De-Mythologizing Bandera: Towards a Scholarly History of the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement

Stepan Bandera (1909–59), the leader of the radical Ukrainian nationalist movement, is, perhaps, the most controversial figure in the history of Ukraine. One has only to compare the titles of some of his biographies, *Stepan Bandera—Symbol of Revolutionary Determination*, by Petro Mirchuk;¹ *Stepan Bandera—a Life Dedicated to Freedom*, by Mykola Posivnych;² and, finally, *Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist: Fascism, Genocide, and Cult* by Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, published by *ibidem* in 2014.³ In this collection of review essays, we use Rossoliński-Liebe’s recent book as a departure point for a wider discussion on the current state of the historiography on Bandera and on Ukraine’s recent past more broadly.

Who was Stepan Bandera: an uncompromising revolutionary, a freedom fighter, or a fascist and an ideologue of “genocidal nationalism”? Not only historians, but also ordinary Ukrainians diverge radically in their answers to this question. As opinion polls demonstrate, of all historical figures about whom respondents are asked, Bandera divides Ukrainians most of all (the figures who most unite Ukrainians in negative attitudes are Vladimir Putin and Joseph Stalin).⁴

The style and the content of the Ukrainian debates on Bandera resemble the Russian polemics of the 1860s about the hero of

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Ivan Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons*, the essence of which one critic summaries as follows: “Is Mr Turgenev’s Bazarov a caricature that should be ridiculed, or is he an ideal that should be emulated?” In the same way, contemporary debates about Bandera and his associates are mostly confined to the question whether they were fascist criminals who should be branded with shame, or national heroes to whom monuments should be erected and whose example should serve for the education of today’s youth.

In other words, a war of two historical myths is being waged (or a war between myth and anti-myth) with the characteristic binary opposition of light and darkness, with no gray in between. In the mythologized historical consciousness, Stepan Bandera, his Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are either placed on the totally light or the completely dark side; there is no middle ground.

The book by Rossoliński-Liebe that is the subject of discussion in the current issue takes the debate on Bandera to a new and more academic level. As noted by one of the reviewers, Yuri Radchenko, this book is the first academic biography of Bandera, and that is the greatest achievement of its author. At the same time, it continues and develops the tradition of historiography of the OUN that aims at “exposing” its darker side. Over several hundred pages the author argues that Bandera and his OUN were not actors in the national liberation movement, but rather fascists, racists, and organizers of mass killings of civilians. However, unlike previous journalistic attacks on Bandera, his followers and activities, Rossoliński-Liebe’s book has a solid foundation in theory and archival sources, meaning that the apologists of the leader of the OUN will no longer be able to simply dismiss it as a piece of “anti-Ukrainian propaganda”.

In this introduction I will not analyze in detail the contents of the book, as this has been done meticulously elsewhere in this issue.

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by André Härtel and Yuri Radchenko. I shall focus on just one fundamental question that forms the main point of my differences with both the author and the reviewers.

Both Rossoliński-Liebe and the two reviewers agree on the characterization of the OUN as a fascist movement and, subsequently, of Bandera as a fascist leader. Indeed, in the late 1930s and early 1940s the OUN had much in common with the fascist movements. Certainly, the concept of “Ukrainian fascism” has a right to exist as one possible explanatory scheme, since it undoubtedly offers plausible explanations for certain facts.

A certain methodological reservation must be made here. When we claim that this or that political movement was fascist, we do not reveal its “true” nature, but simply use a chosen typological scheme in order to place the movement under investigation in a comparative context. Thus, those who consider the OUN to be a fascist organization therefore suggest that a) we will understand the ideology and practices of the OUN better if we compare it with the Italian National Fascist Party, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael, etc., than with the political movements of any other type; b) we will understand the phenomenon of fascism better, if, in addition to the above organizations, we also include in our analysis the OUN.

In my view, both of these assumptions are misleading. The OUN’s ideology and practices do correspond to some interpretations within the framework of the theory of “generic fascism”, yet these are all based on the study of ultra-nationalist movements in nation-states. Serving as it does to elide the fundamental differences between the nationalist movements of nations with and without states, the concept of “Ukrainian fascism” ultimately generates more theoretical and practical problems than it helps to solve. According to this logic, using the framework of fascism, one would have to construct a subcategory of “national liberationist fascism”, which would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

Rossoliński-Liebe apparently senses this logical contradiction, as he consistently uses scare quotes for phrases such as “liberation movement” and “liberation struggle” in relation to the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Thus, for example, he writes that
the “‘liberation struggle’ or ‘liberation war’ practiced by the OUN and UPA could not have been liberation because it was not necessary to kill several thousand civilians to liberate Ukraine” (p. 541). Yet in fact there is no reason why atrocities against civilians should necessarily preclude the recognition of the OUN as a national liberation movement. Such practices were more often the rule than the exception in the history of twentieth-century national liberation movements, and in this respect the OUN was fairly typical.

Historian John-Paul Himka’s approach is more consistent, as he does not consider the national liberationist nature of the movement to be an obstacle to recognizing it as fascist. He asks a rhetorical question: “Does the fact that OUN was also a national liberation movement make it not fascist? The Ustashe was also a national liberation movement—was it too not fascist? The Viet Cong was a national liberation movement—was it therefore not communist?”6

In other words, according to Himka, a national liberation struggle can be combined with any ideology, including fascism. Indeed, certain well-known historical national liberation movements adopted liberal, conservative, socialist, communist, and other doctrines. Does this mean that the national liberation struggle is innately un-ideological? Such a claim would suggest that nationalism is not an ideology. However, nationalism is an ideology, albeit of a kind different to liberalism, communism, and so on. Unlike the latter, nationalism in itself does not contain a vision of the future socio-economic and political system. It focuses on achieving and maintaining the “autonomy, unity, and identity” of the population that is considered to be a “nation”.7 Therefore, in order to be a fully-fledged ideology, able to mobilize the masses, nationalism must borrow elements from other social and political doctrines. Through this process combinations are formed such as liberal, conservative, or socialist nationalism, national-communism, etc.

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However, unlike liberalism or communism, *fascism itself is an extreme form of nationalism* (Rossoliński-Liebe partially agrees with this, although his explanation of the relationship between these concepts (pp. 33–34) is not distinguished by clarity or consistency). Therefore, when considering the relationship between fascism and national liberation movements, an internal typology of nationalism should be taken into account, in particular the division of nationalisms into those of stateless nations and nations with a state. The former group considers the national revival as, first of all, the overcoming of oppression, and the creation of one’s own state; for the latter group, the national revival means the strengthening of the state, filling it with “real” national content, and sometimes also the cleansing of the national community of “hostile” elements, external expansion, imperialism, and national messianism. Undoubtedly, the first type of nationalism can turn into the second. Yet the abstract and theoretical arguments about what the state will be like acquire practical significance only after the first task of achieving the state has been fulfilled. When we employ the term “fascism” for nationalist movements of nations with and without states, we elide the important differences between them.

Rossoliński-Liebe not only rejects the classification of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as national-liberationist, but also spurns the much more neutral term “integral nationalism”, which, starting with John A. Armstrong’s 1955 monograph,\(^8\) has been widely adopted in the historiography as a label for the OUN’s ideology. Rossoliński-Liebe puts forward two main arguments justifying his position here:

First, neither did the OUN use the term “integral nationalism,” nor did it identify itself with the ideology of integral nationalism. Second, the OUN and its leaders did not claim the “traditional hereditary monarchy” and a

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number of other features typical of integral nationalism, as did Maurras, the father of this ideology (p. 25).

Even if the first statement were accurate, it would be difficult to consider it a compelling argument. After all, the fact that members of the OUN did not call themselves fascists and even officially objected to this term does not prevent Rossoliński-Liebe from labeling them as such. In any case, in actual fact the author is mistaken: the OUN activists, albeit infrequently, did use the term “integral nationalism” to define their ideology—Iulian Vassyian did so in 1928, for example, and so did the newspaper *Nash Klych* (Our Call) in 1933. The OUN’s detractors from the Ukrainian Catholic camp also used the term (in a negative sense).

Rossoliński-Liebe’s second objection is equally unconvincing, since the concept of “integral nationalism”, which was introduced into academic usage by Carlton J. H. Hayes, has long ceased to be associated with monarchism in the style of Charles Maurras. Its meaning as used by Hayes and Armstrong is essentially synonymous with the concept of “ultranationalism”, which Rossoliński-Liebe, following Roger Griffin and Stanley G. Payne, includes in his list of the criteria for fascism (pp. 29–30, 33).

While I do not reject the concept of “Ukrainian fascism” out of hand, I would argue that this is not the most accurate or useful description for the OUN and Bandera. Instead, I propose that they

10 S. O., “Soiuznyky bol’shhevyzmu”, *Nash Klych*, 14 May 1933, p. 3. It is possible that the cryptonym “S. O.” was used by Bandera’s close ally, Yaroslav Stets’ko.
be viewed as instances of what I call ustashism. That is, they should be viewed in the context of the revolutionary ultranationalist (integral-nationalist) movements of stateless nations, such as the Croatian Ustaša (before 1941), the radical wing of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party (before 1939) or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Movements of this type had certain features in common with fascism, but their primary aim was not reorganization of an existing state according to totalitarian principles, but the creation of a new state, using all available means, including terror, to this end. The history of the Ustaše movement shows that if the conditions are “favorable”, ustashism can evolve into real fascism. This did not eventuate in the Ukrainian case because the Nazis dispersed Stets’ko’s government and imprisoned Bandera and other leaders of the OUN in 1941, thereby preventing a repeat of the Croatian scenario in Ukraine.

It should be emphasized that the radical ethnic nationalism of the OUN, although it differed from fascism, was not more humane or less prone to violence. This is evidenced time and again by Rossoliński-Liebe’s findings, which describe in detail the mass violence the OUN and the UPA perpetrated in relation to Poles, Jews and Ukrainians during the war, although this had no direct relation to Bandera, who at this time was imprisoned in a German concentration camp. Therefore, André HärTEL is right when he writes below that:

While ongoing debates about the differences and similarities between Ukrainian radical nationalism and e. g. German National Socialism or other fascist movements might be fruitful for the general conceptual delineation between nationalism, ultranationalism, and fascism, they should not lead to a relativization of the inhumane, xenophobic, and totalitarian character and policies of the OUN/UPA before and during the Second World War.

On the other hand, one cannot reduce the activity of the OUN and UPA only to xenophobia and totalitarianism, forgetting about

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their lasting struggle against the even more inhumane and totalitarian Soviet regime, which for most participants was a struggle for freedom.

The main problem with Rossoliński-Liebe’s arguments is not the fact that he considers the OUN and Bandera to be fascists—such an explanatory diagram may have a certain heuristic value—but rather that his *a priori* scheme often prevails over his facts. I do not agree with Yuri Radchenko when he criticizes Rossoliński-Liebe below for having failed to use this or that source. In fact, the source base of the book is more than sufficient, and in any case covering all possible sources on such a broad topic is simply impossible. What matters is how the historian uses his sources while selecting and interpreting the facts.

As I have argued elsewhere, a conscientious historian must take into account not only those facts that support his working hypothesis, but also the ones that do not.15 Unfortunately, Rossoliński-Liebe is not always sufficiently scrupulous in observing this rule. At times the text reads as though he were consciously or unconsciously adjusting the facts to fit into an *a priori* scheme of “fascism”, “racism” and “genocidal nationalism”. He rightly points to the elements of racism in certain brochures written by OUN members, yet he ignores the criticism of Nazi racism which appears in a number of other texts, in particular, in the official OUN publication, *Rozbudova Natsii*.16 He sees fascism everywhere, even in the greeting “Glory to Ukraine!”, groundlessly attributing its invention to a small and little-known Ukrainian Union of Fascists (pp. 34, 563), when in actual fact it had been widespread back in the time of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–20,17 that is, several years before the formation of the Union

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15 See further my forthcoming review of Rossoliński-Liebe’s book in *European History Quarterly*.
of Ukrainian Fascists. Citing documentary sources, he uses the translation “totalitarian power of the Ukrainian nation” (p. 181), even though the word “totalitarian” is not present in the original, which instead refers to the “sovereign, indivisible, total [povna] power of the Ukrainian people”.18 Contradicting his own declaration in the Introduction, where he states that “the study does not suggest that all Ukrainians who were in the OUN or UPA were fascists or radical nationalists” (p. 48), in later chapters the author often depicts the OUN as an ideological monolith, which it was not. Fascism, Nazism, anti-Semitism, totalitarianism, terror had both their supporters and critics in the ranks of the organization, yet the author carefully cites only the supporters.

However, the demand for complete objectivity is a utopian one: it is simply unachievable for a single researcher. As Karl Popper wrote, “science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the attempts of an individual scientist to be ‘objective’, but from the friendly-hostile co-operation of many scientists. Scientific objectivity can be described as the inter-subjectivity of scientific method”.19 This is also a fair statement in relation to history as a “critical human science”.20 That is why the “friendly-hostile” discussion of the different interpretations of the phenomenon of Bandera in an academic environment is necessary if we are to move towards a more accurate account of the history of Ukrainian nationalism.

Yet the Bandera problem also has significance that goes far beyond academic debates. It is important for understanding the current problems and the possible scenarios for the future development of Ukrainian society. Times of revolution and social transformation

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always produce a process that Hayden White calls “retrospective ancestral constitution”.21 This process consists in society’s rejection of the old “ancestry” and choosing of new “ideal ancestors”, whose activity they consider a model for the present and for the building of an ideal future. A similar process has been taking place in Ukraine, starting with the time of perebudova (perestroika) and the collapse of the USSR, and the Euromaidan has given it a new impetus. Ukrainian society is getting rid of the old, Soviet-imperial “ancestry”, and establishing (or reviving) an alternative “ancestry”. This has been and continues to be associated mainly with the carriers of (real or imagined) democratic traditions: from the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks to the Soviet-era dissidents. However, with the aggravation of the problem of geopolitical and civilizational choice (with Europe or with Russia?), the nationalists and historians associated with them are attempting with ever greater persistence to impose their own list of “ideal ancestors” on Ukrainians, with Bandera, the OUN and UPA most prominent among them. At the same time, they do not understand, or do not wish to understand, that such an “ancestry” severely impedes not only integration into the European Union, but also the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation.

In his exclusive emphasis on the “fascist”, “racist” and “genocidal” nature of the Banderite movement, and his complete denial of the presence of liberationist and democratic elements within it, Rossoliński-Liebe goes to the other extreme. Yet he is certainly right to argue that the cult of Bandera, which is currently prevalent in western Ukraine, is an important factor that has prevented Ukrainians from critically reassessing their history. Ukraine needs a radical demythologization and desacralization of its past, and the first academic biography of Stepan Bandera, for all its shortcomings, will surely contribute to this, at least through encouraging broad academic and public discussions of the kind featured here in this journal.

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Bandera’s Tempting Shadow: The Problematic History of Ukrainian Radical Nationalism in the Wake of the Maidan

Gregorz Rossoliński-Liebe’s biography of Stepan Bandera, the leader (“Providnyk”) of the “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists” (OUN/OUN-B) from 1940–59, arrives at a time when debates about Ukrainian nation-building, the legitimate role of the Ukrainian state in writing a “national historical narrative”, and finally the appropriate reference points for such a narrative in Ukraine’s uneasy history have taken on international significance.¹ Ukraine’s current post-revolutionary context and the war against Russian-supported separatism have provoked Ukrainian elites and the general public alike to sharpen the historical image of a “political nation” trying to finally find itself. In such a violent and unstable environment, the temptation to resort to and highlight the more radical phases, actors, and organizations of a nation’s history—an understatement in the case of Bandera and the OUN, as Rossoliński-Liebe’s study demonstrates—is understandably big. Therefore, any such deep and genuine scholarly contribution to the study of the history of Ukrainian nationalism should be warmly welcomed by Ukrainian and international audiences.

The book is as much a biography of Bandera as it is a history of Ukrainian nationalism and its main institutional proponents in the 1930s and 1940s. It furthermore covers Bandera’s “afterlife” beyond his assassination in 1959 and discusses the considerable impact of his “personal cult” on post-Soviet Ukraine’s political culture. After introducing Bandera’s life prior to his assumption of a leading position in the OUN, the author discusses the role of two crucial trials during the early 1930s, which in many ways became the origin of the

“Bandera cult”. In the second part, Rossoliński-Liebe provides a detailed account of the “Ukrainian National Revolution” initiated by the OUN simultaneously with the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, whose final aim was the creation of a totalitarian and monoethnic Ukrainian state. The latter part of this chapter and the chapter following it focus on the systematic extermination of Poles and Jews in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia during the Second World War and discuss the pivotal role of both the OUN and UPA in the organization and legitimization of genocide. This longer section concludes with a chapter on the brutal war between Ukrainian nationalists and the Soviets after 1944, which resulted in tens of thousands of dead on both sides and around 200,000 deported Ukrainians by the mid-1950s. The third part of the book studies Bandera and the cult around him from four different perspectives: his personal life, beliefs, and politics up to his assassination; his role in Soviet propaganda; the growing “Providnyk”-cult, especially in the diaspora community, after his death; and the impact the OUN leader and the ideology of his movement have had on post-Soviet Ukraine.

The “Providnyk” and the Individual’s Role in History

While it is generally a difficult task to assess an individual’s historical contribution, the question of Bandera’s agency when it comes to OUN “homeland” activities in the 1930s and 1940s is especially difficult to answer. Because the “Providnyk” spent almost the entire period under study in prisons, camps, under home arrest abroad, or in exile, his impact, especially on terrorist activities and ethnic violence, requires extensive explanation and a discussion of what are often highly subjective sources. Yet Rossoliński-Liebe manages to demonstrate how Bandera’s early fascination for fascism and the radicalism with which he promoted a racially “pure” Ukrainian state (from p. 106) led to his justification of mass murder for the sake of “liberating” the Ukrainian nation at the L’viv trial in 1936 (p. 159), and to the ultimate call for systematic ethnic violence against “Muscovites, Poles, and Jews” in a crucial 1941 document entitled “The Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime” (p. 181). Notwithstanding those legal facts, Rossoliński-Liebe rightly argues that the
“moral, ethical and political responsibility” weighs more heavily in Bandera’s case, especially considering that he never condemned or even regretted the results of his “Ukrainian National Revolution” (p. 239).

Another crucial factor supporting an interpretation of Bandera as a key historical actor with a strong influence on the OUN movement is the considerable “cult” which apparently elevated the “Providnyk” to the status of an almost superhuman being in the eyes of his followers (p. 98). The cultish adoration of the OUN leader seems to have its roots especially in his charismatic behavior at the Warsaw and L'viv trials and in the narrative of Bandera’s “suffering for the national liberation” in prisons abroad (p. 285), an episode which tends to be somewhat exaggerated by his followers. The “cult” but also the special conditions of arrest mostly granted to Bandera during the war provided him with almost unchallenged authority and ample opportunity to continue to exert leadership and to communicate with his subordinates throughout this period. The cult even went so far as to claim that, after the end of the Second World War, the “Providnyk” was still able to use his aura to deceive Western security agencies about his then waning influence and thereby gain their considerable financial and informational support (from p. 330). From 1944 onwards even Soviet propaganda contributed to an equation between Ukrainian nationalism and the “banderovtsy” (p. 405), and thus helped to reinforce the cult.

Cleaning Up All Myths: the OUN’s Ideology and Systematic Ethnic Violence

The central contribution of the book is however the deep study, evidence, and coherent interpretation Rossoliński-Liebe provides on the mass atrocities committed by members of the OUN-B, the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), and other Ukrainian radical nationalist and paramilitary formations during the Second World War. Because OUN and UPA veterans, Bandera himself, and also many Ukrainian and even international historians have managed and manage to the present day to negate the atrocities and portray the actors as morally and politically unassailable “fighters for freedom and liberation” (see
Chapter 10), such an informed clean-up is still deeply necessary and timely. Systematic ethnic violence, especially against Jews and Poles, Rossoliński-Liebe argues, was well prepared ideologically by the OUN/OUN-B. Following its main ideological “spin-doctors”, Dmytro Dontsov and Mykola Stsybors’ky, the “OUN actively put the anti-Semitic components of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism into practice” (p. 81) and programmatically prepared a fascist totalitarian dictatorship with rights granted to “ethnic Ukrainians alone” (p. 83).

In 1941, the OUN, with its “National Ukrainian Revolution”, began to implement its program of the ethnic cleansing of Ukrainian territory, supported by factors such as the German attack on the Soviet Union and the Nazis’ own genocidal plans, but also the preceding NKVD terror against ethnic Ukrainians. Rossoliński-Liebe convincingly demonstrates how Ukrainian militia, “established and coordinated” by the OUN-B (p. 200), and other OUN-dominated formations such as the “Nachtigall battalion” systematically killed Jews in “well-organized” pogroms and mobilized the Ukrainian population to take part (pp. 212-13). Although Rossoliński-Liebe mainly has to rely on hitherto neglected testimonies of Jewish, Polish, and Ukrainian survivors to prove his claims, there are also plenty of official documents demonstrating how Ukrainian radical nationalists wanted to “solve” the “Jewish problem” (p. 218). This also holds true for the deliberate ethnic cleansing of Poles in Eastern Galicia and especially Volhynia from 1943 on, when “(...) the UPA was the army that the OUN-leaders expected to ‘cleanse’ the Ukrainian race” (p. 268). While it is also acknowledged that Polish formations were engaged in a considerable amount of anti-Ukrainian atrocities at the time, the author convincingly shows how the OUN and UPA had learned from the Germans’ genocidal actions how to “annihilate an entire ethnic group in a relatively short time” (p. 260) and used the same practices to systematically kill between 70 000 and 100 000 Poles by 1945 (p. 271). In short, Bandera and his movement longed as much for the implementation of a completely inhumane, totalitarian, and racist order as they did for Ukrainian national liberation.
Ukrainian Radical Nationalism in Comparative Perspective

On that basis, the author also makes considerable efforts to explain the fascination of many Ukrainians with the “Bandera cult” right up to the present day. Especially for the growing but also very diverse Ukrainian diaspora after the war, the “Providnyk” and the memory of the OUN and UPA’s fight for “national liberation” seem to have become necessary symbolic and cultish objects for preserving a sense of unity and durability during the Cold War (Rossoliński-Liebe calls them “charismatic communities”, p. 416). Yet, the question remains how much of the contemporary defense and even admiration of many ordinary Ukrainians and Ukrainian historians for Bandera and the OUN/UPA is acceptable. An answer to this question can only be found by analyzing Ukrainian radical nationalism in the larger context of other European ultranationalist and fascist movements of the inter-war and war periods and by reflecting on the historical memory of all Ukrainians.

There are indeed some points one should consider before equating Ukrainian radical nationalism too easily with both German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. First, the special ferocity and growing fanaticism of Ukrainian radical nationalism during the inter-war and war periods become more explicable if one considers the specific experiences of Ukrainians during the 1930s: the famine caused by Stalin’s collectivization, Polish discrimination, and the NKVD terror and deportations. It is also an established fact that the Western Ukrainian lands had been the heart of what Timothy Snyder famously called the “bloodlands”, where reciprocal ethnic cleansing and genocide led to almost entire de-humanization on all sides during the Second World War. Second, while German and Italian fascisms were revolutionary movements aiming at a total re-organization of existing states, Ukrainian radical nationalism was first of all about acquiring statehood—a claim which was moreover violently opposed by Poles, Soviets, and also Germans. Finally,

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3 Some scholars claim that the lack of a Ukrainian state distinguishes the OUN/UPA from fascism and fascist movements of the inter-war and war period and allows a classification of it as “Ustashism” instead. See Oleksandr Zaitsev,
Ukrainian radical nationalism was, as Rossoliński-Liebe repeatedly points out, a Western Ukrainian phenomenon (pp. 243–44). Ukrainians from Central and Eastern Ukraine, who shared the cruel “camp-like” reality of the “Reichskommissariat Ukraine” during the Second World War, did not sympathize with the OUN and were occasionally even targets of its terror.

Therefore, it seems hardly appropriate to simply equate the OUN, which was and is understood by many Ukrainians first of all as a national liberation movement, with the Nazis. Nor is it appropriate to expect Ukrainians today to apply the same “Tätervolk” (“Nation of Perpetrators”) attitude to themselves as for example the Germans do. However, it speaks volumes about the treatment of history in present-day Ukraine when even a “liberal group” of contemporary Ukrainian historians tends to “romanticize” OUN-UPA violence and/or sees Bandera and his movement solely in the perspective of the country’s ongoing fight for sovereignty (see the discussion from p. 519). The ideological and political similarities of the OUN/UPA to fascist movements of the time are still too obvious to warrant such an interpretation. Notwithstanding the OUN’s prior quest for national liberation, neither its most important ideologists nor Bandera himself ever left any doubt that a future Ukrainian state should be a totalitarian dictatorship based on fascist principles. For those aims, ethnic cleansing and genocide were seen as legitimate means by the “Providnyk” and the rest of the OUN/UPA leadership. Consequently, while ongoing debates about the differences and similarities between Ukrainian radical nationalism and e.g. German

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5. On this contested issue see further Yuri Radchenko’s review in this issue.

6. The OUN leadership “democratized” its official program only after it became clear that Germany would lose the war and that the fate of the movement and a future Ukrainian state would depend on the Western allies instead. However, as Rossoliński-Liebe demonstrates, these changes were mostly of a pseudo-nature, while Bandera in particular seems to have never distanced himself from his inter-war and wartime convictions; see pp. 264–65 and 346.

National Socialism or other fascist movements might be fruitful for the general conceptual delineation between nationalism, ultranationalism, and fascism, they should not lead to a relativization of the inhumane, xenophobic, and totalitarian character and policies of the OUN/UPA before and during the Second World War.

**Bandera, the OUN and Post-Maidan Ukraine**

Almost inevitably, Rossoliński-Liebe’s book is also a valuable contribution to debates among political scientists interested in post-Maidan Ukraine, in the increasingly heterogeneous development of the post-Soviet space, and in the still highly interconnected politics of memory and identity formation of the region. For example, it raises the question of the degree to which contemporary Ukrainian voters are still attracted by radical right-wing ideologies and parties such as the Svoboda Party, or how Ukrainian nationalist debates were affected by the experience of independence in 1991, by the transformation of the modern Ukrainian state ever since, and finally by the war against Russian-supported separatism since 2014. What value system lies behind the now supposedly more consolidated political nation, and how does it perceive its neighbors? Moreover, it is disturbing to see how much Rossoliński-Liebe’s reflections on the significance of propaganda and counter-propaganda in the inter-war and war periods have in common with the propaganda or “media wars” carried out by Russian or pro-Russian and to some degree pro-Ukrainian officials and media-outlets of the present. What are the

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8 Based on survey data, Lena Bustikova for example argues that the pre-2014 support for Svoboda was a result mostly of voters’ fears related to the character of the Ukrainian state under the Yanukovych regime and of economic threats, rather than of distinguished ideological positions. See Lena Bustikova, “Voting, Identity and Security Threats in Ukraine: Who supports the Ukrainian ‘Svoboda’ Party?”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (2015, in press).


10 See e.g. the related contributions in the first issue of this journal devoted to “The Russian Media and the War in Ukraine”.

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medium- and long-term political consequences of war propaganda, and how successful are current civil-society-led projects and campaigns to counter propaganda and establish a liberal and ethically committed media space? Finally, what role will the history of Ukrainian nationalism and specifically Bandera and the OUN play in the understandable endeavor of Ukraine’s post-Maidan government and society to sharpen the historical image and memory of the nation?

While studies conducted by Rossoliński-Liebe and other scholars have generally called into question the standard Ukrainian image of Bandera and the OUN as “fighters for national liberation”, there is another major reason why the “Providnyk” and his movement are not suitable reference points for any national historical narrative: there is still hardly any other topic which is so divisive between Western and Eastern Ukrainians as radical Ukrainian nationalism or Bandera and the OUN.11 While it is almost unavoidable under current Ukrainian circumstances that history should be excessively used for political purposes, acting politicians should be aware of how much damage playing with the “national card” will do to the apparently newly found national consensus. Although it is true that the Ukrainian political nation seems to extend much further geographically than many observers thought before 2014, this consensus surely does not include a shared interpretation of Ukraine’s past. Yet, with his signature under the controversial “De-Communization Laws” of 9 April this year,12 current President Poroshenko unfortunately missed an opportunity to separate historical debates from contemporary politics and risks making the country’s history a divisive issue again.

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The thought that Ukrainian society is still far from a scholarly discussion on the role of the figure of Stepan Bandera in the history of Ukraine and Eastern Europe struck me yet again during a visit to L’viv in April 2015. During my stay, I made a return visit to the “Prison on Lonts’kyi Street” Museum, with the aim of finding out whether the exposition there had changed at all since my last visit in summer 2010. A quick survey of the museum revealed that little had changed, but I did happen upon an event being held in the same building: the launching of a brochure by Mykola Posivnych devoted to the life of Stepan Bandera. The author’s talk ran for roughly an hour and was mostly hagiographical in nature. Posivnych failed even to touch upon the problem of the OUN’s participation in crimes against Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians who did not share their views. Moreover, judging by the questions from the floor following the presentation, the audience gathered there fully supported this version of Bandera’s biography. In response to my questions about the anti-Semitic component in the OUN’s ideology, Posivnych, and several individuals from the audience, cited “arguments” and “sources” that remained on the methodological level of debates from back in 1991.

* This text is an expanded and revised version of an article originally published on the *Ukraїna Moderna* site under the title “Vid staroho Uhryniva do Miunkhena: istoriia ta spadok. Persha naukova biohrafia Stepana Bandery”, 16 May 2015, http://uamoderna.com/md/radchenko-bandera-biography-review. It is based on research enabled by the support of the L. Dennis and Susan R. Shapiro Fellowship (Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure Fellowship (Zentrum für Holocaust-Studien, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Germany), the Petro Jacyk Visiting Fellowship and the Anne Tanenbaum Centre for Jewish Studies (CJS) Visiting Fellowship at University of Toronto, as well as a stipend from the German Historical Institute in Warsaw. I am grateful to Per Anders Rudling, Yaroslav Hrytsak, and John-Paul Himka, for valuable advice during the writing of this article.

Unfortunately, despite all the political, historical, and pseudo-historical discussions over the past quarter of a century following the fall of communism in Ukraine, not a single(!) scholarly biography of Stepan Bandera has ever been written in Ukraine. As the saying goes, nature abhors a vacuum, and so it is foreign scholars who have taken up the study of Bandera’s biography. This study by Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, a post-doctoral fellow at the Berlin Free University, published in 2014 in Stuttgart, is a case in point. This book comprises the author’s doctoral dissertation. While I have a complicated personal attitude towards the author as a speaker/lecturer, he is to be commended for undertaking the first ever attempt at a scholarly biography of Bandera, as well as an analysis of the historical memory of Bandera in the Ukrainian diaspora and in independent Ukraine. When I received this book by post in January this year, the first thing that struck me was its size. The book is 652 pages long, and 559 of these comprise solid text. Even by German scholarly standards, Rossoliński-Liebe has produced “a weighty tome”.

Both a quick glance and a careful reading of the book will confirm that Rossoliński-Liebe has examined a large volume of archival sources, and that he is clearly also very well-versed in the historiography, not only in English, German, and Polish, but also in Ukrainian and Russian. In the course of researching the book, the author worked in German, Polish, Ukrainian, US, Canadian, and British archives. At the same time, there are some important gaps here when it comes to archival research. For example, while Rossoliński-Liebe did conduct archival work in Kiev, he nevertheless did not utilize documents from the OUN Archive, which contains a large number of Melnykite documents, including those devoted to the 1920s-40s. Although the book does contain references to the Provincial Archives of Alberta, Rossoliński-Liebe did not (at least, according to the book’s references) work in many of the Canadian archives holding useful information for researchers on this topic. Of course, it would be impossible for one individual to cover all of Canada’s archives, especially given that documents connected to the Ukrainian

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diaspora are dispersed widely across the expanses of that huge country and the travel costs that this would entail. This being said, materials in the Peter Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, which is held in the Thomas Fisher Rare Books Library (Toronto)\(^3\) or the “Oseredok” Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Center archive (Winnipeg)\(^4\) could have shed additional light on the questions raised by Rossoliński-Liebe in this book.

While Rossoliński-Liebe’s book does contain references to “oral history” materials, he has made scant use of this type of sources here. For example, the author ignores almost entirely the Shoah Foundation database and the collection of interviews conducted by Patrick Desbois’ team at Yahad-In Unum. The Shoah Foundation database comprises a collection of interviews with Jews who lived through the Holocaust, and also with the Righteous Among the Nations. It was created in the 1990s, but in many respects it is invaluable when it comes to studying the OUN’s attitude towards Jews. The Yahad-In Unum collection is made up of interviews with non-Jewish witnesses of the Holocaust. These sources mostly comprise eyewitness accounts recorded in the late 2000s. It is a widely known fact that the majority of “Ukrainian” eyewitness accounts of the events of the summer of 1941 in Galicia and Volhynia deny the occurrence of pogroms or the participation of OUN-created structures in any such actions. Sources from this collection sometimes yield very useful data for researchers. For example, one Melnykite asserted that a pogrom did take place in L’viv in the summer of 1941, but, and this is the interesting part, he attributed its execution not to the “Ukrainian People’s Militia” created by the government of Yaroslav Stets’ko, but to the “Nachtigall” battalion which was subordinate to the Abwehr.\(^5\) Rossoliński-Liebe’s takes an uncritical approach to some “recollections” cited in the book, such as Yevgenii Nakonechnyi’s *Shoa u L’vovi.*\(^6\) The author of this book was ten years old in 1941, and it is very likely that he based these “recollections” on family narratives rather than his own experience and its interpretation.


\(^4\) [http://www.ukrainianwinnipeg.ca/oseredok/](http://www.ukrainianwinnipeg.ca/oseredok/).

\(^5\) United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), RG-50.589.0187.01.01.

Rossoliński-Liebe’s book is divided into ten chapters. The author analyzes the history of the Ukrainian radical right during the interwar period, Bandera’s political development, the “Ukrainian national revolution” of 1941, the OUN’s crimes during the war, Bandera’s post-war activities, and the Bandera cult in the Ukrainian diaspora and in independent Ukraine up until the end of President Viktor Yushchenko’s rule. Not all sections of the monograph are equally successful when it comes to originality of research and analysis. The best is the fourth chapter, devoted to the events of the summer of 1941, when the OUN made an attempt at realizing the idea of “Ukrainian national revolution” and, collaborating with the Germans and taking part in pogroms of Jews, tried to create their own state. The least successful is the fifth chapter, in which Rossoliński-Liebe attempts to analyze the events of 1941–43, when Bandera was no longer in Ukraine. Particularly unsuccessful are the parts of the monograph devoted to the crimes perpetrated by OUN military formations against Poles and Jews. In these sections the author mostly cites other scholars and offers no original analysis of the events under discussion.

Characteristic of Rossoliński-Liebe’s texts and statements is a disrespectful attitude towards studies of the history of the OUN produced in Ukraine or by Ukrainians. His monograph on Bandera displays similar tendencies. The book includes quite a long introduction setting out the methodological, conceptual, terminological and theoretical framework. On pages 26–33 Rossoliński-Liebe analyzes the highly politicized issue of the correlation between the OUN’s ideology and European fascism. It is telling that here the author cites many scholars of nationalism (including scholars from Eastern Europe), but makes no mention whatsoever, for example, of the discussion between Oleksandr Zaitsev and Taras Kurylo conducted in the liberal L’viv internet publication Zakhid.net.7 Judging by his bibliography, Rossoliński-Liebe is familiar with Zaitsev’s

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monograph on the history of the Ukrainian radical right during the interwar period. In this book, which is based on years of work in a range of archives and libraries, Zaitsev set out his theory that there exists a specific type of integral nationalism, which he calls “Ustash-ism”, and which has the capacity to be transformed into “fully-fledged” fascism upon creation of an independent state. This is an original if problematic idea, but what is indicative here is the fact that Rossoliński-Liebe does not engage with this valuable research and the debates taking place in Ukraine.

I have criticized Rossoliński-Liebe elsewhere for a failure to formulate clear definitions when employing terms such as “fascism”, “Ukrainian radical nationalism”, and “Ukrainian fascism”. Here, in writing, the author defines his terms more clearly than he has done during oral presentations of his work. But the monograph does also contain terms that remain undefined. Thus, for example, in the introduction Rossoliński-Liebe writes of the need to distinguish between “conservative or military regimes like Antonescu’s, Horthy’s or Piłsudski’s, and fascist regimes like Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, and also regimes, which at times were fascist but in the long term combined national-conservatism with fascism, like Franco’s and Salazar’s” (my emphasis—YR) (p. 33). From the text it is unclear what exactly Rossoliński-Liebe means by the term “national-conservatism” or which political parties represented and represent it, in the author’s view. What the author means by “Ukrainian genocidal nationalism” (p. 531) is likewise unclear. The author provides no explanation of what is meant by this term. Is he referring to OUN ideology from 1929? Or 1941? Does he mean OUN-B or OUN-B? A similar lack of clarity is associated with his use of the phrase “fanatical and suicidal nationalism” (p. 532).

9 Radchenko, “Pro ukrains’kyi ‘radykal’nyi natsionalizm’”.
The greater part of the book is devoted not so much to Bandera’s biography as to the history of the OUN-B, its ideology, and its political and military practices. For this reason the book’s title is not always a good fit for its content. For example, a large number of pages are devoted to the OUN’s ideology and to events in Ukraine in 1941–44, a period when Bandera was imprisoned by the Germans and hence unable to exert any influence on events in Ukraine.

Paradoxically enough, at times Rossoliński-Liebe himself (evidently inadvertently) repeats the postulates and theses of OUN propaganda. It is a well known fact that one of the political and commemorative rituals carried out by Ukrainians in interwar Poland was the digging up of graves or burial mounds of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. A wide range of political groups participated in such actions, from the OUN to the Communist Party of West Ukraine (the KPZU). Rossoliński-Liebe repeats the postwar version of these events set out by the Banderite “party historian” Petro Mirchuk and writes that it was precisely the OUN leaders who instructed their subordinates to create symbolic burial mounds even at sites where no Ukrainian soldiers were buried (p. 101), not mentioning the participation in such actions of other groups.

It remains an open question how strong the influence of biological racism was on the pre-war OUN ideology. Rossoliński-Liebe asserts that “[i]n Ukrainian nationalism, racism and eugenics appeared in the context of purifying the Ukrainian nation, culture, and language of foreign—in particular, Polish, Russian and Jewish—influences, in order to obtain a pure Ukrainian ‘race’” (p. 111). It is not entirely clear whether Rossoliński-Liebe is referring here to the OUN or to a broader context. As I see it, racism penetrated more deeply not the OUN ideology but the world-view ideals of the National Unity Front (FNYe) headed by Dmytro Paliiv. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler in his speech to German officers of the SS “Galician” division on 1 February 1944 asserted that the FNYe “was very close to national-socialism in its worldview”.11 One of the famous propagandists of racial anti-Semitism on the pages of the FNYe

newspaper *Peremoha* was Rostyslav Yendyk, whose works were even translated into German in the Third Reich.\(^{12}\) It is interesting to note that after the war Yendyk attempted to defend a post-doctoral work on “The Anthropological Structure of Ukraine with Comments on the Paleo-Anthropology of Eastern Europe” at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, where representatives of the Melnykite and Banderite OUN were influential. Among the authors of positive appraisals of Yendyk’s work was the “leading race researcher” of the now defunct Third Reich, Hans Günther. Some of the reviewers criticized Yendyk’s “study” for “the presence of a large number of factual errors”, while one reviewer wrote that “the author is a fanatical racist”.\(^{13}\) As a result the work was not successfully defended. What is noteworthy, however, is the fact that it was considered and that one of the Third Reich’s chief “race researchers” was brought in as an expert consultant.

Rossoliński-Liebe pays a good deal of attention in the book to the Second Great Congress held in Kraków on 31 March–1 April 1941 (pp. 176–81). This Congress formalized the differentiation of OUN-B as a separate organization and passed a series of resolutions which, in the author’s opinion, comprised a decisive step towards fascism on the part of the political group of Stepan Bandera’s supporters. The political course adopted by OUN-B in April 1941 was totalitarian, xenophobic (and anti-Semitic) and differed little from fascist programs adopted elsewhere in Eastern Europe at the time. What is interesting is the fact that the Resolution passed by the Great Congress did not include any pro-Hitler slogans. But the situation here is not a straightforward one. In the lead-up to the Great Congress OUN-B created a Political Commission, comprising Stepan Len’kavs’kyi as head, together with members Ivan Mitrynha, Borys Levyts’kyi, Lev Rebet and Vasyl’ Ryvak. The Commission, like the OUN-B leadership, included those who were in favor of including in the program a point “on full solidarity with national-socialist Germany” and who tried to make it “identical” with the ideology of the NSDAP. We do not know with certainty who the supporters of this

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\(^{12}\) *Arkiv Ukrains’koho Vil’noho Universitetu*, Fond Rostyslava Yendyka.

\(^{13}\) Ibid.
program were or what Bandera’s position was at the time, but according to Levyts’kyi’s testimony, Mitrynha and Len’kavs’kyi, known for their anti-Semitic statements,\textsuperscript{14} spoke out against including pro-Hitler points in the OUN-B program.\textsuperscript{15}

Rossoliński-Liebe also analyzes a document entitled “The Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime”, which essentially became the program of what the organization’s leadership called the “Ukrainian National Revolution”. The program was actively put into practice in the summer of 1941 on the territory of Galicia and Volhynia and (in part) later also on the territory of Transdniepro Ukraine. Rossoliński-Liebe, like the majority of historians taking a critical approach to the OUN’s heritage, cites large extracts from this text, in which Jews are depicted as an “enemy” ethno-religious group from the point of view of Ukrainians. In addition, the document states that “ethnic minorities” are divided into “friendly” (representatives of “enslaved peoples”) and “hostile” (“Russians, Poles, Jews”) (p. 181). It is telling that OUN-M also produced similar instructions on creating organs of self-government, police, propaganda, and collaboration with the German army. Although anti-Semitic elements were characteristic of Melnykite propaganda throughout the entire war, it is telling that the hierarchy of “hostile” and “friendly” peoples and the attitude to be held towards them was spelt out more clearly by the Banderites.\textsuperscript{16}

Upon creating the Banderite Ukrainian National Government (UDP) Yaroslav Stets’ko brought several former members of Ukrainian parties into this government. Thus, former activists of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) Yulian Pavlykovs’kyi and Oleksandr Maritchak were formally members of the UDP.\textsuperscript{17} Rossoliński-Liebe comments on the inclusion of non-Banderites into the government as follows: “Such cooperation with

\textsuperscript{14} Radchenko, “Pro ukrains’kyi ‘ardykal’nyi natsionalizm’”.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Arkhiv OUN} (Kyiv), F.1, op.1, spr. 266, ark. 1-4.
other parties or political camps was quite typical of some of the fascist movements, which needed to consolidate their power. The National Socialists, for example, cooperated with other political blocs, mainly with conservatives and national conservatives before they established their regime and eliminated other political parties” (p. 217). This passage shows that Rossoliński-Liebe does not fully understand the situation that had taken shape in Western Ukraine from 1939 to 1941. During the “accelerated” Sovietization underway in Galicia and Volhynia, as elsewhere throughout the territories “newly incorporated” by the USSR in 1939-40, all local political institutions and parties that had been functioning prior to the Bolsheviks’ arrivals were now destroyed. Therefore it is incorrect to compare the OUN’s actions after 1939 to Hitler and Mussolini’s cooperation with conservatives and other radical right-wing groups on the path to establishing dictatorship, because in 1941 the UNDO, for example, no longer existed as a structure. In precisely the same way in 1944 the Banderites included into the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrains’ka Holovna Vyzvol‘na Rada, UHVR) on a purely formal basis several politicians who were non-members of the OUN-B.

In his discussion on the “Ukrainian National Revolution” period, Rossoliński-Liebe describes the celebrations held in Stanisławów (now Ivano-Frankivsk) to mark “liberation from the Bolsheviks”. Here, Hungarian military servicemen took part in these events together with members of the OUN-B and the local population. The celebrations were accompanied not only by the slogans “Glory to Ukraine!”, “Glory to Stepan Bandera!”, and “Glory to Adolf Hitler!”, but also by slogans such as “Glory to the allied Hungarian army!”. Rossoliński-Liebe does not comment at all on the OUN’s cooperation with the Hungarian army in the context of the fact that among the slogans put forward by OUN-B in 1941 there were, in addition to anti-Soviet, anti-Semitic, anti-Russian, and anti-Polish slogans, also anti-Hungarian ones. Thus, amongst the proclamations issued by the OUN-B’s Homeland Executive [Kraievyi provid] on 1 July 1941 was the following exhortation: “People! Know! Your enemies are Moscow, Poland, Magyars, Jews—these are your enemies!
Destroy them!”18 This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Hungarian army had intervened and stopped several pogroms in Western Ukraine (p. 236).

Rossoliński-Liebe locates the “Ukrainian National Revolution” geographically in Galicia and Volhynia, and chronologically in the summer of 1941. Consequently, the OUN’s activities in central, eastern and southern Ukraine are left outside the field of his study. Rossoliński-Liebe writes little about the OUN-M’s actions in central Ukraine (pp. 242–45) or about the Banderites’ service in the ranks of the Ukrainian auxiliary policy (pp. 256–60), and he does not touch at all on the topic of the participation of members of “expedition groups” in the creation of police and self-government organs in east and south Ukraine. In some cities of east Ukraine Banderites were so well entrenched in police and self-government organs that they remained in place there until the end of the German occupation. True, it was necessary for them to conceal their party affiliation (this applies to the Banderites from autumn 1941, and the Melnykites from winter 1941–42).

The UPA’s participation in the extermination of the Jews remains one of the most problematic and politicized issues in this history. In his study Rossoliński-Liebe cites a large number of testimonies of Jewish Holocaust survivors, materials from postwar trials, and German documents indicating the participation of armed formations of Banderites in the persecution and murder of Jews in the 1943–44 period (pp. 275–76). There is no doubt that the Banderite UPA took part in such actions, and that in 1944 it killed “its own” Jewish doctors because the Security Service (SB) suspected them of sympathizing with the Soviet regime. It is significant that for the Ukrainian rebels who initiated the struggle against the Germans, Jews remained ideological enemies. In 1943 one cadet from the UPA officers’ school noted that Jews should be considered “agents of Moscow imperialism, once tsarist, and now proletarian, but all the same first we must beat the moskali, and then any remaining Jews

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18 OUN u 1941 rotsi (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 2006), 261.
Jews were exterminated in the same way by Polish and sometimes also by Soviet partisans. The problem is that in their testimony, the Jews who survived attacks by Ukrainian partisans differ in how they identify the attackers. Holocaust survivors called the armed attackers “banderivtsy”, “bul’bivtsy”, or simply “Ukrainians”. This is very similar to the way in which, when describing the events of 1941, Jews call the pogromists (including “Ukrainian national militia” personnel) not “ounivtsy” or “banderivtsy”, but simply “Ukrainian nationalists”, or more often, “Ukrainians”. Consequently, for scholars using Jewish recollections, it is difficult to identify any group of perpetrators precisely as Banderites, Melnykites, bul’bivtsy, or simply criminal elements.

In his analysis of the mass killings by the UPA of the Poles and Jews who had survived persecution by the Germans and collaborationists in Volhynia in 1943-44, Rossoliński-Liebe offers four factors facilitating this: “first, to the social and political situation of Ukrainians in the interwar period or even before; second, to the military aims and strategies of the UPA; third, the tone that the Nazi occupation and Nazi ideology had set; and fourth, the fact that there was no strong administration in these territories at a time when the front was changing” (pp. 279–80). Of course, all these factors played a role in influencing events. At the same time, however, Rossoliński-Liebe ignores the factor of the accelerated “Sovietization” of Volhynia in the 1939–41 period, when the Bolsheviks brought to the region their methods of rule and of struggle against real and imagined enemies of their regime, important elements of which were repressions, deportations, forced nationalization of property, and the killing of prison inmates during the retreat of the summer of 1941.

Rossoliński-Liebe does mention the Ukrainians who helped Jews and Poles during the period of German occupation. Thus, he writes of the 2,472 Ukrainians awarded the status of Righteous among the Nations by Yad Vashem (p. 280). It is significant that among them was OUN-B activist Fedir Vovk. During the German occupation Vovk saved a Jewish family. We know that several UPA

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19 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Archiwum Wiktora Poliszczuka, Sign.153 (Dokumenty dotyczące OUN-UPA z zawodu Centralnego Państwowego Archiwum Wyzszych Organow Wladzy w Kijowe, Kserokopie), 186–87.
detachments hid Jews, who went on to survive the war. The author provides no commentary on this “other” side of events. This issue presents historians with a great many questions. How many members of the OUN and UPA took part not only in exterminating, but also in saving Jews? If there were such cases, then whose initiative was this: that of the individual, or the local leadership? What were the motivations? We know that Wehrmacht soldiers and NSDAP members also saved Jews during the war; Oskar Schindler is the classic example. The lack of research on this topic encourages speculations “from the other side”, when OUN supporters use what were essentially isolated and exceptional cases of OUN rescues of Jews in an attempt to deny the anti-Semitic nature of the OUN during the war. This tendency is exemplified by the position of Volodymyr Viatrovych, who takes the case of Fedir Vovk and uses it to try to prove that the views of this one member of the OUN were shared by practically all members of the party.

Often even moderate organizations in Ukraine adhere to a similar position on this issue. On one occasion, during my visit to Ukraine in winter 2015, a Ukrainian liberal nationalist organization in Kharkiv invited me to give a lecture on my research. At the time I was writing an article on the biography of a Melnykite who had joined Einsatzgruppe D during the war and took part in the murder of Jews in Ukraine and Russia, as well as in “anti-partisan actions” in Belarus. I drafted an abstract and sent it to the organizers. They in turn informed me that “one must bear in mind” that “this kind of presentation” could be used by pro-Russian activists in Kharkiv, and that one needed to “balance” the theme by including discussion of how OUN members saved Jews. I replied that I had not encountered any such cases in the course of my professional study of the primary sources, and cancelled my lecture.


Rossoliński-Liebe also discusses the OUN-B program adopted at the Great Congress in August 1943 (pp. 262–65). This program, as is well known, was an attempt for propaganda purposes to depart from fascist ideology and to break free of the ideological quagmire and trap which was dragging all the European radical right down to the bottom of a fraternal grave in the deep swamp together with Hitler and the Third Reich. Rossoliński-Liebe asserts that this renunciation of the “Führerprinzip”, national discrimination, anti-Semitism, and left-wing rhetoric in the economic sphere, was an attempt to smooth over relations with Great Britain and the United States (p. 265). It is well known, at the same time, that this “democratization” was merely a propaganda move undertaken against the backdrop of the extermination of the Polish population of Volhynia and of the Jews who had survived the attacks carried out by Nazis and their collaborators. But the difficulties that the OUN members themselves had with this program, especially when it comes to “solving the Jewish question”, is shown very well by a secret discussion between Dmytro Dontsov and Iosyp Pozychaniuk that took place in 1944. Dontsov, while he was never an OUN member, had always been an authority for Banderites. This is how Dontsov was described in a 1973 obituary by Volodymyr Makar, a member of the OUN-B and of the UHVR General Secretariat of Foreign Affairs:

[A] great Human Being, who already in his lifetime earned the honorable rank of creator of Ukrainian spirituality, of a new worldview... the creator of revolutionary Ukrainian nationalism.

...[T]his was one of the greatest, epochal figures of the Ukrainian nation, on a par with Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, who—like the ancient prophets of old—were seized by a great fanatical faith in the Truth of Ukraine and her inevitable victory.

For sixty years—two complete generations—Dmytro Dontsov formed the spirituality of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian nation.22

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22 Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, Box 66, Folder “Dmytro Dontsov”.

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Until the end of his life Bandera conducted a correspondence with the author of *Natsionalizm*. Three years before his death he wrote to Dontsov at Easter: “Permit me to send you warm wishes on the holiday of Christ’s Resurrection—[to wish you] joyful celebrations and a regathering of strength for continued irreplaceable work in preparing our people for the national Resurrection.”

Before the war, Dontsov’s works, which praised Hitler, Mussolini, Degrelle and Franco, were read enthusiastically by members of the radical right in Western Ukraine. Dontsov adhered to a radical anti-Semitic position. He called the left-wing liberals, his political opponents, “defenders of yid democracy” and “shabesgoi”. It is significant that Dontsov remained a person who hated Jews and equated them with Bolshevism even after the war. In a letter to a banderite on 22 June 1950 he commented on how in Montreal a Ukrainian football team had played a match against a Jewish team, and criticized OUN-B member Serbin for “calling on young people to play with the Bolshevik-yids”. According to Dontsov, “the Ukrainians beat the yids up in that match, but then the yids beat up two Ukrainians, alleged ‘Hitlerites’... yid and communist pamphlets were distributed at that match.”

Pozychaniuk represented the moderate left wing of the OUN, but his attitude to Jews was also highly problematic. He was thirty years younger than Dontsov and had a completely different life experience. After graduating from Nizhyn Pedagogical Institute Pozychaniuk joined the Komsomol. He lived for a long period in Moscow and Leningrad. In 1940 he was sent to L’viv University, which had already been Ukrainianized by this point. It was at this time that Pozychaniuk underwent some kind of ideological break. He made contact with the OUN underground, and was personally acquainted with Bandera. When the German troops entered L’viv he joined the OUN expedition groups and headed for the East, where he was arrested and sent first to Kraków, and then to Auschwitz together with a group of 140 OUN members. The circumstances of his liberation from Auschwitz are not quite clear. According to one version, “the

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Volhyniaks and Pozychaniuks managed to lie their way out of it in the interrogations and they were released”.26 It is unknown whether Pozychaniuk took part in the pogrom in L’viv in the summer of 1941, but there are testimonies indicating that even during the period when he cooperated with the Bolsheviks he still adhered to anti-Semitic views. As one of his friends put it, “Pozychaniuk, like all members of the Komsomol, had a negative attitude towards the ‘older brothers’—the Russians and the Jewish communists. Complaints were made against the Russian and Jewish instructors who were sent from other regions to work with the Ukrainians.”27

During a discussion in 1944 Dontsov accused the OUN of having passed a new program that resembled the Central Rada’s declaration during the 1917 Revolution. As an example, Dontsov read out that the OUN was “in favor of equal rights for yids”. He stated: “The program contains not a hint of Ukr[ainian] historical traditions, either social, national, or political, and this is not only the traditions of the Cossacks but also the recent traditions of the rebel movement of 1917–21 with their xenophobia against the interlopers from the north, anti-Semitism, religiosity, and private-property tendencies”.28 Even against the backdrop of the genocide unleashed against the Jews by the Nazis with their allies and collaborators, Dontsov wrote: “The mentality and politics of world Jewry is harmful for the Ukrainian nation and statehood. The struggle against Jewry is in the interests and the tradition of the Ukr[ainian] nation”.29 Pozychaniuks response to this recognized that “[t]hese ‘Comments’ were written ... by a person holding authority (indeed, to this day) in Ukrainian circles”,30 and that it was only for this reason that he was

27 Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, Box 96, Folder “Josyp Posichniuk”.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
responding. In the response, Pozychaniuk at times completely rejects the notion that there was a place for any discrimination on ethnic or racial grounds in the new OUN program: “For us the enemy must be defined not by race, but by the degree of hostility to our ideas and by activeness of his activities against us”. But when it came to the “Jewish question” he had very specific views. He acknowledged that anti-Semitism was a constituent element of the OUN’s ideology, but argued that at this stage the anti-Jewish propaganda should be ceased: “despite all our traditions on the Jewish question, we should now depart from anti-Semitism to the maximum possible degree”.

It is interesting to note that the Banderites succeeded in definitively “departing” from anti-Semitism in their propaganda only in 1944—at the time when this discussion was being carried out. For example, in 1944 a pamphlet entitled “Who are you dying for, brothers” and signed “Ukrainian rebels” was produced for Ukrainian Red Army soldiers. The pamphlet said, among other things, that Red Army soldiers were dying for “the new big world empire of blood-sucker-tsars, for the new tsardom of cannibal Stalin, for a clique, for the party, for fat-bellied, well-fed yid commissars, for the beloved NKVD, for the Kaganoviches, Molотовs, Litvinovs, Vyshinskys, and thousands of others, who, the expense of the people’s blood, of plundered property, cavort at banquets and make plans for building the new world empire”. In their personal correspondence the members of OUN-B, even while using leftist rhetoric, continued to exploit the old anti-Semitic stereotypes. Thus, on 6 December 1944, one OUN activist wrote to a friend that the “progressive call of the new human being” came “from the healthy soul of the Ukrainian worker and peasant. And not from the heads of yids [my emphasis—YR]”. Even though Pozychaniuk did condemn the extermination of the Jews, he felt no sympathy for them whatsoever. For him, the ban on anti-Semitism was a kind of tactical move: “This doesn’t mean that we’re

31 Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine. Box 76. Folder “Underground Publications OUN (b)”.

32 Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, Box 81.
in favor of Jewry... No. We are simply discarding that which cannot be used”. He went on to add the cynical phrase: “All the more so since today the Jewish problem no longer exists in Ukraine... After the German practice it’s hard (if not stupid) to play that card today”.33

In his analysis of the image of Bandera and Banderites in Soviet propaganda Rossoliński-Liebe notes that it was precisely in 1947 that a change took place in the terms used by Soviet propagandists to designate members of the OUN-B and Ukrainian rebels. If from 1944 they had been called “Ukrainian-German nationalists”, from 1947 they were referred to as “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists”. Precisely at a time when the “Cold War” was gathering pace the Soviets were trying to identify the Ukrainian resistance with the defense of capitalism in the mass imagination. The author notes correctly that it was precisely after this that the Ukrainian underground began to print on a mass scale literature in which the OUN and UPA were shown as democratic (almost left-wing) structures which had nothing in common with collaboration with Nazism or the extermination of different ethnic groups; instead, they were knights who had fought all Ukraine’s enemies for her independence. The chief rebel author of such texts was Petro Fedun (Poltava). For Rossoliński-Liebe all these declarations from the Ukrainian underground were mere propaganda with the aim of improving the UPA’s image at home and abroad. He does not analyze the contacts between left-wing representatives of the Ukrainian emigration and the left wing of the Ukrainian underground after the Second World War or, for that matter, the left “deviations” in the OUN milieu.34 These topics have in general received little scholarly attention. The newspaper *Vpered*, the organ of the left wing of the Ukrainian Revolutionary-Democratic Party (URDP) was published in Munich from 1949 through 1959. The newspaper’s editors were very negatively disposed towards Bandera; they condemned the terror exercised by his supporters, called for the building of “democratic socialism”, and took a negative line on the Soviet socio-economic model. Articles

33 “Materialy do dyskusii”.
34 On Ivan Mitrynha’s left-wing group see: Radchenko, “Pro ukraїns’kyi ‘radykal’nyi natsionalizm’”.

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appeared in *Vpered* in which authors supported the UPA’s struggle against the Bolsheviks, but at the same time, criticized Bandera as a totalitarian leader and a “reactionary”. One such publication asserted that:

Mr Bandera does not see the new truths. At a time when THERE [in Ukraine—YR] UHVR, UPA and SB are becoming independent of any political party, when even the OUN has a different ideological face and the brand “banderivtsy” looks like a historical misunderstanding—at the same time HERE [in West Germany—YR] Mr Bandera dictates from the tribune of the “vozh’d” ideological formulas “obligatory for all”, gives orders to commanders of military units, makes decisions on mandates which he has not issued and in the foreign press lowers the UPA to the role of his own personal army.35

Publications of UPA leftist propagandists such as Osyp Diakiv-Hornovyi appeared on the pages of *Vpered*.36 The fourth issue for 1950 is of great interest. The front page carried a message of sympathy from the URDP’s Central Committee and the *Vpered* editors in connection on the occasion of the death of UPA commander-in-chief Roman Shukhevych. It is difficult to say whether the left-wing publicists producing such texts had a clear understanding of who Shukhevych was, and whether they would have known for example about his participation in the “anti-partisan” actions in Belarus in 1942. Two long letters were also published in this issue. The first was penned by one of the URDP’s founders, who was also leader of its left wing, Ivan Maistrenko, who wrote under the pseudonym “A. Babenko”. The author of the second letter was Petro Fedun (Poltava). On behalf of the URDP Central Committee it was reported that “correspondence with the Homeland [z Kraiem] is beginning a theoretical discussion, which will have large significance, both for the Homeland and for the emigration”.37 In his letter, Maistrenko praises Poltava and Hornovyi: “The existence of the Ukrainian underground with views outlined in the books by O. Hornovyi and P. Poltava, is of exceptional significance not only from the perspective

36 O. Hornovyi, “Nashe stanovishche do rosiis’koho narodu”, ibid.
of the Ukrainian cause, but also on the universal-historical scale”.38 He evaluated very highly the activities being carried out by the nationalists in Ukraine. At the same time, Maistrenko wished to clarify several points. The majority of Ukrainian right-wing radicals who had been oriented towards the fascist regimes of Europe up until the mid-1950s, had now begun to praise the Francoist system of rule in Spain. Therefore Maistrenko was interested in Poltava’s attitude towards “reactionary movements and tendencies (Franco, De Gaulle, Dewey, Churchill, etc.)”.39 He was also interested in Fedun’s attitude towards private property and the class struggle. But the main issue was what people like Hornovyi and Poltava thought about Bandera and Dontsov’s actions in the West. As we know, Bandera and Dontsov had actively criticized the OUN’s 1943 program and the publications being produced by Hornovyi and Poltava. According to Maistrenko, Dontsov was continuing “to orient the emigration towards fascist ideas”.40

Fedun’s response was very restrained and diplomatic, and avoided “unpleasant” issues. He did not raise the issue of attitudes towards right-wing postwar dictatorships, and he denied the fact that the OUN in Ukraine was moving across to Marxist positions and supporting class struggle. He said nothing about Dontsov, but did add a restrained aside on the conflict between Bandera and the leading rebels in the Homeland:

We also believe that certain disagreements which have emerged between the OUN in Ukraine and ZCh OUN [Zakordonna chastyna or Foreign Branch of the OUN] are only a temporary phenomenon, caused for the most part by the isolation of both parts of the organization. All these disagreements—all of us in the Lands [na Zemliakh, i.e. lands populated by ethnic Ukrainians] believe and are striving towards this, on the foundation of the experience in The Lands, on the foundation of the OUN’s success in Ukraine, in the name of creating a Ukrainian nationalist movement as the most progressive and the most healthy, both on Ukrainian soil and on a broader scale.41

38 Lyst Babenka, ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Lyst P.M. Poltavy, ibid.
The letter closed with very warm words addressed at the leftist emigration:

From the field of the liberation battle in Ukraine I send a revolutionary greeting to you and your party! I wish you and all your friends great success in the name of the cause shared by all patriots—liberation of our Ukrainian people... oppressed for centuries. We would be glad to see members of your party alongside us in the struggle against the Muscovite-Bolshevik occupiers in the Ukrainian Lands.42

Maistrenko wrote a commentary on this letter by Fedun. Maistrenko viewed Fedun’s similar position with regard to the conflict between ZCh OUN and the nationalists in Ukraine as a positive tendency. In this publication he compared Bandera to Stalin: “Bandera’s misfortune lies in the fact that he, like his teacher Stalin, believes more not in an idea, and not in an apparatus, not in ethics, but in tactics and cunning. One can be certain that this will lead Bandera where it led Stalin”.43 Describing Fedun’s position, Maistrenko admitted indirectly that the Banderite OUN was a fascist organization:

The new generation of nationalists in Ukraine, raised on the ideas of the Homeland OUN, is moving further and further away from ZCh OUN. The liberation movement will have ever greater chances of success on all the Ukrainian lands together when it distances itself from everything on which the stamp of fascism still remains.44

It is difficult to say now exactly how many people among the Ukrainian diaspora shared the views of the Vpered editors. Most likely this was a very small group. As we know, the Banderites dominated the political field of the postwar Ukrainian camps for displaced persons. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that this position did exist.

Rossoliński-Liebe devotes several pages of his monograph to the biography of the writer and pro-Soviet propagandist Yaroslav

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
Halan (pp. 392–94). For the most part he has not used here new documents which have the capacity to shed new light on the activities of this individual. It is significant that in the course of over twenty years of Ukrainian independence, not a single scholarly biography of this complex figure has been published. While Halan was glorified during the Soviet period, the situation looks highly ambiguous from the perspective of independence. Thus, in Galicia, for example, all plaques and street names bearing his name have been removed, while on the territory of central and eastern Ukraine they remain in place. It will be interesting to observe what happens to them in the context of the current government’s “decommunization”. Was Halan always a Stalinist? Or was he broken by circumstances? It is especially interesting in this context to note that Halan repeated the Banderite version of the beginning of the conflict between Ukrainians and Poles in Volhynia in 1943. He asserted that the extermination of the Poles in Volhynia was a response to the persecution of Ukrainians in Pidlashshia.

Rossoliński-Liebe also writes about the politicization and popularization of the term “banderivtsy” by Soviet propaganda organs:

The word “Banderites” was an important component of the Soviet propaganda discourse, at least since 1944. All kinds of people who opposed Soviet policies in some way, or were accused of opposing them, could be classified as Banderites, especially if they had some sympathy for nationalism, or if they or their relatives were in the OUN or the UPA. The word “Banderites” had a very derogatory meaning and basically meant a traitor of the Ukrainian nation, a Nazi collaborator, a fascist, an enemy of the Soviet Union, a murderer with blood on his hands, or a spy for Western intelligence services. The word was frequently used to discredit anti-Soviet dissidents and other political opponents (pp. 402–3).

It is interesting to note that in a different section of the text the author effectively uses the term “banderivtsy” as a synonym for “UPA soldiers”, although we know that, for example, the last UPA commander Vasyl’ Kuk placed a ban on using the term for soldiers.45

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It is also significant that in the mass understanding, on the part of both Red Army soldiers and the local population, the Ukrainian nationalist resistance movement was not viewed as synonymous with “banderites” or linked to Bandera in 1944. The discourse did sometimes feature the figure of Taras Borovets’ (Bul’ba), who was arrested by the Nazis in autumn 1943 and who had been an inmate of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp together with Bandera. In one UPA report from 1944, a meeting between a Red Army soldier and local peasants is described: “A Red Army soldier comes in and asks a woman: ‘Is Bul’ba here?’ The woman answers in the affirmative. There, under the bench. The startled Red Army soldier jumped up and a minute later calmed down after he found under the bench not the rebel Bul’ba, but potatoes” (in Ukrainian and Belarusian “bul’ba” means “potato”).

Rossoliński-Liebe writes about the Spanish dictator Franco’s positive attitude towards Bandera after the war. The Caudillo even invited the Providnyk to visit him in Spain, but Bandera turned down the invitation after deciding to stay in Munich (p. 362). After the war Banderites often enjoyed friendly relations of this kind with radical right-wing and (post)fascist movements. For example, Yaroslav Stets’ko was an acquaintance of the leader of the Romanian fascist and anti-Semitic “Iron Guard” Horia Sima, who lived in Spain after the war, while his wife Slava Stets’ko maintained good relations with the editor-in-chief of the neo-fascist journal Nation Europa, former SS-Sturmbannführer Arthur Ehrhardt. Rossoliński-Liebe writes that in December 1959 the pro-Banderite journal Homin Ukrainy printed a sorrowful text on the occasion of the death of the Ustaša leader Ante Pavelić, referring to him as a “great patriot” and “fighter for independence” (p. 415). But in parallel to this, when they needed to show the victimized history of the Ukrainian radical right and of Ukrainians in general during World War II, circles close to the OUN-B published materials devoted to the crimes of the Ustaše

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46 Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library (Toronto, Canada), The Peter J. Potichnyj Collection on Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Ukraine, Box 75, Folder “Ukrainian Insurgency”.

47 Libraries and Archives Canada, MG 31, D 130, Vol. 5, Yaroslav Stetsko.

(including crimes against Ukrainians). Thus for example a collection of reminiscences and articles entitled *In the Struggle for a Ukrainian State*, which recounted the martyrology of OUN-B and OUN-M members during the war, also included a text by a Ukrainian priest from Yugoslavia, Yurii Myz’, who wrote of the death of several dozen Ukrainians in the Jasenovac concentration camp in 1944. Myz’ asserted that:

> [t]he ideology taken on by the Ustaše was essentially identical to the Hitlerite [ideology]. Once holding power in their hands, the Ustaše began to exterminate Jews, gypsies, and ... Serbs, of whom there was no small number on the territory of the NDH [the Independent State of Croatia established by the Ustaše —YR].

One of the methodological problems associated with Rosolski-Liebe’s work is the fact that he tends to see everything in “black-and-white” terms. For example, he calls the current director of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Volodymyr Viatrovych a “radical right historian” (p. 451), effectively placing him in the same category as another Ukrainian public-political figure, the former chief ideologue of the Svoboda Party, now an advisor to the head of the Ukrainian Security Service Yurii Mykhal’chyshyn, to whom part of the book is also devoted. Viatrovych and Mykhal’chyshyn both hold Ukrainian doctoral degrees, in history and political science respectively. On several occasions I have criticized Viatrovych as a propagandist and apologist for the OUN-B, who tries to pass himself off as an academic historian. At one point he even succeeded in receiving a stipend from the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, and he later he wrote a book about the 1943 events in Volhynia which has been sharply criticized by various historians. Viatrovych is not considered a serious historian in the

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West, nor has he published his work in peer-reviewed journals. Nevertheless, to label him as “radical right” would be an exaggeration. The same cannot be said of Mykhail’chyshyn, known as an apologist for Joseph Goebbels, Horst Wessel, Léon Degrelle, Primo de Rivera, and other “social-revolutionaries” or “conservative revolutionaries”, as he calls them. The speed with which Mykhail’chyshyn, who was the Svoboda Party’s chief ideologue, disappeared from the country’s public life against the backdrop of the unfolding of the clashes on the Maidan in the winter of 2013–14 and the intensification of the war in the Donbas in 2014 leads one to wonder whether Mykhail’chyshyn may have been nothing more than a provocateur. It is interesting to note in this connection that some of the theses put forward by Viatrovych and Mykhail’chyshyn coincide. For example, like Viatrovych, Mykhail’chyshyn uses the term “Ukrainian-Polish war” as a label for the killings of the Polish population in Volhynia in 1943.\(^{51}\) He takes pride in these events, calling them a “merciless Ukrainian Reconquista”, whose result was “revenge for the defeat of the ZUNR … an ethnically pure Ukrainian Volhynia”.\(^{52}\)

It is no secret that Holocaust studies are often used by Russian and Polish (mostly from kresowiacy circles) nationalists with the aim of attacking Ukrainian statehood.\(^{53}\) For example, the Party of Regions parliamentary deputy Vadim Kolesnichenko has long been engaged in such activities. His “International Anti-Fascist Front” on at least two occasions illegally published (in awful Russian translation and with highly tendentious introductions) studies by Western scholars on the history of the OUN and UPA, including texts by Rossoliński-Liebe.\(^{54}\) Rossoliński-Liebe has actively condemned both

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\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Kresowiacy—the ethnic Polish population and their descendants from the so-called “Eastern Borderlands”, formerly part of Poland, and present-day Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and Lithuania.

Kolesnichenko’s piracy and his instrumentalization of these works, but he makes no mention of this in his monograph. It is also odd that Rossoliński-Liebe fails to make any comment here on the books about the OUN and UPA written by Aleksandr Diukov, director of the Moscow-based “Historical Memory” Foundation. The latter is known for its instrumentalization of the Holocaust and other mass killings from the World War II period with the aim of helping the Kremlin to attack Ukraine and the Baltic states. Of course, one needs to approach Diukov’s works with great caution, but at the same time, one also needs to remember that he has been provided with privileged access to documents from the FSB Archive which is currently effectively closed to scholars.

Stylistically, the book leaves something to be desired. Rosso- linski-Liebe takes a paragraph to say what could be said in a sentence, and a page to say what could be said in a paragraph, a problem that apparently arises out of an inability to analyze and a tendency to replace analysis with description. Thus, for example, pages 396–98 are devoted to the topic of monuments on the territory of Western Europe that were erected with the aim of commemorating local civilians and chekist victims of Ukrainian nationalists. This material is potentially fascinating, but the author merely lists the dates on which the monuments were unveiled and describes their inscriptions. He provides no analysis, and does not investigate, for example, whether the given commemorative form differed from that used in other regions, what role the local party organs played in the erection of these monuments, or what the post-1991 fate of these monuments has been.

Before leaving office in early 2010 the Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko awarded Stepan Bandera the rank of Hero of Ukraine. On the one hand, this prompted a host of political speculations; on the other, it provoked an academic debate, in which apologists for Bandera and the OUN also took part. One result of this was the publication of the book Strasti za Banderoiu.55 Rossoliński-Liebe divides the participants of that debate into three groups: 1)
historians with a critical approach to Bandera’s legacy (John-Paul Himka, Franziska Bruder, David Marples, Per Anders Rudling, the author himself); 2) “liberal” and ‘progressive’ Ukrainian scholars such as Yaroslav Hrytsak, Andrii Portnov, Vasył’ Rasevych, and Mykola Riabchuk”; and 3) defenders of Bandera (Volodymyr Viatrovych, Marco Levytsky, Askold Lozynskyj) (p. 520). In my view the criteria used with regard to the second group identified here are excessively vague and the criticisms made of their work not always valid. Thus Rossoliński-Liebe cites an article by Hrytsak that was published in 1996,\(^{56}\) without noting that the author, who, incidentally, acknowledges that he is not a specialist on the history of the Holocaust,\(^{57}\) had changed his position on certain issues in the intervening period.\(^{58}\) In various articles published over the course of the past decade Hrytsak has recognized that members of the OUN and the UPA took part in the persecution and extermination of the Jewish population.\(^{59}\) Furthermore, in his role as editor of *Ukraїna Moderna* Hrytsak has often offered Ukrainian and foreign historians the opportunity to publish texts critical of the OUN, UPA and their heritage in the journal and on its website.

Rossoliński-Liebe reproaches Andrii Portnov for using the term “integral nationalism” to describe the OUN’s ideology. Rossoliński-Liebe writes that “[f]ollowing [John A.] Armstrong, [Portnov] called the OUN-UPA ‘integral nationalists’ and suggested that their cult would be a legitimate pursuit” (p. 523). In fact, Armstrong himself used the term in the 1950s so as to avoid creating trouble over the issue of the OUN’s legacy at a time when the Cold War was gathering pace and many Ukrainian radical right-wing activists were actively collaborating with Western intelligence services, such that labeling CIA personnel “fascists” at that time could

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well have cost a scholar his career. Furthermore, the term “integral nationalism” was conceived not by Armstrong but by Carlton Hayes, and was also actively used by, for example, Peter Alter.

It is clear that Rossoliński-Liebe finds all forms of extremism abhorrent. He condemns the attempts at rehabilitating Stalin currently underway both in contemporary Russia and in several regions of Eastern Ukraine (p. 526). He is also critical of Polish right-wing radicalism. He devoted one of the subsections of the book to a comparison of the Bandera cult with other authoritarian and totalitarian leadership cults (pp. 526–29). In his description of the cult surrounding Polish right-wing politician Roman Dmowski, Rossoliński-Liebe asserts that the manner in which Dmowski was commemorated by the Polish diaspora during the Cold War is very similar to the Ukrainian diaspora’s veneration of Bandera:

Like the Bandera worshipers, Dmowski admirers have denied or diminished the anti-Semitic and extremist views expressed by him and the Endecja movement and have prized his patriotism and his devotion to the process of establishing a nation state. They have also propagated distorted nationalist versions of Polish history. They have denied the Polish involvement in the Holocaust and have presented the Poles as tragic but brave heroes and martyrs, and the victims of their neighbors, in particular Germans and Russians (p. 527).

Rossoliński-Liebe compares the Ustaša cult of Ante Pavelić in independent Croatia with the cult of Bandera and the OUN in Ukraine after 1991 (p. 529). It is significant that the Ustaša cult became very popular against the backdrop of the war for independence and the rule of President Franjo Tudjman. At that time, Serbs came to be referred to as “Četnici” and Croatians as “Ustaše” in the propaganda of the warring parties. We are currently witnessing something similar happening in connection to the conflict in the Donbas, where the Ukrainian army and volunteer battalions are often called “banderites”. As Croatia moved forward towards integration into the

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61 Unfortunately, Portnov did not specify exactly what he meant by the term “integral nationalism”; see Andrii Portnov, “Kontekstualizatsiia Stepana Bandery”, *Strasti za Banderoi* (Kyiv: Grani-T, 2010), 392.
EU and NATO, the Croatian state authorities had to renounce the cult of the Ustaše and their leader. Although this was a very painful process, it brought results. It is no longer possible for any respectable Croatian politician to praise Pavelić or to use the Ustaša greeting “Ready for the Homeland” (“Za dom spremni!”). It seems to me that the situation regarding the struggle with aggressive nationalism is better in Croatia not only because the Croatian state had a more favorable starting position and more competent politicians but also because the Ustaše received their statehood from Hitler and actively collaborated with the Nazis until the end of the war. By contrast, the members of the OUN, even though the OUN was a variant of East European fascism whose members killed Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians who did not share their views, also in part became victims of the Nazi occupation regime. For this reason it is sometimes very difficult to explain to the layperson that it is possible to be an ideological fascist and simultaneously a victim of the Nazi SD, to spend time in a Gestapö prison or concentration camp and even to die there.

At times Rossoliński-Liebe interprets the OUN and UPA in a very specific way, comparing them with other nationalist movements and partisan armies in Europe. For example, he accuses Polish intellectuals Mieczysław and Ksawery Pruszyński, who compared the relationship between the Ukrainian nationalist movement (including its radical-right segment) and the Polish state with the British-Irish or Spanish-Catalonian analogy, of “romanticizing” the OUN. But why exactly should this qualify as “romanticization”? The IRA, which in many respects can be compared to the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), also included activists who initially fought London for independence and later began to sympathize with the ideas of fascism and Benito Mussolini. One such example was Eoin O’Duffy. In 1930 he founded the Army Comrades Association. Members of this society wore blue shirts and, like members of the OUN before 1943, greeted one another with the “Roman salute”. O’Duffy’s men fought in Spain on Franco’s side and attempted to collaborate with the Nazis during World War II.62

Rossoliński-Liebe is inclined to compare the UPA to the “Forest Brothers” in the occupied Baltic states (p. 532). In parallel, he avoids comparing the UPA to the Polish partisans. In Ukraine and amongst the Ukrainian diaspora it is currently very fashionable to compare the UPA with the Polish Home Army (AK). In my view this approach is not quite justified, since the founders of the AK were representatives of the Polish government-in-exile, which was not comprised exclusively of right-wing and radical-right-wing figures. Bandera’s UPA on the other hand was founded as a military formation of the OUN-B. Later on its ranks were joined by many people holding different views, including peasants who lacked a clear political or world-view orientation. It would be more accurate to compare the “early UPA” (1943–44) to the Polish National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ). The founders of that partisan movement were on the radical right. The NSZ was notorious for its anti-Semitic slogans and murders of Jews. Like the OUN, the AK and NSZ in the Polish underground tried to keep control over the auxiliary German-organized “blue police”. Finally, like the OUN, after the Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad the NSZ came to see not Nazi Germany but the USSR as the main enemy.

Rossoliński-Liebe takes a sharply critical approach to the cult of the OUN, UPA, and the SS “Galicia” division in Ukraine and among the Ukrainian diaspora. But what is striking here is that he discusses this subject very much from the perspective of an outsider; nor does he offer Ukrainian society any suggestions for a way out of this trap. As Stirlitz put it in the popular Soviet TV series, “It’s always easier to criticize and get angry. Putting forward a reasonable program of action is always harder”. By contrast, the Polish historian Tomasz Stryjek offers very interesting advice on how to handle the OUN and UPA heritage and on how it might be combined with, for example, elements of the Soviet past. Stryjek outlines his vision for a new national narrative in which:

the role of hero, victim, criminal, and witness would be carried out by separate individuals, rather than by nations or organizations as a whole [my emphasis].

63 “Policja Granatowa”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bC5cohHjwg.
The same individuals can be evaluated in different ways in different periods of their biography. There would be obvious criminals—both those for whom this was the only role they played in their life, and those who sooner or later themselves became victims. And the heroes [of this narrative] would be those who saved the lives of other people, irrespective of the group belonging or the role played by those whom they saved.64

This approach would be equally well suited to the Ukrainian case, it seems to me.

To sum up: this is not an ideal book, but it is to be welcomed as the first scholarly biography of OUN leader Stepan Bandera. Post-Soviet Ukrainian scholarship has yet to reach the methodological level enabling the production of serious scholarly work on this subject. The scholars writing critical histories of the OUN and UPA either live or spend most of their time outside Ukraine. I hope that this situation will soon change, and that no amount of legislative acts65 or threats by radicals66 will succeed in arresting this process of change. The historical field in Ukraine frequently suffers from an inability to separate text from author. In this connection I would recommend that Rossoliński-Liebe’s critics first read his book, so as to form their own opinion of his work and then, even better, to write their own book on the subject! It is my hope that the publication of this book and, perhaps, its future translation into Ukrainian, will serve not to intensify the old conflict between radicals, which has already brought bloody consequences in the Donbas, but to stimulate scholarly academic discussions—Ukraine’s own version of the Polish debates over the tragedy at Jedwabne.

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