukrainian race. It worth stressing the remark about Lypa’s definition of race as not a biological but a political identity: “race, he says, ‘is a great spiritual community in the moral and emotional dimension.’” As Dontsov’s theory of authoritarianism is based on a new understanding of race and caste, the issue of race should be explained in greater detail. Dontsov’s elites have the features of a chivalric order, caste, or race and he considers them to be a racial aristocracy. As a result, race is not only a biological but a cultural identity and aristocratism includes not only heredity and genealogical characteristics but also a component of upbringing and self-affirmation.
In general, the term “race” was compromised by its link to fascism and it has returned to scholarly use with great caution. It is obvious that race as well as ethnos or nation are imagined notions or discourses that are constructed to explain social, political or biological differences. Eric D. Weitz argues that “[a]s modern forms of group identity, ethnicity, nationality, and race have never been hermetically sealed off from one another; instead, the lines between them are fluid and permeable.”\(^{14}\) Obviously, as in other cultures, race discourse played some role in the development of the modern Ukrainian national ideology. The aesthetic of the Visnyk circle and its writing used ideas that were popular during the forming of the German nation, for instance, a stress on masculinity of the new-born nation as they incorporated friendship, male sensuality, and other tendencies into the national consciousness. Shkandrij rightly mentions the obsession with the Roman ideal of male beauty in the 1930s,\(^ {15}\) but he does not connect this ideal to the spreading of ideas about a new national and political imperialism. This issue touches on the gender discourse too. Although in his analysis of the general ideas of nationalist ideology and politics Shkandrij did not place particular emphasis on the gender aspect that was very important for the Visnyk writers, he compensated for this in his close examination of Teliha. However, the issue of feminism and nationalism that was studied by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak could provide a broader perspective for the analysis of gender discourses in the 1930s.

The other problem that should be studied is the issue of the so-called imperialistic discourse and in particular “literary imperialism.” In general, the nationalist discourse of the 1930s had features of imperialistic discourse, as shown through its appeals to, among other themes, empire and Roman symbolism. Dontsov’s integral nationalism had an aesthetic-literary foundation and resembled the ideology of the so-called “literary imperialism.” Thus, the Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk (Literary Scientific Herald), edited by Dontsov, was very
enthusiastic about Ernest Seilli ère’s idea of the “literary imperialism” (La philosophie de l’impérialisme, 1903-1908), as well as about the works of the followers of this literary trend. Dontsov repeated the proclamations of literary imperialism and they became part of his national-cultural theory. He argued that only “the spirit of imperialism, eternal anxiety, labour, and adventurousness” could make the Ukrainian nation “great” and pull out of the “provincial quagmire.” (Dmytro Dontsov, Sansara) The main features of his imperial concept were orientalism, the ideal of male aristocratism (“deed,” “chivalric order”), the erotic vitalism of hero-soldiers, and the struggle against the feminized (melancholic) Ukrainian literature. The gender aspect acquired not only symbolic but also political meaning. Like Malaniuk, Dontsov characterized the populist Ukrainian literature of the nineteenth century and the works of the female writers, such as Olga Kobylians'ka, as a feminized and weak literature. Thus, Teliha’s nationalistic views and her ideal of the woman were not pro-feminist because she subordinated this ideal to the needs of the nation. Her views were formed under the influence of Jack London’s and Rudyard Kipling’s ideals of literary imperialism. Teliha promoted the cult of a new women who would consider her husband, children, and particularly herself to be “guardians of the integrity, happiness, and strength of the bigger family--the nation. (Olena Teliga, Iakymy nas pragnete?)

The issues I have raised do not undermine Shkandrij’s fundamental and innovative research. On the contrary, his book contains an ocean of ideas, thoughts, and observations that intrigue and encourage discussion. The author commands a vast source base of archival sources, periodicals, literary texts, which he scrupulously and for the most part skillfully interprets. Shkandrij’s book is indisputably an important work for not only Ukrainian Studies but also for contemporary Eastern European Studies; it will serve as a compass for future researchers.
Bibliography


Translated by Oksana Vynnyk
Some thoughts about Myroslav Shkandrij’s book *Ukrainian Nationalism. Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956*

The historiography of Ukrainian nationalism is quite clearly divided into two trends: the “apologetic” and the “accusatory.” The first trend emphasizes the liberationist nature of the Ukrainian nationalists’ struggle for an independent state and it denies or ignores the totalitarian or xenophobic aspects in their ideology and practice. In contrast, the second trend underlines the extremist, totalitarian, and “fascist” features of Ukrainian integral nationalism, denying its liberationist and democratic elements. This division remains during the last years too and for instance, Volodymyr Viatrovych’s book *Druga pol's'ko-ukrains'ka viina* (The Second Polish-Ukrainian War)\(^1\) justifies Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) actions against the Poles, while Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe’s *Stepan Bandera*,\(^2\) which is correctly considered the first truly academic biography of the OUN leader, belongs to the “accusatory” historiography.

Myroslav Shkandrij is one of the few scholars who have succeeded in avoiding both trends. In his *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Shkandrij does not justify, praise, or accuse; instead he tries to explain and to encourage readers to think critically. His approach is multidimensional and he does not depict the OUN ideology as homogeneous. Rather, he writes about the various views
inside the organization and shows how socio-political transformation caused change in the OUN itself.

I will focus only on a few aspects, in order to demonstrate that Shkandrij’s book is an important contribution to the study of Ukrainian radical nationalism.

Although there are many works about the OUN, the author of *Ukrainian Nationalism* correctly points out that “surprisingly little research has been devoted to the OUN’s ideologists themselves”³. Shkandrij partly fills this void by analysing the programmatic-theoretical and journalistic works of the OUN interwar ideologists and political strategists, in particular Volodymyr Martynets', Evhen Onats'kyi, Mykola Stsibors'kyi and Iulian Vassyian, as well as the postwar OUN (Melnyk faction) ideologist, Iurii Boiko. Even Dmytro Dontsov, the most famous ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism, whose views have been studied in several books and numerous articles, appears in a new light because of the examination of his conflicts with the OUN ideologists and nationalist writers. The author concludes that Dontsov represented a type of the integral (authoritarian) nationalism different from the OUN ideology.⁴ This conclusion is correct but not completely new, because both OUN activists⁵ and scholars⁶ have mentioned the difference between the “organized” and “voluntaristic” nationalism.

The attempts of literary scholars to study the history of political ideologies are often very superficial. However, this cannot be said about Shkandrij’s book, where the chapters about the politics and ideology of the Ukrainian nationalism are written at a high professional level. I would praise even more the chapters “Myth” and “Literature,” where the author really presents himself as a literary scholar. Here, he brings the topic of Ukrainian nationalism into a new broader context through the analysis of its elements in fiction. His excellent knowledge of Soviet Ukrainian literature of the 1920s allows Shkandrij to draw parallels between the adoption of
modernist principles by writers in Soviet Ukraine and outside it, and between the “leftist” and “rightist” forms of literary modernism. He demonstrates that rejection of tradition and a search for new artistic forms were popular in both rightist and leftist intellectual circles. In contrast to the previous literary scholarship that linked the Western Ukrainian and emigrant writers of the 1930s to populism, traditionalism and outdated forms of realism, Shkandrij argues that the works of the seven writers whom he studies contributed to modernism. As a result, he restores the missing link in the genealogy of modernism in Ukrainian literature. At the same time, his research into nationalist writers’ works allows him to show how the nationalist movement created a strong mythology with the myth of palingenesis at its core. Shkandrij adopted this concept from the scholars of fascism Roger Griffin and Emilio Gentile, and he successfully uses it for the interpretation of Ukrainian nationalism.

Shkandrij focuses on a problem that has become the source of heated discussions recently: whether the ideology of the OUN and Dontsov should be defined as fascism? He agrees with Alexander J. Motyl’s conception, which explains the difference between fascism and nationalism as follows:

Fascism’s two preconditions are an already existing state and an already existing non-fascist type of regime, political system, or state. Fascists do not build states de novo; nor do they build types of regimes, political systems, or states de novo. Unsurprisingly, it is in fact the case that fascism and fascists are always found in already existing states with already existing non-fascist types of regimes, political systems, or states. […] Nationalism’s only precondition, both conceptually and empirically, is the non-existence of a state. Unlike fascists, nationalists build states de novo. Unsurprisingly, it is
empirically the case that nationalism and nationalists are always found in stateless territories.\(^7\)

It seems that Motyl excessively narrows the concept of nationalism—the majority of scholars and theorists agree that nationalism exists in nation-states as well. Moreover, many scholars of fascism consider it to be a form of radical nationalism. However, Motyl and Shkandrij are correct that the nationalism of the stateless nation has very different aims than fascism. According to Shkandrij, this nationalism “is interested primarily in creating a state, and not in the type of state to be created” and it is better to compare the interwar OUN “to other nationalist movements that have aspired to national liberation and the creation of nation-states, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Irish Republican Army, the interwar Croatian Ustashe, and the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, and not to fascist regimes or movements.”\(^8\) Elements of fascism were parts of the OUN’s ideology, but they did not constitute its core. As Shkandrij shows, OUN ideologists themselves made similar arguments and refused to consider it fascist.

Rossoliński-Liebe does not agree with this argument. In his view,

[t]he idea that fascism can develop only in a state and that fascists without a state are “integral nationalists,” as argued by Motyl and recently by Zaitsev, is simply wrong. […] If movements could become fascist only in a national state or while controlling a state, then the Iron Guard would be a fascist movement only for a period of a few months in late 1940 and early 1941 and for the rest of its existence was an ‘integral nationalist’ movement. Similarly, the Italian Fascists, the German National Socialists or the Croatian Ustasha would be ‘integral nationalists’ before 1922, 1933 or 1941 and fascist after that.\(^9\)
Rephrasing my esteemed opponent, I will note that his interpretation “is simply wrong.” Rossoliński-Liebe confuses two things: the existence of a national state and control over that state. Motyl and I have never argued that control over the state is a necessary precondition of fascism. Obviously, the Italian fascists were fascists before 1922, as well as the German national-socialists before 1933 (the case of the Croatian Ustaše is different). However, they could be fascists only because they acted in their own national states. It did not matter whether they were in government or in opposition. A generic fascism model can be a useful approach for the examination of ultranationalist (or integral nationalist) movements in nation-states, but it does not explain much about ultranationalist movements in stateless nations, which only aim to create their own states. In such cases, we need another theoretical model.

Shkandrij correctly uses the stateless integral nationalism model in order to place OUN in a comparative context. This nationalism can adopt elements of fascism, but until the establishment of its own state, it remains first of all a national-liberation movement. However, the experience of the Croatian Ustaše shows that once such a state—even a puppet state—comes into existence, the integral nationalism of a former stateless nation can be transformed into real fascism. “What would have occurred if Germany had installed a puppet [Ukrainian] state?” asks Shkandrij. He does not answer clearly, but leads the reader to the conclusion that most likely the events would have developed along the lines of the Croatian scenario. The OUN did not transform itself into a real fascist movement and did not build a fascist regime not because it did not want to, but only because the Nazis suppressed attempts to establish a Ukrainian state in 1941 and prevented the crystallization of Ukrainian fascism.

In Shkandrij’s book I did not find anything to disagree with categorically. However, I would like to clarify some aspects, and change the accents in some cases.
Shkandrij writes about three currents of Ukrainian nationalism: the national-democratic (Ukrainian National Democratic Association), and two versions of radical authoritarian (integral) nationalism, the OUN and Dontsov types.\(^{11}\) I agreed that those currents were the main ones in the interwar period, but to give a full picture it would have been worth mentioning the other important currents of nationalism: the conservative (Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Vasyl' Kuchabs'kyi) and its clerical “Christian” or “Catholic” variety (Bishop Ivan Buchko, Father Mykola Konrad, Kostiantyn Chekhovych, and the Catholic Association of Ukrainian Youth “Eagles”); the socialist (Volodymyr Levyns'kyi, Karlo Kobers'kyi and Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party); and the “creative nationalism” that was the third current of Ukrainian integral nationalism (Mykola Shlemkevych and the Front of National Unity).

Though Shkandrij correctly emphasizes the differences between the OUN’s and Dontsov’s ideology, it seems that sometimes he overestimates the meaning of these differences and takes OUN populist rhetoric too seriously. He correctly points to the difference in the views of Dontsov and the OUN leaders on the role of “orden” or “the caste of the best people.” Dontsov underlined the role of elites and contrasted their interests to the interests of the masses, while, for instance, Stsibors'kyi stressed the necessity of constant contact with the masses.\(^ {12}\) However, it is important to understand that the difference was not significant. In his *Natsiokratiia* (Natiocracy), Stsibors'kyi predicted that in the future Ukraine, “organized nationalism” would play a vanguard role, similar to the role of the Communist party in the USSR or the fascist parties in Italy or Germany, and that other parties would cease to exist.\(^ {13}\) I should remind the reader that for Dontsov, the models of the “orden” were “parties of fascist type” and he considered the Bolshevik party to fall into this category. In fact, Stsibors'kyi’s “vanguard”
differs little from Dontsov’s “ruling caste,” despite his rhetoric about its origin “in the depths of the nation.”

Stsibors'kyi’s understanding of dictatorship was similar. Shkandrij correctly stresses that he warned about a permanent dictatorship. However, the difference between the temporary “national dictatorship” and a permanent “natiocracy” system in Stsibors'kyi’s writing is reminiscent of the difference between the “dictatorship of proletariat” and the “state of the whole people” in the late USSR. The level of direct violence decreases but people do not receive real access to governance and the political and ideological monopoly remains under the control of “the vanguard.”

Actually, Dontsov’s “orden concept” and “caste system” and Stsibors'kyi’s “natiocracy” were different types of a totalitarian project of the future Ukrainian state. The main difference was that, similar to fascism, “natiocracy” could be considered to be a variety of political modernism (in Griffin’s interpretation) while Dontsov’s ideas developed into an anti-modernist utopia (see his Dukh nashoi davyny (The Spirit of Our Antiquity) [1944]). As for the role of violence or the relation between the leaders and masses, the differences were rather rhetorical than essential. Dontsov’s views on “immorality,” “creative violence” and the “ruling caste” were franker and more consistent, while the main OUN ideologist in emigration sought to balance between elitism and populism. However, this did not apply to the OUN activists in Western Ukraine, some of whom (such as Mykhailo Kolodzins'kyi or Dmytro Shtydkalo) were more enthusiastic supporters of Dontsov’s ideas than Dontsov himself.

Shkandrij’s book has already drawn the attention of several reviewers, the majority of whom have evaluated it highly. Perhaps the most interesting is Jared McBride’s review, which compares Ukrainian Nationalism to Rossoliński-Liebe’s and Viatrochych’s books. One of the
key problems where the reviewer differs with the author is in the interpretation of the OUN’s ideological turn, which started in 1943. Though in general McBride thinks highly of Shkandrij’s work, he criticizes his belief in the sincerity of the OUN turn to democracy and “evokes John Armstrong’s old speculation that there were ‘avowed and real attitudes’ in the OUN movement, hinting that the embrace of fascism may have been a temporary political expediency, while democratic views, usefully close to those of the Western Allies, lay just beneath the surface all along.” McBride doubts the democratization of the OUN that had started allegedly in 1943 and cites two arguments: 1) “in the summer of 1943 the OUN and the UPA were still months away from concluding their ethnic cleansing operations, even after they formally announced principles of democracy and the rights of national minorities;” 2) “the postwar record of OUN activities in Germany was rife with violence and internecine fighting, as documented by Rossoliński-Liebe.”15

First of all, it should be clarified that Armstrong and Shkandrij do not argue that democratic views “lay just beneath the [OUN’s] surface all along.” Both scholars claimed that an independent state remained the unchanging principal aim of the OUN but the means to fulfill this aim (the adoption of fascist ideas and co-operation with the Nazis or democratization and co-operation with the Western allies) changed depending on the circumstances.16 Secondly, Shkandrij’s text does not indicate that its author overestimates the democratization of the OUN. He actually writes that the Third Extraordinary Congress was not “a complete reorientation and acceptance of Western democratic and liberal principles”17 and depicts the anti-Polish ethnic cleansing18 and the struggle between the OUN-B and the opposition in the OUN after the war.19 At the same time, it is hard to deny that, the OUN, albeit not all elements and not all at once, had started to democratize in 1943. The clash with the Nazi system during the Second World War
and the rejection of the totalitarian features in OUN ideology and practice by the majority of the Dnipro Ukrainian population caused revisionist tendencies inside the underground nationalist movement. The radical change in the war in 1942-1943 also pushed both the OUN-M and OUN-B to the search for “a new face” that would be accepted by the new allies (the Western democracies and the population of Central and Eastern Ukraine). The most significant change took place in OUN-B. Its Third Extraordinary Congress approved a program that is reminiscent not of the ideology of the integral nationalist movements of the interwar era but of the programs of the postwar anti-colonial movements of the “Third World.” At first, at least for some OUN-B leaders, the revision of ideology was a tactical step. However, later the circumstances led to the creation of a united national-liberation front and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (1944), and this caused a deeper ideological transformation in the direction of democratization and the strengthening of the social aspects. The underground national movement in Ukraine gradually lost the specific feature of integral nationalism and turned to a democratic position before the 1950s. In contrast, the Bandera group continued to advocate the cult of the leader in emigration and this resulted in a long struggle between the supporters of a hard line and a democratic opposition and later in a new split inside the OUN.20

McBride also argues that “Shkandrij does not answer the question raised by Rossoliński-Liebe: how did Bandera and his followers develop such ‘rigid, fanatical views,’ including the racial nationalism and reverence for violence?”21 McBride agrees with Rossoliński-Liebe that the answer can be found in Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi’s and Stepan Rudnyts'kyi’s works, which “offered racialized views of Ukrainians and their neighbors that had an obvious influence on OUN members.”22 However, Mikhnovs'kyi was not a racist and his reluctance regarding mixed marriages was caused not by racist but political and cultural views. Rudnyts'kyi had some racist
prejudice, but the influence of his work on the OUN was limited. In general, Shkandrij correctly argues that although some nationalists were exposed to the racist views, the OUN did not accept racist theories and rejected them openly. That is why the statement about “OUN racist nationalism” is greatly exaggerated.

The roots of fanatical views and a predisposition to violence among OUN members should be sought elsewhere. First of all, we should remember that compared to the experience of the previous generations, the era of the OUN’s most dynamic activity was also a period of unprecedented mass killing and deportation of the civilian population. As Oleg Olzhych wrote “the era is as cruel as a she-wolf” and it was especially cruel to the Ukrainians, because millions of them became the victims of the communist terror and Holodomor. Although the position of the Ukrainians under the Polish rule was not so tragic, the discrimination and repressions according to the principle of collective responsibility caused a feeling of national grievance. The “pacification” of 1930 left an especially sore legacy in Ukrainian-Polish relations. The lust for revenge overcame not only ordinary peasants but also radical politicians, who dreamed of retribution against their enemies who, in their eyes, were not only the concrete initiators and executors of the repressions, but also “enemy nations” in general.

Secondly, a social-Darwinist conception of inevitable struggle among nations was an important part of the integral nationalism that became the foundation of OUN ideology. According to this theory, the nation is the totality of individuals and the collective individuality that unites all past, present, and future generations and acts as a living organism. The nations struggle for existence and only those that have a more developed will to life, power, and expansion will survive. According to Dontsov, whom many OUN members considered their spiritual father, the nations “similar to the organic world, will always compete with one
another… two of them cannot dwell on the same territory under the sun just as two figures of
different colours cannot be on the same square of a chessboard; the weaker nation (in this
moment) has to surrender and allow the stronger nation to take its place.”23 From this point, it
was only one step to ethnic cleansing, and Dontsov’s followers took that step. Both these aspects
are shown and explained in Shkandrij’s book.

Comparing Rossoliński-Liebe’s and Shkandrij’s books, McBride always prefers the work
of the former. I have a different opinion. While respecting Rossoliński-Liebe’s enormous work
in reconstructing Bandera’s life and afterlife and the history of the movement that bore his name,
I think that Shkandrij’s interpretation is less one-sided and more convincing. Skilfully using the
theoretical concepts of “fascism,” “integral nationalism,” and “modernism,” he does not allow
himself to be caught in a trap of words and he does not reduce his work to a scrupulously
described case that will illustrate a supposedly universal category. He shows the views of every
ideologist or writer as a complicated and ambiguous system that did not have any a priori
meaning, but at the same time, can be and should be explained within the particular theory.

To sum up I believe that Shkandrij’s *Ukrainian Nationalism* is, today, the best general
work on the intellectual history of Ukrainian integral nationalism that has ever been published.

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Mohylians'ka akademiia”, 2012.
2. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, *Stepan Bandera – The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism,
5. Martynets', *Ideolohiia orhanizovanoho i t. zv. volevoho natsionalizmu.*
8. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 4
10. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 125
11. Ibid., 270-271. See also Shkandrij, “National democracy.”
12. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 105
17. Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 270
18. Ibid., 68-71
19. Ibid., 73-76

**Bibliography**


Translated by Oksana Vynnyk
Response by Myroslav Shkandrij

I am grateful for the close attention paid to the text by these three prominent scholars, and for their generous praise. Their comments raise many interesting questions and suggest directions for future study. They indicate lacunae in our understanding of interwar nationalism, including the role of ideologists, and the influence of fascism and Nazism on the pre-war and wartime Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). There is also the question of definitions, such as the content of the words “nation” and “fascist,” and the need to consider new methodologies, especially the search for comparative frameworks that would throw into relief the ideas and actions of Ukrainian nationalists in the 1930s and 1940s. I cannot elaborate on all the issues raised, but will simply comment on a few themes that run through the responses, particularly those that touch upon methodology and new directions in research.

In my book I tried to examine what nationalists said (their ideology) and did (their politics), but also how they thought and felt (their literature and its myth structure). Literature scholars, such as myself, are generally trained to examine some aspect of what Raymond Williams called “structures of thought and feeling” -- in an individual writer, or a particular generation. The identification of such patterns helps to illuminate individual and collective behaviour and the motivation that guides it. It was my intention in writing the book to look at the period 1929-1956 in this broader way in the hope of finding connections between ideology, politics, and literature, and to situate interwar nationalism and the OUN in particular within a wider generational framework and cultural context.
It is a pleasure to learn that others have found this exercise useful in illuminating the multi-faceted nature of Ukrainian nationalism, its ability to evolve and change. The broader (small “n” nationalism), which was present in the 1930s but whose origins reach back into the nineteenth century, could be described as protean. To a more limited degree this is also true of the more specific movement associated with the OUN.

In writing the book, it was also my concern to broaden the “archive” of materials employed. I mean by this not only the introduction of new information culled from archival deposits (many figures have left as yet untapped correspondence and memoirs), but to incorporate different “genres,” such as the texts of creative literature, and to at least indicate that art, musical and stage performances might also provide valuable “evidence” for the researcher who tries to understand the period. I am gratified that the commentators find stimulating the idea of extending the “archive” as a way of developing a better understanding of ideology and politics in the period.

The evidence from such a wider array of sources, I believe, supports Oleksandr Zaitsev’s contention that the model of “generic fascism” is insufficient for understanding the ultra nationalism of stateless nations. While no scholar would deny that elements of fascism were present in the OUN, the point needs to be made that these elements were challenged both within the broader society and within the OUN itself.

Another methodological issue raised is the need to clarify definitions and distinctions. It may be, as Zaitsev suggests, that I overstress the distinction between the broader nationalism, the OUN, and Dontsovism, but it seems to me that by making these distinctions one can highlight some important internal tensions, and envision the ideology and politics of this period as a contest between more democratically-minded nationalists, authoritarians, and fascists. One then becomes aware of the porousness of
boundaries, the fluidity of ideological attitudes, and the way individuals could shift allegiances. This shape-shifting feature of nationalism becomes important in studying the years after 1943, when real as well as pro-forma changes took place in the OUN’s ideology and practice, leading to internal dissent, defections, and organizational splits. Not everyone changed at once and not every change was evident immediately, but change did occur. Some, both inside and outside the OUN, might have retained fascist and racist convictions, but others never held such convictions and moved rapidly toward embracing democratic positions during and after the war. Such a parsing of definitions enables one to understand the mutability of the OUN’s ideas and its evolution toward pro-democratic views after the war, a process that has hardly as yet been examined by scholars.

It is useful to draw a comparison with the communist movement, which also transformed itself -- before, during, and after the war. Some individuals remained wedded to the authoritarianism we call “Stalinism” and to views that could be considered genocidal in their focus on eliminating entire nationalities or large percentages of the population. However, others broke from the Soviet party at various times, transforming themselves into supporters of parliamentary and democratic rule.

Roger Griffin and Jeffrey Herf, among others, have pointed toward another way of approaching the topic -- by examining interwar “modernism” not only as a political tendency but as something closer to a literary-artistic style and a mythology. In my analysis I tried to show that “reactionary modernism” (Herf’s term) was obsessed not only with palingenesis, but also with an aesthetic of rupture and violence, and with social Darwinism, masculinity, and strength. I also tried to show the way these
obsessions were connected to developments in the Soviet sphere and in the West – a comparative framework that is rarely employed.

Tamara Hundorova, herself a pioneer of feminist literary criticism, is justified in stressing the value of studying masculinity/femininity during this period. She also notes that “aristocracy” was not a new feature of Ukrainian literary modernism. I agree, of course, but would argue that the “aristocracy” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (with its Nietzscheanism, anti-populism, cult of the intellect and refined feelings) was of a different nature and in many ways during the interwar period stood in opposition to the “aristocracy” of Dmytro Dontsov and his acolytes. In fact, the appearance of this new strain of “aristocracy” exemplifies how earlier modernism morphed into the “reactionary” version of the 1930s. Refining the meaning of this term would help us to identify continuities and discontinuities.

“Reactionary” modernism reverberates in today’s world of media management, where small elite groups take on the role of directing popular indignation (through political technologies, false advertising, fake news, and so on), while expressing contempt for democratic values and parliamentary procedures. They manipulate popular attitudes by controlling the media and manufacturing movements, while privately scoffing at the gullibility of viewers, listeners, and readers. This kind of “aristocracy” seems to me to echo Dontsov, who despised “the mob” while using unscrupulous journalistic methods to manipulate it. Nonetheless, as I tried to point out, his cynicism was resisted, both outside and inside the OUN, by individuals who were concerned with enlightening the public about the realities of political oppression, and who tried to awaken grassroots activism around the issue of national liberation.
Much of my book is devoted to the “close reading” of individual texts and authors. This is partly an attempt to do justice to the complexity of individual lives and imaginations. As a literary scholar, one tends to resist “simplifying” people, to be accepting of contradictions within individual personalities, and to search for evolution in thought and means of expression. I tried to do this for the writers selected for analysis, each of whom serves as a “case study” in how nationalist ideology and revolutionary enthusiasm affected individuals.

It is part of my argument that a more in-depth analysis of 1930s nationalism as a style, a form of “reactionary modernism” along the lines of Italian Futurism, with its focus on violence, militarism, masculinity, war, and the engineering of new projects, will open up new lines of research and reveal links to Soviet and Western authors who were interested in similar topics. My point is that modernism could be both liberating and implicated in the rise of authoritarianism, fascism, and Stalinism.

Hundorova may be right in suggesting that one should also explore the period in terms of neoromanticism, neoclassicism, neobaroque, and so on. My own impression is that potential discoveries wait to be made in researching interwar modernist art, décor, dance, chanson, cabaret, film, and theatre, and the ways these affected Galicians and the large Ukrainian émigré communities living in Central and Western Europe. These forms of art and entertainment generated a seductive glamour, one that can be glimpsed by viewers of Bernardo Bertolucci’s film masterpiece, The Conformist (1970). The broader point is that interwar literature and art, Lviv cabaret and chanson, and the Ukrainian contribution to international avant-garde art and film were part of the context that produced nationalism, which could therefore not fail to reflect and be shaped by this
creativity. As far as I can tell, very little scholarship has been devoted to exploring this topic.

It is true that Dontsov appears as a negative “hero” in my book, a kind of evil genius of the period, a Stephen Bannon with Vistnyk (Herald) the equivalent of Breitbart News. Dontsov was, in my view, not only immoral and deceitful, but profoundly reactionary -- in terms of his attitude toward the general population, womanhood, and the liberal political order in general. His journals and immediate circle differed profoundly in tone from others. It is a rebuke to contemporary Ukrainian studies that the exposure of this difference comes as a shock. I make this point because of recent attempts to improve Dontsov’s image by aligning him with the broader nationalist current (or, conversely, by discrediting this broader current by confusing it with Dontsov). Olena Teliha, for all her womanly charms, was under his spell and appears to me to have been one of the more pro-fascist and pro-Hitler figures in this generation. Her aristocratism of the spirit was part of a Dontsovist orientation. However, I also see her as maneuvering in order to find a fulfilling role for women in the OUN’s ideology and Ukrainian society. It seems to me that the idea of reducing women completely to the role of mothers and nurturers of the nation’s sons was something she found difficult to accept.

Yaroslav Hrytsak is right in suggesting that we perhaps overestimate a particular text’s readership, and that ideology often does not play a decisive role. However, the interwar generation invested an enormous amount of energy into producing and distributing literature, both ideological and creative. The network of journals, newspapers, literary and artistic groupings has, as far as I can judge, not been adequately mapped and analyzed. Moreover, ideology works not only through political
pronouncement but also as “soft power.” It is projected through many vehicles and channels: fashion, style, film, high art, architecture and design, music, sport, and popular entertainment. The interwar generation in Galicia produced a popular literature that, it seems to me, was read, and carried “subliminal” as well as overt messages. All those Desheva knyzhka (Cheap Book) publications, newspapers like Zhinka (Woman), children’s literature, art exhibitions, music concerts, and theatre productions convey messages. Today the surviving scraps from this past occasionally sound like coded signals, bleeps from a lost age coming to us from cosmic space. However, these phenomena should be analyzed, because they would put the ideologies and politics into a wider framework – the myth structure that also operated in art and entertainment. The seductive “messages” in performing arts, periodicals, graphic and poster art, when juxtaposed with the pronouncements of political ideologists, might explain why the public found some messages particularly alluring.

A comparison with the pro-Soviet movement is again useful. How widely read ideologists were might be difficult to establish, but were Marx, Engels, and Lenin the favourite reading of rank-and-file communists and their sympathizers? Was it the aura of poster images of Stalin, Che Guevara, and Mao that had the greater effect? Or, perhaps the popularization of ideology through mass literature, performances, and rituals was the dominant influence? It is, of course, very difficult to ascertain what actually went on in heads of people who listened to speeches, witnessed performances, viewed art, and read novels. Reception studies here provides another, little explored avenue of research.

The reasons for adhering to a group are many and Rogers Brubaker is no doubt correct in assigning importance to employment and career opportunities. Personal
experiences of abuse and the witnessing of atrocities also frequently become moments of conversion, as my book demonstrates, for example in the case of Ulas Samchuk, Olena Teliha, or Leonid Mosendz. But as Hrytsak points out, the atmosphere of the time also played an important role: the cult of death, the mystique of self-sacrifice, and the charisma of certain figures. We can denounce and reject these and similar trends of the 1930s, but we need to understand how they were able to generate enthusiasm. I agree entirely with Hrytsak that the spectrum of responses even within the OUN toward many questions – including violence, antisemitism, racism, fascism, and Nazism – was wide. Different elements came to the fore at different times, and then receded. Perhaps the most important point is that there were differences and that the situation kept changing.

The search for new methodologies, the broadening of the “archive” at the disposal of scholars, the refusal to neglect different levels at which the “archive” operates (including both short-term, local developments and slowly maturing, larger forces whose existence is more subterranean), the identification of commonalities and distinctions – all this is part of the effort to find approaches and a language that might bring greater clarity by conveying nuance and complexity. I will be delighted if my book succeeds in making a contribution to this effort.